Daily Report

Latin America

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Cuba

Further Reportage on Three Arrested Miami Men

Outside Reports Cited

FL1001135992 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1000 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Citing relatives and members of counterrevolutionary circles, reports by the EFE, NOTIMEX, and AFP news agencies have confirmed that the team of infiltrators recently captured in Cardenas carried out training for terrorist activities in Florida. These sources say that the three men had trained for months in the Everglades in Florida, according to remarks made by relatives of the three arrested men.

AFP quotes Daniel Santovenia, one of the participants in the thwarted Bay of Pigs invasion and father of the arrested man of the same name. Santovenia has acknowledged that his son trained for several months to infiltrate Cuba and start a sort of guerrilla war in the mountains. Santovenia explained to THE MIAMI HERALD: For months, he told me he was training with his friends in armed exercises at a paramilitary camp.

For his part, Hector Alfonso of the Nationalist Insurrectional Directorate [Directorio Insurreccional Nacionalista] told NOTIMEX that Daniel Santovenia Fernandez and Pedro de la Caridad Alvarez belonged to that group, although they did not want to involve it in the incursion into Cuba. Santovenia, Alvarez, and Eduardo Diaz Betancourt were captured after landing in Cuba with guns and incendiary devices.

Meanwhile, in an unusual communique sent to AFP, a Miami-based organization that claims it is a defender of human rights, Human Rights in Cuba, asks for mediation to save the lives of the arrested men, no matter the cause or circumstance that led them to their current situation. It seems that the humanism of the cynical counterparts of the small Cuban groups does not extend to the men, women, and children in Cuba who might be victims of the terrorists trained under nose of the FBI.

Although Washington says it considers illegal the attempts made by paramilitary groups of anti-Cuban exiles to attack Cuba, AFP notes that the Alpha-66 organization has asserted that it trains members in the Everglades and other organizations have taken responsibility for missions to Cuba in recent years.

Man Arrested, Interrogated

FL1001155292 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1502 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] This morning, Ministry of Interior [Minint] forces, helped by the populace, arrested and are interrogating the murderer Luis Miguel Almeida Perez, who was identified by First Sergeant Rolando Perez Quincosa. Perez Quincosa was seriously injured during the thuggish attack. During the criminal act, which took place in the early morning of 9 January, three Minint soldiers were traitorously and vilely murdered while fulfilling their duty at the Tarara Naval Base.

Meanwhile, the people continued to show their sorrow and indignation today as they passed in front of the coffins of the three soldiers placed at the lobby of the Minint main building. The funeral of the three combatants who fell defending the revolution will be held in the Revolutionary Armed Forces pantheon at Colon Cemetery at 1500 today. Cuban television will broadcast this ceremony at 2030 tonight.

'Main Perpetrator' Arrested

FL1001182692 Havana Radio Progreso Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Communique issued by the Interior Ministry; place and date not given]

[Text] At about 0300 on 10 January, as a result of information provided by the public, fugitive Luis Miguel Almeida Perez was arrested in a house in Mariel Municipality, where he had gone with the aim of illegally leaving the country to escape revolutionary justice. At the time of his arrest, he was bearing one of the pistols stolen from the murdered combatants. In his initial statements, Almeida Perez admitted that he was the main perpetrator of these abominable crimes.

Other individuals, who had participated in the murder of the three Interior Ministry combatants and seriously wounded others, were arrested at the same time. The arrest of other suspects is pending. The weapons that had been stolen were recovered at a house in San Miguel del Padron and a place on the coast where they had been hidden by the criminals. The state security organs and the National Revolutionary Police began investigating the arrested people in order to turn them over to the courts as soon as possible.

Once again, the combative behavior of the populace in the face of a terrorist counterrevolutionary crime such as this one, which has shocked our people and cost the lives of several of their best sons, has made possible the quick arrest of the murderers and show that there will be no tolerance or refuge for those who attack the sacred interests of the nation and the revolution.

Signed, Interior Ministry

'Murderer' Sought

FL1101144092 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1255 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Excerpts] The indignation of the people over the events of last Thursday are such that we wanted to provide information to all those listening in the various provinces on the search and capture of another of the murderers involved in the event we have been reporting on. The assassin is being sought at this moment in Manzanillo. His name is Pedro Marcelino de la Rosa

Guerra. The people, together with the Council of Defense which was mobilized early this morning, have been searching for him. Pedro Marcelino de la Rosa Guerra is 49 years old and is white. [passage omitted] He was a worker of the Casa Blanca Hotel.

Latest reports from the Interior Ministry lead us to believe that two of his brothers, who were not at their homes, and one of his sisters-in-laws, are with this individual. These persons are: Enrique de la Rosa, known as Chucho, Enrique's wife, Juana; and Jose de la Rosa Guerrra, neighbor of Thomas Barrero Pinal in Manzanillo. [passage omitted]

I repeat that according to information obtained in Manzanillo from Officer Jose Manuel Parra, the intensified search has been taking place since early this morning.

Fugitive Arrested

FL1101020792 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0100 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Today at 1520, 10 January, 19-year-old Eric Salmeron Mendoza was captured in a house in the Mariel Municipality. Salmeron, who is unemployed, was identified as one of the men who, on the morning of 9 January, perpetrated the attack on the Tarara Naval Base where three Ministry of the Interior soldiers were murdered.

Signed: Interior Ministry

Another Fugitive Arrested

FL1101173192 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] With the activation of Granma's unique surveillance system and the support of the masses, one of the fugitive perpetrators of the murders committed at the Tarara Naval Base has been captured. These crimes cost the lives of three Interior Ministry soldiers.

Pedro Marcelino de la Rosa Guerra, accompanied by two of his brothers, was captured in a place known as Altos de la Habanita in the mountain municipality of Bartolome Maso Marquez.

Interior Minister Comments

FL1101155692 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1255 GMT 11 Jan 92

["Exclusive" interview with General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, minister of the interior, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] During an exclusive interview with this news station, Corps General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, minister of the interior, said that the individuals involved in this horrendous crime were arrested in less than 25 hours.

[Colome] We could explain this in a very graphic way. In less than 25 hours the individuals involved in the horrendous crime were already arrested. What better example could I give you of reaction than that which the soldiers of the Ministry of Interior have themselves given. [words indistinct] We were able to capture them alive even though they were [word indistinct] we were able to capture them alive. They were not beaten or hurt, they were caught alive. They have a sense of neither reason nor morals.

[Reporter] Are you satisfied with the operation?

[Colome] In one way I am, and in another I am not. The cost has been high. The operation has been successful, but the price we have paid has been too high. We are not interested in paying that price despite the success of the operation. The life of a human being is worth a lot more. What we are confronting, and our comrades know this, is that this is going to be a difficult year. It is going to be difficult for the ministry, difficult for the [word indistinct], but above all for the Interior Ministry.

[Reporter] The reaction of the people shows that they offer their support.

[Colome] That is the support we have received. They have given us their support since last night. [words indistinct]

[Reporter] Thank you very much, Minister.

Trial Ends

FL1101035792 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 0025 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] This afternoon the death penalty was requested for the three terrorists who on 29 December clandestinely infiltrated our country through the Sierrita region in the Municipality of Cardenas in Matanzas Province with certain terrorist plans against the economy and public places. The trial of Case No. 1 of 1992 has been in session since this morning at the Havana City Provincial People's Tribunal in the section which deals with crimes against the security of the state. The trial is prosecuting the following: Eduardo Diaz Betancourt, Daniel Candelario Santovenia Fernandez, and Pedro de la Caridad Alvarez, all residents of Miami.

During the trial evidence was presented linking counterrevolutionary groups operating out of the United States with groups which under the false pretense of the defense of human rights, try to internally act against our revolution and our people. The accused had the names and addresses of specific Havana residents in case they needed to turn to these people.

The brilliant report by Dr. Jose Luis Toledo Santander, prosecutor professor, detailed the charges on which the three prisoners are accused. These include, acts against the security of the state, such as sabotage, terrorism, and subversive propaganda, among others. All these charges were amply demonstrated in addition to the testimoy

and physical evidence presented as well as the confessions of the accused while being interrogated by the investigators and in the tribunal which today judged them.

The prosecutor's presentation emphasized how the accused Eduardo Diaz Betancourt made contact with the so-called counterrevolutionary group L Command, prepared, organized, and obtained all the means and required equipment such as weapons and explosives in order to infiltrate the Cuban national territory and later plant them in theaters, restaurants, and other economic places in preparation for more harmful activities. It was also completely proven that they had weapons and explosives capable of producing intoxication, fires, and panic at public gatherings. The terrorists also brought a number of cassette tapes with messages. These were given to them when they left Marathon Key, Florida, to be played in Cuba with the goal of subverting order. They planned to use the tapes after attacking and forcing into obedience workers from radio stations such as Radio Progreso and Radio Reloj.

He also pointed out that Eduardo Diaz Betancourt was closely tied to the groups that welcomed him as an expert on the coasts of Matanzas and could facilitate the entrance of infiltrations. Eduardo left the country clandestinely nine months ago but before he left he was tried for crimes of fraud, theft, [word indistinct], illegal trafficking of currency, and also has a terrible record of social behavior in the Matanosas residential neighborhood.

Daniel Candelario Santovenia was tried in the United States on more than one occasion. He was imprisoned for two years for brawling in a bar. His training with the purpose to return to Cuba is known.

Pedro de la Caridad Alvarez, who left the country when he was six years old with his family, is a drug addict and his training in camps to return to Cuba is also known.

I also want to point out the outstanding actions of the defense made by Dr. Elena America Elias, who represented Daniel Candelario Santovenia and Pedro de la Caridad Alverez; and Dr. Jorge Luis Gabriel who defended Eduardo Diaz.

These three men formed the infiltration team that on 29 December clandestinely entered our country because according to them they knew that the people were very unhappy and wanted to give them all the support they needed. But what they found is that the people participate in the Unified Vigilance System together with the border patrol soldiers. Today, the people were there throughout the trial. This is the way the accused were greeted when the trial ended. [Crowd yells: "Murderers"]

Three Sentenced to Death

FL1101161092 Havana Radio Progreso Network in Spanish 1559 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] The provincial court of Havana City has sentenced Eduardo Diaz Betancourt, Daniel Candelario Santovenia Fernandez, and Pedro de la Caridad Alvarez Pedroso to death by shooting. These individuals were captured while they tried to infiltrate national territory to sabotage industries, public establishments, tourist centers, and public concentrations, as well as commit other acts against the security of the country.

Today, the Supreme People's Tribunal will decide and possibly pronounce an appeal for the accused men.

Events Reviewed

PA1301001592 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 0000 GMT 12 Jan 92

[From the "new" weekly review and commentary segment by Victor Perez Galdos and Roberto Morejon]

[Text] [Galdos] As of 11 January we will begin a new segment within the "Revista Informativa de la Noche" newscast. Every Saturday we will analyze what has happened in Cuba over the previous seven days. For this I am in the company of Roberto Morejon, the national commentator during our "Revista Informativa de la Noche" newscast.

Welcome to the review, Roberto, although you are already a part of it, of course.

[Morejon] Thank you very much, Victor, and thank you to Diana who has given me her place on "La Revista Informativa de la Noche" so that I could join you here. Well, Victor, I believe you were going to make an introduction and I interrupted you.

[Galdos] Not really. Now, as we analyze the past seven days, we see a series of events that have shaken Cuba and international public opinion. I believe you could comment on these two major events, which have affected Cuba's everyday life.

[Morejon] That is right, Victor. There is no doubt that these events—or at least one of these events—has even included the sorrow of death. I am specifically talking about the murder of three public order officers, just on the outskirts of Havana, at the Tarara Naval Base. There, a group of counterrevolutionaries tried to leave the country illegally. They were unsuccessful and killed three policemen. As we speak, a fourth policeman is on the verge of death from the wounds he suffered at the hands of these counterrevolutionaries.

[Galdos] There is one fact that has shaken Cuban public opinion, and that is that the policemen had been taken by surprise and even tied up. They killed them while they were tied up. This has truly moved our people. On this, I would like to tell our listeners that the perpetrators have been arrested. The arrests are the result of swift

mobilization of Cuban security agencies in cooperation with the people; the seven people who participated in the vicious crime are under arrest. I would also like to comment on what General Raul Castro, the Cuban first vice president, said during the funeral services for the victims. He pointed out that all this activity is related to the plans of counterrevolutionary movements abroad and the members of minuscule counterrevolutionary groups inside the country, and to plans to destabilize the country and the revolution.

[Morejon] There is no doubt, Victor, that we can even relate this event to another event, the infiltration of a group of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, who currently live in the United States—specifically in Miami—along the northern coast of Matanzas Province. They infiltrated Cuba during the last few days of 1991 to commit several sabotage operations. They had very clearly outlined the actions they were to carry out against several economic targets—especially in public places in the western part of the country—to create general chaos and panic in Cuba. Their intention was to have this chaos and this confusion create instability for the Cuban revolution, for the power of the people and the power of the revolution.

The Cuban people consider this infiltration as.... [pauses] All Cubans have condemned this infiltration. The summary trial against these three infiltrators has just ended. Here in Havana we all witnessed the crowds of people who spontaneously gathered outside the courthouse, in front of the building where the trial took place, to condemn the criminal intentions of these infiltrators. I would like to clarify to our listeners, Victor, that the infiltrators received their military training outside Miami, with no trouble at all. Furthermore, the press in that U.S. city frequently carries reports on the training of these counterrevolutionary elements of Cuban origin, by units such as Alpha-66, and this other one, to which this group that just infiltrated Cuba belongs, which calls itself the Liberation Command [Comandos de Liberacion]. Thanks to action by the security agencies and the Cuban people, they were stopped before they could complete their mission.

[Galdos] There are also news dispatches on this event which highlight statements by the father of one of the infiltrators, who said that his son had been training in Miami for this purpose.

[Morejon] That is right. They confirmed the press agency reports in statements they made during the trial that just took place here in Havana. It should also be said that they also mentioned that some members of these Liberation Commands are declared CIA agents. They themselves—those captured in this terrorist action who have been tried in Cuba—admit that there are CIA agents among these so-called Liberation Commands.

We must also mention during this segment, that at the conclusion of the trial, the sentence of death by firing squad was requested. At this time we are waiting for a specific procedure to be completed, which normally takes place here in Cuba whenever a sentence such as this is requested. Various instances must be notified of this, to insure compliance with all procedural guarantees. They will examine all the allegations, the charges, and the evidence presented, and during the week of 13-17 January they will have to determine if they agree with the request. As higher authorities they must decide if the request by the attorney general's office is upheld. The case, as our constitution states, will be forwarded to the Council of State, which will have the last word in this case.

[Galdos] Roberto, we have mentioned two very important events in Cuba, but there is still one more to mention quickly that is taking place right now in our country. This event is the tripartite conference on the October Caribbean crisis. This time it is taking place in Havana, almost 30 years after the event, which almost led humanity into a world nuclear war.

[Morejon] This type of meeting is very important. This is the third meeting on the issue. The first took place in Moscow and the second was held on the Caribbean island of Antigua. Delegations from the three main countries involved in the events of the sixties take part in these meetings. I am speaking of the United States, the USSR—or the former USSR—and Cuba.

Victor, according to reports we have, I believe that in fact very interesting analyses are taking place at the meetings, although they are being held behind closed doors. We have learned that very interesting deliberations are taking place, because the stated purpose of the Cuban delegation and Cuban President Fidel Castro, who is attending the meetings, is to learn all possible lessons and to dig up the roots of this conflict, to precisely prevent this type of conflict from happening again in the history of humanity, in the future of humanity; so that humanity does not suffer the danger of extinction that is did during the sixties.

[Galdos] Well Roberto, we have commented a little about the most important events and developments that have taken place in Cuba over the past seven days. I will be expecting you next Saturday, live and direct during our evening review, so that we can examine what happens during the next few days in Cuba.

[Morejon] I accept the invitation.

'Anti-Cuban Campaign' Noted

FL1001155892 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1255 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Orlando Contreras commentary: "Our Opinion"]

[Text] The murder of three Interior Ministry soldiers by counterrevolutionary elements; the infiltration of terrorists trained in Florida, United States; and an increase in the anti-Cuban campaign by the U.S. Government are not unrelated acts. When you promote a campaign

against Cuba, when you try to create an atmosphere of triumphalist hysteria outside Cuba concerning old and new plans to crush the revolution, or when you tolerate, if not encourage, the training and movements of terrorist elements residing in the United States, it is evident that the criminal actions against our country are being encouraged by commission and by omission.

The cowardly murder of the three Interior Ministry soldiers is a reflection of that climate being created against Cuba. Of course, those who are behind this campaign, those who manipulate the strings of hysteria, those who believe that our people will be demoralized or frightened by these crimes, do not know our people, and have not learned a thing in these 30 years of struggle about the historical basis that sustains the revolution and the attitude of the people. Confronted by these cowardly crimes and the vile campaigns against our country, the fighting spirit of the people grows, the pride of the people is inflamed, and their patriotism is increased to its ultimate level. The unity of revolutionaries, patriots, and the great majority of the Cuban people is reinforced.

Training Viewed

PA1201200492 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 1400 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Roberto Morejon commentary]

[Text] The abundant fauna living in the Everglades swamps in the southern U.S. state of Florida have been the mute witness for over 30 years to the continuous military training of Cuban counterrevolutionaries. Guided by such notorious leaders as Andres Nazario Argen at the helm of Alpha 66, individuals ranging from former members of Fulgencio Batista's army to stale veterans of the foiled Bay of Pigs invasion, have been trained in terrorist techniques in this area, not far from Miami.

With the passage of time, the periods of training have had setbacks due to the difficulties of those individuals who dared to infiltrate Cuba to unleash their criminal actions. Nonetheless, individuals of the nature of Nazario Argen insist on periodically training Cuban descent mercenaries, and—in order to do this—invoke what they think are some results of their efforts.

In fact, the terrorists sent from Miami were never able to consummate all of their purposes in Cuba. In the last three decades, however, they have inflicted many casualties and material damage on economic and social installations. Included among the many individuals who form part of the counterrevolutionaries stationed in Miami—they have nothing to do with those who honestly ask for a dialogue with Havana—there are individuals such as Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles, who are the masterminds of an act of sabotage against a Cubana Airlines airplane in 1976, which left 73 dead.

The terrorist groups of Cuban descent have worked in the United States without any problems for the past three decades because they are the illegitimate children of the CIA of that country. They were rejected during their frantic campaign of anti-Cuban violence when they attacked installations on U.S. soil in order to kill a Cuban diplomat at the United Nations and blew up an art gallery displaying paintings by Cuban artists.

The irrationality of these sectors who imitate fascists has led them to harbor hopes of a return of capitalism in Cuba due to its serious economic situation.

To accelerate this process, the extreme rightists established in Miami have just sent a band of individuals trained in sabotage to the northern coast of Matanzas Province. Once again, U.S. territory is used to attack a neighboring nation. Washington says it considers the attempted incursions by the exiled paramilitary groups against Cuba illegal. We would then have to ask: Why does Washington allow them to train and then leave?

Raul Castro, Leaders Honor Murdered Soldiers

FL1001230992 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2032 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] The funeral procession with the mortal remains of our three murdered soldiers is traveling along the main avenues of Havana, from Revolution Square to the Colon Cemetery. A very large group representing the people from the capital, and state and government leaders, as well as friends and family of the fallen soldiers, accompany the bodies of Rafael Guevara Borges, Orosman Duenas Valero, and Yuriy Gomez Reinoso, who were vilely murdered by counterrevolutionary elements.

Army General Raul Castro, second secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba and minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, took part in the final honor guard detail in the lobby of the main Interior Ministry building. Corps General Abelardo Colome Ibarra and Politburo members Carlos Aldana, Abel Prieto, Jorge Lezcano, and Roberto Robaina, also participated in the final honor guard for our martyrs.

Raul Castro Speaks

PA1101040092 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 0110 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Speech by Army General Raul Castro, second secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba and minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, at the funeral ceremony for three murdered Interior Ministry soldiers, at the Colon Cemetery in Havana on 10 January—recorded]

[Text] Family members of those fallen at the Tarara Naval Base, revolutionary comrades, compatriots:

I could.... [changes thought] Let us begin by saying, as the poet said: We are saddened, enraged. That is how we feel. These deaths are not a predictable absurdity. The words of the poet could have been written to fit this occasion. Even the toughest, the most hardened, those

among us who have lived the most ill-fated moments of our history, have found themselves immersed in perplexity, in a stupor. How is it possible that a barbaric act such as this one can still take place? But, yes, it is. We are facing it. It is these three young lives, savagely destroyed, because they could not be bought, because they could not be silenced, because they could not be turned into accomplices. Because they were the type who rather stop living before ceasing to be revolutionaries. [applause] The type who will have to be killed by those who try to take away their fatherland. That is why we are not the only ones afflicted by this horrendous crime this evening. One of the explanations for this crime could be the unfortunate irrational act of a madman. We are facing an act that is, more than anything else, political; a counterrevolutionary action because of its motives and consequences.

We are, once more, the virile and energetic people, whose tears made the injustice tremble, and today overwhelms the culprits with fear. On whom is this generous blood, once again spilled by our youth, to fall? Let us answer, at a time such as this, with the unanimous voice of patriots, with a conscience enlightened by the lessons of history, from a reflective and mature point of view, beyond the pain and the just anger that gathers us here. These lives, prematurely immolated, would not have been threatened—as are so many other lives of our comrades fulfilling the task of defending our borders, preserving socialism, and protecting the resources of the people throughout the whole country during this crucial time—if the U.S. Government would not receive as heroes, would not shelter, would not turn into pilgrims in search of liberty every pariah, every unpatriotic person, every adventurer, every degenerate, or every common assassin who arrives on their coasts from Cuba, even when their hands are bloodied, as has happened so many times. They continue to use all kinds of deceptions and tricks to block, restrict, and prevent the possibility of an organized and legal migratory flow. Or as has happened recently, they react to Cuba's sovereign decision to ease the policy of temporary travel to that country, by virtually making it impossible. Since any traitor, anyone full of resentment, any mediocre person, any assassin, knows that their defection will be rewarded, there are always people capable of not only denigrating their country, of not only harming the nation, but also they are even capable of murder when they fail to achieve their goals. The members of the traitor groups, established like a cyst [enquistados] in economic and political spheres of the U.S. society, which from their positions promote and favor desertion and betrayal, share the responsibility for crimes such as this. The splinter groups which within our country adopt the diverse facets of imperialist counterrevolutionary strategy, are also morally guilty, more guilty every time. Those who join the anti-Cuban campaigns and are filled with boldness seem to believe that they will have better luck than that of their predecessors in the sixties.

Meanwhile, let us hope that they will look and see in time the parasites of the classless scum, the well-to-do, those soft and corrupt, and the fifth column of pseudo-intellectuals who are on the prowl for a lucky strike to gain power, as they have seen others do in crumpled East Europe, willing to even do a great favor for Yankee imperialism and make the Cuban Government responsible, together with the U.S. Government, for the historical fight which Marti had foreseen and which we have sustained for more than 30 years.

The images of our comrades, whom we bury today, were machinegunned in cold blood, when they could not make even the smallest defense gesture, nor even move, because they had been tied up, brings to mind the atrocious crimes of the counterrevolutionary groups, the henchmen of tyranny, the CIA-trained torturers in Latin America, and the death squads that freely operate in several countries on the continent.

Above all, this demonstrates the perverse and merciless nature of the counterrevolution. [applause] How many dreams, how many rightful hopes, how many healthy and possible goals—thanks to the fact that we have a fatherland, that we have the revolution, and that we have socialism—were cut off when these young combatants to whom we say farewell this evening, were murdered? Savage actions such as this one, several times over, could have cost the lives of men, women, elderly people, and children. This is what the terrorists captured in Cardenas wanted to do. Their summary trial is taking place right now. [applause] They would haven taken pleasure in the suffering of our fathers, our brothers, our wives, our daughters if capitalism were to be reestablished in our country and along with it imperialistic domination was reestablished. In Cuba this cannot now take place as long as at the helm of our people, enriched and strengthened by the new generations, continues the historical leadership headed by Comrade Fidel. [applause] This will not happen later or ever, because of the continual and immortal renewal, as Che [Guevara] said when he referred to the eternal presence of Camilo [Cienfuegos], the picture of our people will always be one of men capable of fulfilling their duties to the death, such as Yuriy Gomez Reinoso, Orosman Duenas Valero, and Rafael Guevara Borges. [applause]

The people, in a long and unending line since the early hours have rendered tribute, all day long, to the fallen combatants with an impressive silence which really constitutes a war cry against the traitors, a combat cry, a cry of victory. The enemies of our people believe that.... [chanting and applause] If the enemies of our people believe that they can dominate us because others have abandoned us, if they believe that they can divide us, if they believe that we are going to go backwards because we have difficulties, because with have problems, and assume that they can scare us, if they do not learn their lesson and persist with their provocations and atrocities, such as the one that took place at the Tarara Naval Base, every counterrevolutionary inside and abroad beware. Those who are in the United States currently gathering signatures to ask the Bush government to authorize

military action against Cuba, finally beware: He who lives by the sword, dies by the sword. [applause]

We wish to live in peace, we wish a peaceful life for every nation. We have created a great pool of talent and have enough strength to sustain unprecedented creative efforts, to resist and overcome the trials of the special period in times of peace, yet we do not relax for a single minute our readiness to conduct the war of all the people which could only end with our victory. Those people in Miami who are recruiting cannon fodder and who are using radio transmissions to agitate the domestic traitors, beware: We will not hesitate to reinstate, if it becomes necessary, the revolutionary tribunals. [applause]

To the mothers, and to those dear to the comrades who today we bury, we can also assure you that the tombs of our combatants will never be desecrated. [applause] To Yuriy, Orosman, and Rafael: Farewell dear brothers. Rest in peace, with your example we will continue our work together with these fighting Mambises who now begin to saddle the horses. Eternal glory to the heroes and martyrs of the fatherland. [crowd responds: "Glory"]

People Express Sympathy

PA1201141292 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0100 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Our editorial room continues to receive messages, notes, and telegrams reflecting the people's feelings toward the incidents at the Tarara Naval Base at dawn on 9 January. One of those messages, which was sent by the Cuban Ecumenical Council, reads textually as follows:

As believers of Jesus Christ, we feel urged by the word of God to rejoice with those who are joyful and weep with those who are sad. In these sad moments, when many are shedding tears of sorrow, especially the relatives of the three young soldiers who were despicably murdered, the Cuban Ecumenical Council voices its solidarity with the sorrow that all our people are feeling.

Incidents such as these, inspired by hatred, ambition, and selfishness, reinforce our determination to work and struggle for peace and justice and ensure that our people's legitimate right to build a more just and humane socialist society is respected.

The Ecumenical Council's message ends as follows: We pray to the God of life to show his love and power among us and allow all those who are hungry and thirsty for justice to satiate their desires.

Our editorial room also received notes from the Las Tunas branch of (UNIAT) [expansion unknown], Ilusion de Vivir Grandparents' Club in Punta Alegre, Karl Marx Cement Enterprise in Jovellanos, Association of Residents and Descendants of Haitians in Cuba, Jose Marti Contingent of Internationalist Builders, the medical brigade that is fulfilling a mission in Bluefields, Nicaragua, the camping enterprise team in Ciego de Avila, Santiago Havana Hotel in Colon, Playa Giron Museum in Matanzas, [word indistinct] number 10 of Santa Clara, and the Yo Me Quedo Camp of mobilized workers in Melena del Sur.

Pioneers and youths also sent us messages. Among them are the Revolucion Socialista de Octubre School in Sibanicu, the Salvador Cisneros Betancourt [word indistinct], and the Luis Ramirez Lopez Crafts School in Nueva Paz. The most recent telegrams received include those from the Municipal Gastronomy Enterprise in Palmira, the 1 January Plant, and the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution in Cueto Municipality.

Haiti

U.S. Ambassador's Visit to Assembly Reported

FL1101012392 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in French 1800 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Excerpts] Yesterday afternoon, U.S. Ambassador Alvin P. Adams paid a courtesy visit to parliament. He made a point of personally greeting the parliamentary delegation which returned to the country after a 48-hour visit in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela. Mr. Adams, known as Bourik Chaje [Loaded Donkey], spoke for nearly two hours with the delegation and, according to the observers, the designation of Rene Theodore as prime minister was included in the points addressed in the conversation. Jean-Marie Ferari spoke with Bourik Chaje as he was leaving the parliament.

[Begin Ferari recording] According to what he said, the American ambassador, Mr. Alvin Adams, also known as Bourik Chaje, paid a visit to the parliament this afternoon. He greeted the arriving parliamentary delegation that returned from Caracas. This welcome lasted almost two hours because of the lengthy conversation between the U.S. ambassador and the members of the parliamentary delegation. Certainly, they talked about the designation of Rene Theodore who would become the new prime minister if this appointment is ratified, according to the senators and deputies who were outside. We broached this question with the ambassador as he left the chamber. Bourik Chaje said Washington does not have a candidate. His country will cooperate with Theodore if he is ratified by the National Assembly. [passage omitted]

When asked about the possibility that the parliament would not ratify the choice of Theodore, the American ambassador answered that this was a very hypothetical question.

May we point out that this is not the first visit of the American ambassador to the chamber. According to observers within the chamber, Mr. Adams has played a significant role in trying to find a solution to the current Haitian crisis. [end recording]

Senators Interviewed Upon Return From Caracas

FL1001163292 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in French 1200 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Begin recording] [Jean-Marie Ferari] It was on 9 January at around 1500 GMT when the parliamentary delegation to Caracas returned to Haiti. The parliamentarians looked more tired than satisfied with their mission on their arrival at the airport. At least they did not look as people who had reached a final solution. According to Senator Dejean Belizaire, who we interviewed upon his arrival at the airport, the parliamentary delegation traveled to Caracas to find a solution that was satisfactory to everyone. What results have they achieved toward this goal? Let us listen to Senator Belizaire.

[Belizaire] Well, we indeed went to Caracas. We met with Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide and we met with members of the OAS mission as well. We held talks with them. We emphasized our viewpoints. We think we can say that the final results confirmed that Reverend Father Aristide verified what Mr. Ocampo said when he came here: that if the negotiations succeed, he would accept only Rene Theodore as possible prime minister.

[Ferari] The choice of Rene Theodore as prime minister. But Senator Eddy Dupiton, who was a member of the delegation, told us more.

[Dupiton] I believe all that was discussed in the name of [words indistinct], finally, we were continuing.... [changes thought] We had an appointment to continue discussions about this, and to get guarantees on what should result from the choice of prime minister. But finally, it is this proposal that still remains on the table.

[Ferari] The nomination of Rene Theodore as prime minister is an official choice now. There is no more risk of confusion, according to Senator Dejean Belizaire. What exactly will be done when the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies consider ratifying this choice?

[Belizaire] At present, we think—as we were negotiating—that we must meet with the other Haitian authorities, especially the president of the executive branch—the Haitian Armed Forces is part of this executive—and other sectors of national life before we can say anything on what we will do and how the situation is progressing. [passage omitted]

Of course, the embargo has never stopped preoccupying us. It has always been a very important point for us due to the damages and the devastation that it has caused to the economy of the country, the health of the country, and the education of the people. This question was, of course, also dealt with. But as you know, the resolutions made by the OAS was a package of resolutions. So they go together. During the development of these negotiations and the results that we expect, we feel assured that the embargo will be lifted. But for the time being, we cannot say the embargo is lifted. [passage omitted]

[Ferari] The total lifting of the embargo depends on how the negotiations progress, according to all diplomatic observers we contacted. On that score, Rene Theodore, president of the National Reconstruction Movement [MRN], has been chosen as prime minister. Will Theodore have the confidence of the parliament and the other sectors that are creating events?

In the meantime, we can tell you that Theodore is 51 years old, a teacher of mathematics and physics. He was born in Ouanaminthe, in the northeastern part of the country. He returned to Haiti in March 1986 after 17 years in exile. He has been secretary general of the Unified Party of Haitian Communists and was elected president of MRN, a leftist nationalist coalition, in August 1990. In all of his statements, Theodore has always advocated a national coalition government. [end recording]

Assembly To Decide on Theodore's Nomination

FL1001215292 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Now that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide has agreed on the choice of Rene Theodore as the new Haitian prime minister, it will be the parliament's role to decide on that choice. Although the OAS mediator, Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, said Theodore could officially take office within two weeks, there are no signs yet to show how the Haitian parliamentarians will vote during the session that they must hold in the upcoming days to reach a decision on Aristide's choice.

A significant portion of the country's political sector still does not agree with the negotiations that are being held. Many of the Haitian political leaders say they do not understand why, as parliamentarians, they have agreed to negotiate with the deposed president. This is in light of the fact that it was these same parliamentarians who installed Lawyer Joseph Nerette as provisional president of Haiti on 8 October 1991.

Other people note that as at the beginning of October 1991, the reactions in the international community always come before the reactions in Haiti. The international community was the first to condemn the coup that the military staged against Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide's power and likewise, the international community has begun saying it is satisfied with the fact that the deposed president has chosen a candidate for the post of prime minister in Haiti.

The parliamentary delegation which went to Venezuela has returned to the country. National opinion has focussed its attention on the parliament to learn what will transpire at the session the Haitian parliamentarians must hold soon on the decision that resulted from the Caracas negotiations and to know how the Haitian political crisis will develop in the next days.

Deputy on Nerette's Status, Theodore Nomination

FL1101003992 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Interview with Deputy Laveaux Jean-Baptiste by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] Deputy Laveaux Jean-Baptiste thinks the choice of Rene Theodore as prime minister is feigned because there is now a provisional president in power. The deputy from the city of Aquin thinks that something needs to be done. The provisional president must resign first so the parliament can acknowledge President Aristide's authority because there cannot be two presidents or two prime ministers at the same time. [passage omitted] The deputy was asked if he was ready to ratify this choice?

[Jean-Baptiste] (?We cannot ratify it) because there cannot be two presidents. There cannot be two prime ministers either. Prior to that, Nerette must resign, (?formally say) he is not president. Aristide could then be reinstated in his position. Then, Article 137 of the Constitution could be applied. That would allow Aristide to choose Theodore officially as prime minister.

[Correspondent] Is that your personal opinion or the opinion of the entire Chamber?

[Jean-Baptiste] This is logical because a president cannot be ratified while there is an existing president. Neither may a prime minister be ratified while there is another prime minister. Indeed, there is already a prime minister and Nerette is president. Aristide must be reinstated in his post as president. I do not say.... [changes thought] He is not required to be in Haiti. Once he is reinstated as president, a choice can officially be made.

[Correspondent] Concerning the choice of Rene Theodore as prime minister, Deputy Lionel Joseph, who we met, did not want to make any comments. The Delmas [Port-au-Prince suburb] deputy thinks we must not be speaking only of a prime minister because the country is deteriorating daily without us realizing why. The National Front for Change and Democracy deputy says that Haitians must sit down and decide for themselves, settle their country's business without dictates from foreigners. [passage omitted]

OAS Mediator Interviewed on Latest Negotiations

FL1101004192 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Telephone interview with Ambassador Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, OAS negotiator, by Bernard Degraff, director of Radio Nationale in Port-au-Prince on 9 January—recorded, in French]

[Text] [Degraff] I am very pleased to have you on the phone once more for our millions of listeners. I am happy to be able to ask you this question and I am sorry to bother you at this time. It is 2100 Thursday evening, 9 January. Mr. Ramirez Ocampo, I just would like to ask you to give us your personal view of the situation after the latest round of negotiations held in Caracas. Good evening Mr. Ramirez Ocampo.

[Ramirez Ocampo] Good evening Mr. Degraff. I am happy to be able to talk with the Haitian people through Radio Nationale. Today, I am very happy because I think we are headed in the right direction to solving the crisis. After meeting in Cartagena on 14 December, the two concerned parties agreed on the choice of a prime minister. This is what was discussed during that time.

Following this agreement, President Aristide proposed 14 names to President Belizaire and President Brutus and several parlamentarians. We tried to do things properly and with the authorization of President Aristide. We asked the presidents of the two chambers to also propose names. The parliamentarians then proposed the names of Rene Theodore and Marc Bazin. Folloiwng the negotiation of the past three weeks, as you know I came to Port-au-Prince several times, and finally President Aristide officially agreed on the choice of Rene Theodore. Consequently, I do not think it will be difficult for parliament to ratify Rene Theodore.

I hope that [words indistinct] to organize a government of agreement among the majority of Haitian political parties and the largest sectors of the population. I think that a person such as Mr. Theodore; a moderate and intelligent man, a man who could, with the support of the international community, organize a government to establish constitutional order, the return of President Aristide, and the cooperation of the entire international community.

If you would allow me, Mr. Degraff, I would like to point out that the Haitians made this decision. We have only facilitated the process. All the conversations, [words indistinct] were presented by President Aristide [words indistinct] the parliamentarians, meaning that if the name of Rene Theodore was submitted for advisement and [words indistinct] agreements among Haitians, we can testify that the negotiations were held by the Haitians.

[Degraff] Mr. Ramirez Ocampo, I would like to ask you if there is an existing agenda in Caracas for the implementation of the projects?

[Ramirez Ocampo] We cannot specifically talk about an agenda yet. First, a prime minister and Article 137 of the Constitution must be ratified. Article 148, regarding the organization of the cabinet [words indistinct] chosen by the prime minister together with the president, needs to be applied. The return of President Aristide also needs to be frankly discussed [words indistinct] for a peaceful arrival, without hate, as a bearer of peace—as he said during the last meeting at Cartagena.

President Aristide's trip to Washington, together with Presidents Belizaire and Brutus also needs to be organized during the Caracas meeting. They will meet with

foreign affairs ministers to discuss the embargo problems, the reestablishment of constitutional order, the lifting of the embargo, and the initiation of sincere international aid to all the Haitian people. That is why it is necessary to work very quickly to set up a meeting between Mr. Theodore and President Aristide, as well as with the presidents of both chambers to establish an agenda.

Most of all, I am really counting on the patriotism of all the political [words indistinct] so we can reach an historical moment for Haitian and Latin American history which were organized for the first time to unanimously defend democracy and constitutional order.

[Degraff] Ambassador Ramirez Ocampo, I would like to ask you this question. It seems that Aristide has asked for the head of General Cedras and Major Joseph Michel Francois, the current commander of the police department of the metropolitan area, as a condition in preparation for his return to Port-au-Prince. [sentence as heard] What can you tell us about that?

[Ramirez Ocampo] We have told you about different proposals. We need to find an honorable solution for everyone. We still need to discuss [words indistinct] so that the solution can help reestablish constitutional order.

[Degraff] Would an honorable solution be the departure of General Cedras and of the commander of the metropolitan area?

[Ramirez Ocampo] I cannot say anything about that yet. You know that we need to negotiate all the details for the entire [words indistinct] of the Constitution.

[Degraff] In case the name proposed by Aristide is not ratified, what is the alternative?

[Ramirez Ocampo] I think that the parliament proposed the name of Rene Theodore. There should not be any difficulty for the ratification as provided in the Constitution.

Government Criticizes Mediator

PA1101022592 Paris AFP in Sanish 0100 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Port-au-Prince, 10 Jan (AFP)—The provisional government of Haiti has described as "untimely" statements by former Colombian Foreign Minister Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, OAS mediator in the Haitian crisis, that Rene Theodore will be appointed new prime minister within 15 days.

In statements to the media in Caracas on 9 January, Ramirez Ocampo said that possible prime minister Rene Theodore, "could be officially appointed within two weeks," and added that the return of deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide could take place in the days following Theodore's swearing in.

The government states, in a communique issued by the Haitian Foreign Affairs Ministry, that such statements "sow confusion and in no way favor a peaceful solution to the conflict, which is actually a domestic affair."

Theodore recently said that Father Aristide's return is part of a process "whose agenda cannot be preestablished."

Diplomatic sources close to the OAS believe that it will be impossible for Aristide to return in the near future because of the ardent hatred and political antagonism that the priest-president creates in the country.

The foreign ministry also reaffirmed the "provisional government's determination to hold serious talks with all parties who are interested in finding a solution to a crisis that has already lasted too long."

The communique adds "with bitterness" that "despite the meritorious efforts of the parliamentarians, the dead, the exodus and desolation caused by this excessive and unconventional embargo, the OAS secretary general has no plan to make a gesture, not even a humanitarian one, for the sake of the Haitian people."

"Because of this, the government will not be able to support any process that fails to explicitly take into account the living conditions of the Haitian people," the communique states.

OAS Secretary General Joao Baena Soares on 8 January said in Washington that the embargo against Haiti "is still in effect" because "it is the sole means to pressure the coup supporters" and because "it is not the cause of poverty in Haiti."

Some organizations have criticized the catastrophic effects of the embargo and, according to religious sources, this measure has killed thousands of the most vulnerable and poor members of the population.

Finally, the foreign ministry reminds diplomats accredited in Port-au-Prince that they "must refrain from making statements, as required by the Vienna Convention" and urges them to refrain from pressuring Haitian institutions.

Theodore Meets Assembly; Tensions 'Obvious'

FL1101141592 Bonaire Trans World Radio in English 1230 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] The communist leader picked to be Haiti's interim prime minister has met with parliamentary leaders. Unified Haitian Communist Party leader Rene Theodore is attempting to lay the groundwork for a possible return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. However, tensions in the parliament itself are obvious. Lawmaker Pierre-Francois Boutau waved an automatic pistol yesterday. The civil war will begin here if they try to impose on me someone I don't want, he said.

Belizaire Denies Opposing Theodore's Candidacy

PA1101210492 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 1958 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Port-au-Prince, 11 Jan (DPA)—Senate President Dejean Belizaire today ruled out the possibility of the immediate reinstatement of deposed president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

"The current situation in the country is not favorable for Aristide's return," Belizaire told DPA.

The Senate leader, along with Chamber of Deputies President Duly Brutus, headed a congressional commission that met this week in Caracas with Aristide, under OAS mediation, to seek a solution to the country's institutional crisis.

Belizaire denied press reports that he opposed the candidacy of moderate communist leader Rene Theodore for the post of prime minister, which Aristide accepted during the Caracas meeting.

The right wing politician, who is close to the soldiers who toppled Aristide on 30 September, admitted that he had been "pressured from several sectors," which he did not identify, to reject Theodore as possible successor of provisional Prime Minister Jean-Jacques Honorat, who was imposed by the coupists.

He did, however, admit his preference for right wing banker Marc Bazin as the new head of government and felt "it would be very difficult for Theodore to lead a government of national consensus because he does not meet the requirements."

The Haitian congress will resume its sessions on Monday, 13 January, following the Christmas recess. Belizaire says that the legislators will not immediately put Theodore's candidacy for prime minister to a vote.

Referring to the mediation of the OAS in Haiti, the leader of the lower chamber said that "were it not for international pressure, the situation in the country would have been easily settled."

El Salvador

Cristiani Discusses Peace Plan at News Conference

PA1001222992 San Salvador Radio El Salvador Network in Spanish 1734 GMT 10 Jan 92

[News conference by President Alfredo Cristiani with foreign and domestic reporters and unidentified moderator at the Presidential Palace in San Salvador—live]

[Text] [Moderator] Question by Mr. Ernesto Rivas of AL DIA.

[Rivas] Good afternoon, Mr. President. I would like to know about the Armed Forces reduction plan. Yesterday it was said....

[Cristiani, interrupting] What was that?

[Rivas] I would like to know about the Armed Forces reduction plan. Jorge Shafik Handal said yesterday that it was one of the topics that became a stumbling block to the final agreement, because the Armed Forces reduction plan had not been presented. I would also like you to explain how the amnesty is going to work and who will benefit?

[Cristiani] First, the reduction plan has nothing to do with any agreement that may be reached at the New York meeting. The agreement that deals with the reduction plan was based on the criteria set forth in the reduction plan. [sentence as heard] It is starting from that criteria that the government will commit itself exclusively, before the United Nations, to carrying out a plan that the United Nations will verify. The plan is not subject to negotiation, as perhaps Shafik Handal would like. I fail to see what the plan itself—reduction scheduling—has to do with what is happening now. The reduction agreement process was completed prior to 31 December and is part of the overall Armed Forces agreement. Of course, that is only starting from the criteria. As I have already said, the plan entails a reduction of approximately 50 percent in stages. We do not consider it advisable for large numbers of troops to demobilize at this time because they would only join the ranks of the unemployed. We believe that the process must be gradual, thus it covers a period of between 22 and 24 months, beginning on 1 February, when the plan goes into effect. If you recall, our obligation in the September New York Agreements is to present to the UN secretary general, by the time the end of the armed confrontation is signed, a definite reduction plan—based on the criteria agreed upon with the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front]. We therefore have up to 16 January. On that day, we will be handing the plan to the UN secretary general.

Concerning the amnesty, it is something that needs to be studied by the Legislative Assembly, because it is the only body that can issue an amnesty decree or law. At this time, it would be very bold to try to guess what conditions the amnesty decree or law might have, because it will depend on the assembly debates. We hope that the amnesty law receives the full consensus of the Assembly representatives.

[Moderator] Question by Mr. Jorge Barahona of Teleprensa.

[Barahona] Mr. President, first we would like to know the definite agreements to be signed on 16 January. It is said that the amnesty plan will be discussed by the National Assembly. Does that mean that the FMLN members and high-ranking FMLN leaders now in exile cannot enter the country on 16 January?

[Cristiani] Not immediately, I believe. However, it needs to be analyzed in depth, because as you know there are FMLN participants in Copaz [National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace], for example. I believe—and it all depends on the Assembly—Copaz will exist until about February or March. That is why the topic needs to be expedited, to allow every member of the Assembly to speak before discussing more general topics, such as the amnesty.

[Moderator] Question by Mr. Jose Antonio Alvarado from Cuatro Vision.

[Alvarado] The areas that will delimit where members of the FMLN are to stay have been mentioned, but only among opposition circles. We would like to know how the territory where members of the FMLN are to remain during the disarming and demobilization period will really be delimited.

[Cristiani] For the time being, 15 general areas have been agreed upon. Once the cease-fire mission is in place, ONUSAL [UN Observers for El Salvador] is to determine the exact grid coordinates. Up to now those areas have only been described as temporary, or designated areas as the United Nations calls them, where members of the FMLN are to gather during the first 30 days, beginning 1 February. In other words, the FMLN will remain in those 15 areas up to 1 March. They are not territories, but merely zones temporarily designated for conducting what the United Nations refers to as the dismantling of the FMLN military structure. There, ONUSAL will have the responsibility for the weapons. There are a number of requirements that the FMLN must meet, such as giving lists of fighters, weapons inventory, etc., to be moved to the areas. Afterward, the FMLN will leave the areas unarmed.

[Moderator] Ismael Beltran of EL DIARIO DE HOY.

[Beltran] I have two questions. [Words indistinct] January, but did not say if it would be a general holiday for the private and public sectors. Second question: We have learned that Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano did not accept the invitation to be in Mexico on 16 January, nor has his foreign minister. Can you tell us why and if he will send any representative?

[Cristiani] As for the holiday, my proposal is to have a national holiday for everyone. I understand that the

political parties met and that their blocs want to submit a bill declaring 16 January a day of peace, thus, a national holiday. My view as head of the government is that it should be a holiday for everyone. I do not consider it to be a celebration for just one sector, but for all citizens. For that reason, the holiday should not be for one sector only. We will again have to respect the decision on the matter by the legislative branch. What was the second question?

[Beltran] [Words indistinct]

[Cristiani] To date, we have not received any official communication that President Serrano will not attend. When I personally invited him over the telephone, he talked of some problems he had because the date coincides with internal elections in the legislative branch and the Supreme Court. I may be wrong, but he mentioned some elections in which he and the legislative branch are involved. He was concerned as to whether or not the Legislative Assembly would grant him permission to travel. I can tell you that the only president who has excused himself is Guillermo Endara of Panama, because of some unavoidable commitment with the legislative branch, as well. He will send his foreign minister on his behalf. Endara personally informed me of that this morning. We have no confirmation from President Serrano either way.

[Moderator] Erwin Larin of LA PRENSA GRAFICA.

[Larin] Good morning, Mr. President. My question deals with the national budget. Peace has been achieved, but the Defense Ministry still draws on 20 percent of the budget. How will that huge sum be used?

[Cristiani] We first need to check the figures. I am almost certain that it is not quite 20 percent. I believe that it is less than 20 percent. Please, bear that in mind. The defense budget has an internal component—the national budget—and an external component—military aid from the United States. In that respect, the internal component has served almost exclusively for maintenance, wages, and the normal expenses of the Armed Forces. The reduction in the budget, when it happens, will come from the external component. That money would not be spent, as it was used for ammunition, spare parts, etc., because the Armed Forces would no longer be in operation, which would necessitate the replacement of war material and the like used in an armed conflict.

We are not expecting a reduction in the budget during that period, because the reduction plan, which may affect the Army, is a gradual process and is not so significant that it would have a major impact on the internal budget. To recap, the impact would be reflected in the lack of need for external aid, but a reduction is coming.

[Moderator] Mario Rosenthal of the NEWS GAZETTE.

[Rosenthal] Mr. Cristiani, I have two questions for you. First question: What government or security authority will be in charge of those areas where the FMLN will be located? Second question: What is the government stand on the attacks the FMLN has carried out since the signing of the New York agreements? I suppose it is one of tolerance, on the assumption that it is just a minority group. I would like you to comment on the matter.

[Cristiani] With regard to the first question, I will say what we have always said, that unilateral truces are fragile. They are fragile because if there is no verified separation of forces, there is the possibility of clashes between the Armed Forces and the FMLN taking place. We also believe that there are groups within the FMLN that perhaps want to ignore the peace agreements; let us hope it is an insignificant sector. It is possible that groups of renegades, if we can call them that, may emerge. Such groups would be considered real criminals and terrorists that we would have to fight. We will fight those who do not want to adjust to the peace process. We will fight any renegade group regardless of its ideology, because we do not think it is fair for minorities to ruin the right sought by a majority of the Salvadoran people to live in peace in this country.

With regard to security in the area where the FMLN will be concentrated, such security will be the responsibility of Onusal. No national security organization will enter this marked zone. The Onusal members, who come from police and armed forces, will be in charge of maintaining order in that region as long as the process to put an end to the military structure of the FMLN continues and until the people of the FMLN rejoin the lawful life of the country. In the rest of the national territory, the current National Police will provide public security during the transition to the new National Civil Police.

[Rosenthal] Excuse me if I am being impertinent, but this is a question that I think everyone would like to ask. Will the Onusal force be armed?

[Cristiani] Thus far we have not seen any armed UN peace force. I do not think they will be armed.

[Moderator] Javier Najarro, from Cadena de Oro has a question.

[Najarro] Mr. President, will you personally sign the document in Mexico or will you delegate that duty to the commission that has been negotiating the agreement.

[Cristiani] So far this matter involving the documents to be signed has not been established. I can say, based on what I have heard thus far—as it is the part of the ceremony that is being organized by the United Naions—that the peace agreement will be signed by Codial [Dialogue Commission] and, of course, by the members of the FMLN delegation and the UN secretary general. I understand that there will be an annex to the peace agreements and that it will form part of the complete document. That annex will be signed by friendly presidents and probably myself. They will sign as guarantors and endorsers. The agreement, though, will be signed by the Dialogue Commission.

[Moderator] Mario Alberto Jovel, of Radio Sonora, has a question.

[Jovel] Mr. President, my first question is: Does the Salvadoran Government agree with the opinion of Bernard Aronson that the amnesty will not include those who killed the three U.S. instructors last year?

[Cristiani] I do not consider it appropriate for the government to make any hypothetical statement. I believe it is the Legislative Assembly that must decide what kind of amnesty will be best for El Salvador. It will decide what the amnesty should and should not include.

[Moderator] Here is a question from Mauricio Burgos, from Cadena Horizonte.

[Burgos] Mr. President, even though you said in a national network that recruitment will continue until 1 February, I would like to hear you explain—as commander of the Armed Forces—what the logic is in continuing the recruitment, even though it is opposed by many. The activity has also been criticized because—it is said—more than anything else, the military is interested in filling some vacancies at administrative level, which might create problems later on. That is one thing. Another is that we have learned that a group of leaders will accompany you when you return from Mexico after signing the peace agreements. We would like, if possible, to know the number and names of the countries the presidents of which will accompany you.

[Cristiani] First, the recruitment continues because, as I stated previously, the clashes continue. We cannot do anything else until a definite cease-fire is signed and implemented. We must continue to prepare to fulfill our responsibility; we must provide security for the country. Nevertheless, I believe that it must be considered... [pauses] The recruitment has virtually ended and it will be replaced by a new military service law. Military service will be mandatory for everyone.

Second, no leader will come to El Salvador following the events in Mexico—at least, no one has confirmed it. I believe there is the possibility that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker will visit Nicaragua and El Salvador after attending the signing of the agreements in Mexico—but no presidents are expected.

[Moderator] We now have the participation of Radio Cadena YSU....

[Cristiani, interrupts] As far as I am concerned, those who wish to come are cordially invited.

[Moderator] Fidel Alberto Tolosa, Radio Cadena YSU.

[Tolosa] Good morning, President Alfredo Cristiani. I have a question. What will be done with the weapons in the country once the peace agreements are signed and a cease-fire is implemented?

[Cristiani] We understand that the FMLN's weapons will be destroyed and the weapons of the Salvadoran Armed Forces will remain intact. Logically, like all Armed Forces, our's must have weapons—in numbers that are adequate to size and mission. Also, you may recall that there are regional accords that include an agreement calling for a balance of forces and a reduction in the number of weapons at the Central American level. That is something totally separate from the current peace process, but I have no doubt that it will influence the future.

[Moderator] Mauricio Funez of Telemundo and CNN.

[Funez] Good morning. One question: Referring to the military changes that are being reported by the media—at least as a rumor, because we have yet to see if they are true or not—are they part of the reorganization that must be carried out within the military leadership based on the agreements that call for a reduction in military forces?

[Cristiani] First, there has been much speculation [laughs] about possible changes within the Armed Forces. I urge you to request official information at the Defense Ministry because the order will be issued today. There are several changes among the Armed Forces commanders. It is the result of several things; I do not think it is the result of a given situation. Instead, changes are being made. The destinies of certain people will change, that is, their functions. Vacancies must always be filled. That generates a chain of events, particularly when it involves changes in brigade or detachment command posts.

An order was issued late in December appointing an Armed Forces inspector general. The post of Armed Forces inspector general has existed in the Armed Forces, but it was vacant. Therefore, Mauricio, you can very well say that it is a result of the agreements, because the agreements talk about organizing the office of the Armed Forces Inspector General—and General Dionisio Ismael Machuca has been appointed Armed Forces inspector general. However, all the changes are not necessarily part of the plan, even though others certainly are. Steps are being taken to retire certain members, meaning that this is part of the reduction in the officer ranks. We can basically say that a reorganization is underway to implement the Armed Forces reduction.

[Moderator] Victor Manuel Juarez, EPOCA magazine.

[Juarez] Good afternoon. Mr. President I have some doubts about the reduction of the FMLN and the dismantling of its military structure within nine months, and the fact that the reduction of the Army is going to take 22 months. Then, there is the fact that the Army is going to keep its weapons, but the FMLN will be disarmed. It seems to me that this might be the prelude to a dirty war or a witch hunt. What will your government do to prevent such a situation? Also, as a Mexican, I would like to know why Mexico is the site for signing the definitive peace accord.

[Cristiani] As I said when I answered Mr. Rosenthal's question, first we are going to fight all groups that want to disrupt peace in the country, regardless of their ideologies. In that regard, I believe that under no circumstances should we draw the conclusions that you have. One is a armed rebel group, the FMLN, while the other is a permanent institution of the country. Therefore, there is no comparison. The rebels, as an armed group, are going to disappear and will join the country's political and civilian life. That is a constitutional requirement.

At the same time, a significant number of Armed Forces troops cannot be suddenly eliminated, because thaty would entail a serious social problem. The economic infrastructure cannot absorb them immediately into a productive situation where the soldier could earn a living for himself and his family. Therefore, the reduction will take a longer period of time.

There are other reasons for that. We have clearly stated to the UN secretary general that there will probably be some renegade groups in the country that we will have to fight. The Armed Forces will have to be used to fight such groups. It is possible that weapons will continue to flow in, and the FMLN may not turn in 100 percent of their weapons to be destroyed.

Besides, that is a reduction process that will be verified by the United Nations within the period of time that has been stipulated. In other words, there will be no problem with that. We must never believe that a more delayed process of reduction automatically means a witch hunt. However, I reiterate the government's stand that there might arise groups that will disrupt peace and tranquility in the country.

You asked me why the accords will be signed in Mexico. Because Mexico has been the country where we have not only felt the support for the peace treaty, but it has been the site of—and has received us as guests throughout much of the process of—the negotiations. Mexico, as among a group of friends of the Salvadoran peace process, has provided all the facilities for the process so that it can develop. We believe that given the situation of having to sign the accords outside El Salvador, strictly for legal reasons, we feel that Mexico is most adequate. President Salinas has personally voiced his support for the process. We Salvadorans appreciate the fact that we will be signing the peace accord for our country on Mexican soil.

[Moderator] We now have the participation of Mr. Joaquin Ibarz, of VANGUARDIA.

[Ibarz] Mr. President, what is your opinion about the attacks against my fellow journalists a few minutes after the accord was signed? Could this mean that there are groups, well known for being hardline groups or members of a party, or members of the Armed Forces, who are opposed to the agreements and who could create problems in the future. What is your opinion about the presence of the presidents from the group of friends in Mexico? Does it represent support for the implementation of and compliance with the accords to be signed?

[Cristiani] First, concerning the attacks, from the very beginning the government has condemned the attacks, and we are investigating them through the National Police, as well as through the Criminal Investigations Commission, to determine who carried out the attacks. As I have said two or three times before, the government is going to fight any violent group, regardless of ideology or banner. We believe that El Salvador and a vast majority of Salvadorans want peace, and we are sure that they are small groups who insist on violence as a methodology, but that methodology is becoming outdated and such mechanisms for imposing their ideas is being left behind over the course of history. Therefore, we are willing to fight the groups.

We highly value the fact that the presidents of the four friendly countries themselves will attend the signing of the peace agreement. I believe that it is an occasion that merits their attendance as it is a ceremony that is tremendously important for the Salvadoran people, in view of all the support they have given the process in the past. These four countries have played an important role in the fact that the process has made progress.

There have been occasions when, without the cooperation of those four friendly countries, we might not have been able to overcome obstacles. Therefore, I believe that their presence is not only important, from the standpoint that they have played an active role in the process, but also their presence is a guarantee that implementation of the accords continues to move ahead. As you probably know, there was an initiative in the United Nations to form a support group that will be activated after the signing of the peace accord.

From our standpoint we see that the signing of the agreement is not the end of something, but the beginning of the process of consolidating peace and democracy in El Salvador. The fact that the countries have formed a support group in New York, which will include the United States, is intended to call on other countries such as Canada, Japan, the European Community to join in. That will enable them to continue to contribute in the future to the development of peace in our country.

[Moderator] Fernando Orgamvides from EL PAIS.

[Orgamvides] Mr. President, we have confirmed that among the guerrillas there is a large number of school-age youngsters who were forced to drop out of school because of the war—many went only as far as fourth, fifth, or sixth grade. That does not include the large percentage of youths who did not go to school at all, some of whom are hoping to be members of the future National Civilian Police [PNC]. Is your government considering initiating projects to train those youths and allow them, through compressed study plans, to go into the ninth grade?

[Cristiani] First, we would have to see... [pauses] I have seen that some adolescents not only do not fulfill the educational, but also the age requirement to go into the ninth grade. One of the admission requirements is to be at least 18 years old. Not just education is taken into consideration.

Second, to join the PNC as a police officer at the basic level, we have contemplated the possibility of administering equivalency exams. Some people may not have the ninth grade diploma, but may have the educational background, maybe self-taught, or may have acquired in some other way a ninth grade education. The Public Security Academy would give courses to assist such people in passing a ninth grade equivalency exam. Logically, it must be understood that we cannot perform miracles. If a person has not even passed the first grade, it is very unlikely that a class would take him up to the ninth grade level. We cannot guarantee that by taking the class the individual would be qualified to join the PNC. However, the Public Security Academy has scheduled some classes for the ninth grade level. Another alternative would be to give the youngsters the opportunity to go back to school until they turn 18. That would enable them to get their diploma and later join the PNC.

[Moderator] Timothy Johnson, of the MIAMI HERALD.

[Johnson] Mr. President, the WASHINGTON POST published a report stating that attending the negotiations in New York was one of the toughest decisions you have made in your term. Can you elaborate on that?

[Cristiani] That newspaper report was referring to the visit I made to New York in September, not December. In September, it was difficult for me to be there because there was no guarantee that some obstacles, which at the time were considered insurmountable, could be overcome. From the personal standpoint, it was not difficult to make that decision, because it was easy for Alfredo Cristiani to get on a plane and fly to New York. It was difficult in the sense that the president represents the highest government authority. Without having any specific agreements or conditions that could have determined that it was possible to overcome those obstacles, it was a difficult choice. The risks of having the highest government authority fail in breaking the stalemate at the peace talks were high. That could have been the end of the peace process. Thank God it is history. We were able to overcome the aforementioned obstacles and the process continued.

The situation was different in December. We always said that if certain conditions—which permitted us to see that it was feasible to conclude the negotiations on substantive issues—did not exist, the president would not go to New York, basically for the aforementioned reason. However, two days after receiving the written note from the UN secretary general inviting the president to go to New York.... [pauses] He later stated over the telephone that he already had a commitment that created the conditions for the president to be there for the second time.

[Moderator] Two more journalists will take the floor—they are Douglas Mine of AP and Daniel Alder of UPI.

[Mine] Mr. President, after such a long and bloody war as the Salvadoran conflict, it is natural that there is a level of distrust between the former enemies. After personally participating in the negotiations in New York both in September and December and maintaining contacts with the FMLN leaders, are you convinced that the FMLN has changed its political thinking and is becoming more moderate? Is the FMLN really committed to competing in politics according to the rules of the game, as perceived in the rest of the democratic world?

[Cristiani] First, I want to state that I have not had any personal contact with any FMLN member up to now. Thus, I cannot categorize a FMLN member. However, [word indistinct] personally, I would say that I believe that several members of the FMLN have made certain changes [laughs] because they signed a peace agreement stating that they are willing to put an end to the FMLN military structure. That action has, of course, been a change in favor of moderation. They have changed from being a group that wanted to gain power with their weapons to a group that today wants to seek political power within the rules of the democratic system. That is definitely a change.

There are other things about which I have doubts. However, they are not included in this discussion because there is freedom of thought here. Anyway, it is a bit difficult for me to believe that someone who has had a Marxist-Leninist ideology for many years will change his ideology overnight and become a social democrat. I believe that it is more show [last word in English] than a true change. Some of the FMLN leaders have said this and others insist.... [pauses] Friends in Codial have told me that Shafik Handal has said that communism is not dead, that it will make a comeback, that communism is the best system, and that he insists that the Soviet Union will be reestablished. Well, he is free to believe what he wants, but I do not believe his ideology will change any time soon.

However, I believe that what is important is what I mentioned first. It is important that the FMLN has agreed to live in a democracy and will attempt to gain political power without weapons and follow the same rules that are applicable to all parties. Of course, I believe we will need to carry out a process to promote trust. However, trust cannot be promoted if our actions do not allow it. That corresponds.... [pauses] I would say that it applies to everyone and not just the FMLN. We all have to work at this if we are to attain reconciliation and harmony in El Salvador. We all have to act in a way that will allow trust and confidence to arise so that we can all

live in peace and develop the Salvadoran state of law. That is what we really need now.

[Moderator] Daniel Alder.

[Alder] Mr. President, New York reported this morning that there were some problems in reaching an agreement on schedule. Would there be a problem if the United Nations has to impose a schedule? Would certain sectors refuse to comply with the peace agreements if that is the case?

[Cristiani] I would like to maintain the question as a hypothetical one. We have seen that agreements are usually reached in the last two hours of the negotiations. We are confident that the agreements will be reached by 2200 or 0000 tonight. Those of you who followed the peace process during the last three days of 1991 saw that things did not start to move until 1900, when time was running short. Earlier, it is a struggle to see who gets more or less.

However, I believe that perhaps a few points in the two topics that still await agreement may remain pending, but they will be very few. If that should occur, I do not believe there should be any problem if the United Nations determines the schedule, because that is part of what we agreed to on 31 December. Thus, we would have to accept whatever the United Nations decides if we have made an effort but are unable to reach an agreement, and I do not believe we should take it badly. However, if it does happens, it will be on very few points. I am certain that most of the topics will be solved by midnight.

[Moderator] NEW YORK TIMES, Shirley Christian.

[Christian] This morning, Radio Farabundo Marti mentioned that a new nation has been born. I would like to know how you see the future now. Do you see El Salvador as a new nation? Has the negotiating process produced a different country.?

[Cristiani] I believe that all countries evolve, all societies evolve as well. There are times when the evolution is much faster than at other times. There are other times when nothing happens for long periods of time. I believe that a nation not only consists of institutions, but I believe it primarily consists of its society, its population, and its inhabitants. I do not believe we can say that we are a new nation; we are the same Salvadorans. Perhaps, we have taken a very long step toward consolidating and strengthening the democratic institutions of our countries, which will reinforce what we have tried to promote during the past decade, a Salvadoran democracy. I believe, however, that we, the Salvadoran people, as we said, are going to continue to have our same customs, we are always going to have our origins, our past, and our future in our minds, as well as what we want to be. That a dynamic and permanent process that will continue. I do not believe we have to call it a new nation every time there is a change, because then we would be new nations too often. I would say it is a special qualitative step in the consolidation of Salvadoran democracy.

[Moderator] The last question from REUTERS. Mr. Aildale.

[Aildale] Mr. President, could you tell us how many people you expect from the United Nations during the test period?

[Cristiani] I could not give you a specific number. All I can tell you is that the intention of the United Nations is to end the Onuca [UN Observer Group in Central America] mandate and transfer the Onuca contingent to Onusal, exclusively in El Salvador. I do not know if there are going to be additional contingents to what Onuca already has. I believe Onuca has about 200 personnel. However, I could not give you an exact figure. I do not believe even Mr. (Bulding), who has been in charge of these situations in the United Nations, has made a decision as to how many are needed, because all the technical aspects of the cease-fire have not yet been determined. He first needs to know what he must do before he makes a decision on how many people are needed. It is difficult for me to give you an estimate. I can tell you that (Mr. Bulding) has a great deal of experience in such matters and that he will know how many people will be needed to carry out the mission. We have trust in his capabilities.

[Moderator] We have one last question. It is a question in English from Gene Columbo.

[Columbo, in English] Mr. President, in its first editorial after the peace agreement was signed, EL DIARIO DE HOY called the agreement suspicious; they called it dangerous. They said that it was like putting sheep in a pasture with wolves, and most important of all, it said that the trouble with it is that it means incorporating terrorism into the political life of the country. Now, when they say terrorists, they mean the FMLN. My sense is that the policy of your government has been all along to try to persuade the FMLN, to incorporate them all the way. So my question is: What is your reaction to that kind of... [pauses] I would call it hostile criticism. Does that trouble you?

[Cristiani, in English] No, I have seen more hostile criticism before and it does not trouble me. I think everyone has the right to think the way he wants to and express what he feels, and everybody has a right to his own opinion. I think that probably a lot of the uncertainties surrounding the agreements had to do with the fact that the actual agreements were not known and that it created suspicion with respect to what was agreed to. The acta [document] that was signed obviously did not explain much about the substantial agreement within the process. I think that there has been... [pauses] I have seen a change—even when you talk about EL DIARIO DE HOY—with respect to some editorials after the television explanations were made of what the agreements were. When people get to know what has been agreed to,

then a lot of the suspicion simply fades away, but everybody has a right to think the way they feel. It does not bother me.

[Moderator] Mr. Morris from REUTERS.

[Morris] How do you view the possibility that unhappy groups may emerge from among the Armed Forces? Do you believe those groups could represent a threat for the reconciliation process?

[Cristiani] I would not... [pauses] Obviously, we cannot say it is not possible. I think it is possible that it could happen. I insist on saying that it is not always necessary to think of the Armed Forces. I can even think of other sectors, including sectors within the FMLN itself, which may not be content with the agreements, and I believe that some of what we are still seeing is product of that. We believe, however, that it is a minority and that the minority, logically, lacks the capacity to generate violence. We have always said that no one can justify violence to impose ideas or criteria. That has been our principle from the beginning. Especially not while the vast majorities want something in particular.

In this sense, I repeat, all we can do is fight them, and we are willing to fight those groups.

[Question unheard]

[Cristiani, in English] I was just saying, it is obviously possible that we will have different groups that might continue waging violence in the country, from whatever side. Renegades from the FMLN that might not be in agreement with what their leadership signed or other sectors, members of the Armed Forces, members of whatever ideology or color you want to tag them with. Certainly we are not going to change our principle that we cannot accept violence as a means to impose a way of thinking or impose a way of acting and that we are going to deal with all groups that might continue to wage violence in the country.

[Moderator] Thank you very much, Mr. President, and many thanks to the colleagues of the national and international press who have visited us this morning.

Government Presents Armed Forces Reduction Plan

PA1001190092 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1802 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] United Nations, 10 Jan (EFE)—The Salvadoran Government negotiators on 10 January submitted to the United Nations the government's plan for the reduction of the Armed Forces, one of the points pending before the conclusion of the peace agreements. A spokesman for the government delegation told EFE the reduction plan was presented to the United Nations on the morning of 10 January, and that the government and guerrilla negotiators are meeting in a plenary meeting.

Joaquin Villalobos, one of the commanders of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), early on the morning of 10 January accused the government of not presenting a specific formula for the reduction of the Army, adding that the lack of such a proposal "had bogged down the continuation of the meeting."

The government and guerrilla negotiators, who began meeting here on 6 January, are trying to conclude on 10 January the pending points in the peace agreements reached on 31 December. Those points are the timetable for the implementation of the agreements, and the mechanisms for the demobilization and return to civilian and political life in El Salvador of the FMLN and its members, after nearly 12 years of civil war.

On 31 December, the two sides agreed that if the pending points are not resolved by 10 January, they will accept a formula to be presented to them by the United Nations no later than 14 January, in view of the fact that the final agreements will be signed in Mexico on 16 January.

Government Accused of False Army Reduction

PA1001210592 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1934 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] United Nations, 10 Jan (EFE)—The Salvadoran guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] have charged that the government, which waited until today to present its timetable for the Army reduction, has changed the real figures to present a "false reduction."

FMLN spokesman Roberto Canas said: "We are at a crucial moment in the negotiations." He then accused the government delegation of having "bad faith."

According to Canas, the government claims the Army has 63,175 troops and that it will reduce this number by 50.2 percent, down to 31,000, within 24 months. However, the current figure is 35,000.

The FMLN spokesman added that the Army has also started a large-scale recruitment campaign and that it is adding personnel from other security organizations to "appear as if it is willing to make a substantial reduction." He added that, according to the most recent Army roster, there were 2,086 officers in 1990. However, according to the proposed reduction, that figure will increase in real terms to 2,320 within 24 months.

He noted that the government proposes to eliminate only one of the five "rapid reaction battalions, which are the symbol of this war," during the nine months of the cease-fire, which is to begin on 1 February. Something similar is happening with the number of garrisons. During the war they went from 24 to 40; now they intend to include the installations of the security forces in them "and that means that what they describe as a reduction really becomes an increase."

Canas warned, however, that there are still hours of discussion and negotiation ahead to iron out the differences and thus it cannot be said that the effort has concluded without an agreement.

Regardless, it was established that if no consensus is reached on the process to implement the agreements, the parties must accept a formula proposed by the UN Secretary General by 14 January so that the peace agreements can be formally signed in Mexico on 16 January.

FMLN Commander on Problems With Army Reduction

PA1101023092 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSKL in Spanish 0017 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Telephone interview with Commander Rebecca Palacios of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN, by Rene Hurtado on 10 January; place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Hurtado] Commander, at this moment, how is the meeting in New York, during which the schedule is being discussed, going? Is progress being made?

[Palacios] As you know, the political measures were agreed upon on 31 December. The meeting currently being held is to set dates to implement the measures. The meeting should have ended today; however, we can tell you that the negotiations on the dates have entered a critical stage. That is because the government has not, to date, presented a plan for the reduction of the Armed Forces and it has not presented any type of document that [word indistinct] implementation of the agreements. We have presented a document.

We have also found such problems as the government trying to avoid assuming the responsibility it agreed upon with the FMLN on 31 December. That is the agreement concerning the dissolution of the fighting battalions. The government is saying that it would dissolve an elite battalion by the end of this year, and they are talking about dissolving the rest of the battalions by late 1993. That is unacceptable because the cease-fire period would end in October and, as far as we understand, by that time the main agreements should have been implemented, especially the agreement on the reduction of the Armed Forces.

[Hurtado] Commander Rebecca, what is going to happen if no agreement is reached? The New York agenda called for the meeting to end today. When will the meeting end?

[Palacios] For the time being, they have agreed to continue the meeting until 14 January.

[Hurtado] In other words, the meeting is being extended.

[Palacios] It is being extended until 14 January, possibly.

[Hurtado] You have said that there is a problem concerning the reduction and purging of the Armed Forces. What is really happening? What numbers are the Army or the government talking about? How many active members should the Army have?

[Palacios] The agreements state that they must reduce the Armed Forces; that they must dissolve 22 infantry battalions and the 5 elite battalions. What they are now trying to do is increase the number of officers and chiefs and make a reduction that would not really affect them, but rather benefit them.

That is unacceptable. We see this move by the Army as dangerous, in the face of the electoral contest that will take place in 1994. If we continue to have the same level of militarization throughout 1993, we could say that chances of democratizing all aspects of the country would be very limited.

[Hurtado] Can it be said that by 14 January we will know what will be the final outcome of the situation?

[Palacios] We hope it can be resolved before 14 January. Now there is an element... [pauses] We think that the government position is unacceptable, both for the international community and the national forces. Our negotiating commission is working intensely to try to find a satisfactory solution to the problem.

[Hurtado] According to the New York agreement, the parties must reach an agreement on the issue between 5 and 10 January. The agreement adds that such negotiations must yield positive results by 10 January, at the latest. If that cannot be accomplished, the agreement says, the parties pledge to accept the formula presented by the UN secretary general on the pending issues by 14 January, at the latest. If you say that the negotiations will end on 14 January, does that mean that you are breaking what was agreed upon in the New York Agreement?

[Palacios] The agreement establishes that as we have until 14 January to reach an accord on pending issues, the UN secretary general may make a proposal and give us extra time. That will permit both parties to act reasonably and reach agreements, instead of declaring ourselves incapable of reaching accords and having the UN secretary general tell us what we must do. However, if no agreement has been reached by 14 January, the UN secretary general will once again decide the configuration of the timetable.

[Hurtado] YSKL listeners, we have listened to commander Rebecca Palacios who reported to us on the crisis at the negotiations, which are expected to conclude on 14 January in New York, between government and FMLN representatives.

FMLN's Villalobos: Peace Process Irreversible

PA1101145592 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] Joaquin Villalobos, commander of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN], said during an exclusive interview with Canal Doce on 9 January that the peace process is irreversible. He added that it confirms the dismantling of the rebel military apparatus over a nine-month period. According to Villalobos, the

country will experience important transformations because of the peace agreements.

[Villalobos] "I would say that if the agreements are fulfilled, it would be the basis for solving the causes of the war and then the war would really end."

The New York Agreement means the end of 20 months of negotiations to end the armed conflict between the government and the FMLN. The agreements—which cover military, economic, political, and social topics – will have to be fulfilled by 1 February.

[Villalobos] "We must keep in mind what the framework for the 1994 election, the end of the National Guard, Finance Police, and Civilian Defense mean for the country. All those things are very important. They mean the end of torture and persecution. All that remains to be seen. As of now, they are promises, and that is why everyone's observation is the guarantee. The guarantee is represented by the combatants alertness to see the agreements fulfilled. That is the important thing."

[Unidentified reporter] "With rifles in their hands?"

[Villalobos] "That is precisely what the nine months are for."

The rebel leader said he was satisfied with the result of the negotiations and that the causes of the conflict had been discussed during the process. We are implementing democratic transformations; there is a new country, he said.

[Villalobos] "If we deal with the causes that resulted in the armed movement 20 years ago, we will get 100 percent results."

Asked whether the fall of the communist model drove the FMLN command to seek the negotiated solution, Joaquin Villalobos said that the FMLN was the product of the internal social and political conditions, not of communist expansionism.

[Villalobos] "I would say that communism is dead, whereas the FMLN lives. That is because the FMLN was not a part of that project. It had not been a part of it for a long time. The two did not coincide geopolitically or politically. The framework we were using was completely different. The clearest proof of that fact is that the FMLN is the main character in our country's transformation. That is the undeniable reality. I ask: Would they have carried them out by themselves? Or was it necessary for us to....[pauses] or doesn't the other part recognize the fact that the armed struggle was necessary for all these changes to take place in the country?"

Villalobos accepted that reconciliation will not be easy. There will be sectors interested in maintaining violence, but there will also be guarantees in the implementation schedule, which represents security for the FMLN and the irreversibility of the process.

[Villalobos] "It is important to point out the irreversibility of what has been achieved. I believe there will always be those who fall to the temptation of opening a chapter of violence. That is why the new police is important. That is why the reforms to the judicial system are important. That is why the transition period will also be important."

The rebel commander, political-military leader of the People's Revolutionary Army—one of the groups that form the FMLN—clarified that the rebel's military dismantling will be complete in nine months, whereas the Armed Forces will be reduced in two years.

Rebel Front Urges Support for Agreements

PA1201141392 San Salvador EL MUNDO in Spanish 9 Jan 92 p 3

[Communique issued by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN, National Army For Democracy, END, Feliciano Ama Front Joint Command at the Santa Ana Volcano on 9 January]

[Text] The joint command of the special eastern Feliciano Ama Front region greets and congratulates our suffering Salvadoran people for the victory obtained by the signing of the New York Agreement. That pact will free us from the military dictatorship, which has scourged the country for more than 60 years. The agreed structural changes will enable us to have democracy, true peace, and social justice.

a) We congratulate the President of the Republic Alfredo Cristiani for his courage. His praiseworthy action of attending the meeting in New York contributed decisively to reaching the agreements and showed his will and political maturity.

b) We also recognize the efforts made by the United Nations, as well as its former Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and his representative Alvaro de Soto, in the mediation of this conflict.

c) The Feliciano Ama Front fighters publicly state that we fully support the agreements reached by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) General Command.

d) We call on the well-known hardline sectors to respect the agreements reached in New York, which will only bring benefits to the Salvadoran people.

e) We call on the international community and friendly countries to maintain surveillance on the compliance with the agreements reached by the government and the FMLN. We also call on the Salvadoran people to denounce noncompliance with the agreements.

For peace with democracy and social justice, praise and glory to all the martyrs that made this victory possible.

[Issued] Santa Ana Volcano, 9 January 1992

[Signed] FMLN National Army for Democracy eastern Feliciano Ama Front Joint Command

Rebel Vows To Crush Opponents of Peace Process

PA1101201292 ACAN in Spanish 1832 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Joateca, El Salvador, 11 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—Guerrilla "Commander Jonas" [Jorge Melendez], who heads rebel troops in Morazan Department in eastern El Salvador, said on 11 January that "those who are opposed to peace in the country are such small sectors that we are going to crush them."

In statements to ACAN-EFE, "Jonas" indicated that the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has fought for 11 years "to attain peace and social and democratic guarantees for the people."

Consequently, the guerrilla leader said, "we are not going to let a handful of extremists opposed to peace block a process that will be irreversible."

"Jonas," who participated in the process of dialogue between the government and the FMLN, emphasized that in the nine months that it will take to dismantle the rebels' military apparatus, there must be "faithful" compliance with the legalization to turn over lands to peasants who have participated in the armed struggle. There must also be a guarantee of social security; otherwise, "our weapons will again be heard," he said.

In addition to his warnings, however, the rebel "commander" expressed confidence in the development of the peace process. He said it will "serve to bring about development and social justice." "We will begin to consolidate a new model of political development and of advanced, rather than backward democracy," the guerrilla leader said emphatically.

According to the FMLN, the peace agreements that are to be signed on 16 January in Mexico were achieved despite the "ultrarightist threats to stage a coup d'etat within the Salvadoran Armed Forces."

Regarding concerns that the agreements will not be complied with, "Jonas" said: "Throughout our history, no law has ever guaranteed the people's rights. That guarantee will be provided by the people, who will know how to defend the peace that has been won."

Another clear warning issued by the guerrilla leader was that the FMLN will not put down all its weapons until each point of the agreements has been "irreversibly" complied with. "There will be no turning over or destruction of our weapons before that," he said.

The FMLN feels that when it becomes part of the Salvadoran political process, it will also be the best organized force. It has already announced that it will form alliances, even with the rightists, if necessary.

"We do not expect to achieve high levels of power in the state immediately, but rather a combined power with an institutional force. We will seek high levels through the organized civilian society that will act on its own, instead of placing its hopes in what can be done by its representative within the government structure," Jonas said.

The rebel "commander" believes that the other organized force that exists in El Salvador is the ruling Nationalist Republican Alliance, which has a "neoliberal position that works against the people."

"Let no one doubt that, as a party, the FMLN will also be the top organized force, with the popular support we have achieved in 11 years of war," the rebel leader said.

"Jonas" does not know what he will do when he rejoins civilian life, but he said he knows definitely that he will be wherever he is needed, wherever it is necessary to organize the popular sectors, defend justice and safeguard the peace. "I will be there. Let us hope that it will not be necessary to take up arms again," he said.

Government Plan Disbands Rapid Deployment Units

PA1201002492 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2237 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] United Nations, 11 Jan (EFE)—The Salvadoran Armed Forces reduction plan presented by the government to the United Nations, within the framework of the peace agreements with the guerrillas, includes the "gradual" disbandment of the five rapid deployment infantry battalions in the next few years.

That was stated on 11 January by Oscar Santamaria, chief of the government delegation in the UN-mediated negotiations with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).

Santamaria was scheduled to reply on the afternoon of 11 January to the UN proposals to establish dates for the reduction of the Armed Forces, one of the main obstacles that prevented the conclusion of the peace agreement on 10 January.

Judging from the development of the negotiations on 11 January and the persistent disagreements, everything seems to indicate that the negotiations will continue until late on 12 January, when the new deadline for the agreement expires. "We will respond on the afternoon of 11 January" to the "ideas" of the United Nations on the establishment of dates for the reduction of the Army, Santamaria stated. He refused to disclose what the United Nations has proposed and whether he believes it is acceptable.

Santamaria said that according to the government proposal, the five rapid deployment infantry battalions will disband between the first and second phase of the Army reduction plan that will be carried out in two years. Santamaria said that in the first phase, which will be carried out in the first six months from the start of the cease-fire on 1 February, approximately 19,000 of the

more than 63,000 troops of the Armed Forces will be cut. Those figures given by the government are being disputed by the guerrillas.

Santamaria added that 12,000 more troops will be cut in the second phase. At the same time, and in a seemingly contradictory statement, Santamaria said that an agreement has already been reached between the government and the United Nations on the Armed Forces reduction plan, one of the key points in the peace agreements. He said that the plan "is not on the discussion table." Santamaria added that "there is no discussion of the number" of Armed Forces members.

The FMLN, which has accused the government of "inflating" the figures so that the real reduction will be less, wants to see the disbandment of the rapid deployment battalions by 31 October. Those battalions have been accused of serious human rights violations.

Guerrilla spokesman Roberto Canas said on 11 January that the United Nations has presented a working document that broaches the issue of the numbers "in other terms" and speaks of "substantial and verifiable reductions." However, he refused to disclose details of the formula but said that "we think it is a good basis" for negotiations.

The guerrillas are willing to disarm in the nine months of the cease-fire but they link that to the reduction of the Armed Forces and the fulfillment of the "factors for the reconversion" of the FMLN. Those factors are its legal status as a political party, the legalization of land ownership in the zones it is now occupying, and the participation of its members in the new National Civilian Police which will replace the current security forces.

Canas also said that the FMLN on 11 January presented specific proposals on security for the guerrilla leaders. "Immediately after the signing of the present agreement, a special security plan coordinated by the UN Observers for El Salvador (Onusal) will be adopted to protect the FMLN leaders who so require it," the proposal stated.

Government, FMLN To Resume Talks 13 Jan

PA1301130292 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1133 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] United Nations, 13 Jan (EFE)—The Salvadoran Government and the guerrillas, facing a timeframe to dissolve the elite battalions and resolve other aspects, decided to extend the deadline of 12 January until midnight 13 January, to complete the peace agreements.

Upon leaving the United Nations at approximately 0600 (1100 GMT) after engaging in negotiations during the entire night, the two parties expressed their preference to resolve their differences through consensus, rather than accept a UN-imposed formula. They added they will resume their discussions in six or seven hours.

This is the second time that the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) missed the deadline established in the agreements on 31 December, which established the timeframe to implement the agreements, to demobilize the guerrillas, and to reinstate its members into Salvadoran political and civil life.

The first deadline expired on 10 January, when it was decided to extend the deadline until midnight 12 January, which the two parties also failed to meet.

In the agreements reached on 31 December, the two parties agreed that if a final agreement was not reached by 10 January, they would accept a UN-proposed formula by 14 January at the latest because the final peace agreements are scheduled to be signed on 16 January.

Details of Government-FMLN Agreements Published

To End Armed Conflict

PA1001180192 ACAN in Spanish 1520 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] San Salvador, 10 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—The following is the full text of the hitherto undisclosed text of the agreement between the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] guerrillas on the "end of the armed confrontation." This is one of the agreements to be signed on 16 January in Mexico City, Mexico.

The only thing pending to be defined in this and other agreements are some of the implementation dates, which the two sides are currently discussing at the UN Headquarters in New York.

End of Armed Confrontation

1. The end of the armed confrontation (henceforth called CEA) is an irreversible, short, and dynamic process with a preset duration that must be implemented all over the national territory of El Salvador. During the CEA, there will not be substantive negotiations, but only discussions about the measures necessary to put into practice the agreements reached during the negotiations.

2. The CEA is to begin on 1 February 1992 (henceforth known as D-Day) and is to culminate on 31 October 1992.

3. It covers four elements, as they are defined in this agreement:

a) cease-fire;

b) separation of forces;

c) end of the FMLN's military structure and the reincorporation of its members, within a fully legal framework, into the country's civilian, political, and institutional mainstream.

d) UN verification of all the activities mentioned above.

Cease-Fire

4. The cease-fire will officially enter into force on D-Day.

5. Starting on that date, both sides, as it applies to them, are to abstain from carrying out any operation or hostile act by the forces or individuals under their control. They cannot conduct any kind of attack by land, sea, or air; conduct patrols or offensive maneuvers; place mines; interfere with military communications; conduct any kind of reconnaissance operations, acts of sabotage, or other military activity that in the opinion of the UN Observers for El Salvador [Onusal] may disturb the cease-fire; or carry out any other actions that do not respect the human rights of civilians.

6. Verification of compliance with the commitment described in the previous paragraph is to begin officially on D-Day. Onusal will investigate any alleged violation of the cease-fire.

7. During the period between the signing of this agreement and D-Day, the two sides will observe an informal cease-fire by means of which they pledge not to conduct any of the activities described in Paragraph 5.

8. During the informal cease-fire period, Onusal is to deploy its personnel and equipment to be able to verify all the CEA aspects starting on D-Day.

Separation of Forces

9. The purpose of the separation of forces is to reduce the risks of accidents, strengthen trust, and allow Onusal to verify compliance by the two sides with the agreement.

10. The separation of forces will be established in two phases, so that the Salvadoran Armed Forces (FAES) can progressively withdraw to their current positions until they are in the position that they will normally maintain in time of peace; and so that the FMLN forces can progressively gather in places mentioned within the strife-torn areas, as determined in Annex D.

11. During the first phase, which will coincide with five days following the start of D-Day, the FAES land forces will move to their existing garrisons, bases, and semipermanent installations and other locations listed in Annex A; and the FMLN forces, except for the fighters mentioned in paragraph 18, will move to the places listed in Annex B. The places listed in Annexes A and B reflect in a general manner the current withdrawal of the forces of the two sides.

12. The movements described in the previous paragraph will be conducted under Onusal supervision. Neither side will do anything to hamper or jeopardize the movement of the forces of the other side during that period. The Onusal military observers are to supervise closely all the places listed in Annexes A and B and are to be present in principle 24 hours a day in each of those places starting on D-Day.

13. During the period between the D-Day plus six and D-Day plus 30, the FAES ground forces will retreat to the positions it would maintain in times of peace, and which are listed in Annex C; and the FMLN forces, except for combatants mentioned in Paragraph 18, will retreat to the areas mentioned in Annex D. The precise locations will be determined by the head of Onusal after consulting both sides during the informal cease-fire period.

14. The movements described in the previous paragraph, which will also be supervised by Onusal, will be carried out based on a plan divided into phases to be agreed between the head of Onusal and the parties during the informal cease-fire period, through the joint working group mentioned in Paragraph—[as received]. To accomplish that task, the group will proceed according to the agreed schedule for implementation of the agreements.

15. As soon as possible after the signing of this agreement, and no later than two weeks before D-Day, the FAES will give the head of Onusal a detailed report on the number of its troops and weapons to be concentrated in the areas mentioned in Annex A.

16. As soon as possible after the signing of this agreement, and no later than two weeks before D-Day, the FMLN will give the head of Onusal a detailed report on the number of its troops; an inventory of its weapons, ammunition, mines, other explosives and military equipment it has throughout the national territory; and its plans for concentrating them in the areas listed in Annex B.

17. After completing the first phase for the separation of forces—in other words, six days from D-Day—Onusal will verify that all the troops and military equipment declared by each side are concentrated in the areas mentioned in Annexes A and B. Onusal will investigate any report or complaint about the presence of military personnel or equipment in any area outside those mentioned, except for the departures stipulated in Paragraphs 20-22.

18. The aforementioned arrangements are related to the FAES ground forces and the FMLN forces defined in Paragraph 11. Although for practical reasons, it is not possible to arrange a similar separation of clandestine forces, those forces will be fully committed to abstaining from conducting any operation or hostile act. As stipulated in Paragraph six, Onusal will investigate any alleged violation of that commitment.

19. Effective on D-Day, the FAES air and naval forces will abstain from conducting any offensive operation. Those forces will only carry out nonmilitary operations necessary to fulfill duties not related to the armed conflict. Onusal will be notified in advance of all military flight plans. Those flights will not be over the areas in which FMLN forces are concentrated.

20. During the CEA period, Onusal liaison officers will be at the FAES units, bases, and garrisons to coordinate beforehand the deployment of its forces throughout the national territory and to verify that such deployments do not violate the cease-fire and do not in any way negatively affect the process for the implementation of that agreement.

21. Specifically in regard to forces deployed close to the areas in which the FMLN forces are concentrated—in other words, areas listed in Appendix One of Annex A and those listed in Appendix One of Annex C, the government agrees that those forces will only leave their locations with prior consent from Onusal, and for the following reasons:

a) To carry out rotations and relieve troops;

b) To carry out liaison and coordination activities between commands at levels no lower than battalion;

c) To obtain provisions and logistical supplies;

d) To participate in programs of deactivation, removal, or elimination of mines;

e) While on leave, to receive medical attention, or for other humanitarian reasons, individually, in civilian clothes, and unarmed.

Onusal will not approve any leave, including in the cases already mentioned, if it decides that such leave could endanger the cease-fire or other aspects of this agreement or that it could disrupt the detente and reconciliation process. The forces to move out in connection with Articles A, B, C, and D will be accompanied by Onusal officials who will verify that their movements take place in line with what is established in this agreement.

22. Likewise, during the CEA period there will be Onusal liaison officials at the sites where FMLN forces will be concentrated so that the Onusal officials may coordinate the FMLN pullout. The FMLN accepts that its forces may leave those sites with the consent of Onusal and for the following reasons only:

a) To carry out liaison and coordination activities between the FMLN high command and the commanders of the forces stationed in the already mentioned places;

b) To deliver food supplies, clothes, and other survival material;

c) To participate in the defusing, removal, and elimination of mines;

d) To take advantage of permits or to receive medical attention, or for other humanitarian reasons. That must be done individually, in civilian clothes, and unarmed.

23. Onusal will verify that the supplies delivered to either side do not include lethal articles. However, FAES will be allowed to maintain a normal peacetime ammunition level. The mechanisms for such verification will be established by the chief of the Onusal military observers in consultation with the two sides.

24. During the cease-fire, Copaz [National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace] will systematically evaluate implementation of the agreements. If it notices that a situation that could lead to a crisis is emerging, it will announce its conclusions and make pertinent recommendations to avoid a break in the cease-fire or any other public order crisis. It will inform the Onusal chief of its conclusions and recommendations.

25. If in spite of that, a public order crisis emerges, normal procedures for maintaining domestic peace and public security fail, and the president of the republic decides that it is necessary to implement the special recourse that Number 12 of Article 168 of the Constitution established following the constitutional reform of April 1991, then, before issuing the corresponding order, the president will establish communication with the Onusal chief to make it possible for him to make pertinent recommendations. The behavior of the FAES under such circumstances will be closely watched by Onusal to verify that such behavior is congruent with all the peace agreements.

—The termination of the FMLN's military structure and the reincorporation of its members into the country's civilian, political, and institutional life in a fully legal framework. (26. Pending)

Verification by the United Nations

Onusal's military and civilian personnel will be increased to allow that organization to carry out its work related to the processes agreed upon, as they are described in this agreement.

The secretary general will ask the UN Security Council to approve such an increment in Onusal personnel and in Onusal's mandate. He will also ask the General Assembly for the necessary financial support. The composition of the Onusal military force, by nations, and the appointment of its military commander, will be decided by the Security Council on a recommendation from the secretary general after he consults with the two sides. To fulfill its new obligations efficiently, Onusal will require complete freedom of movement throughout the territory of El Salvador, as it is required to fulfill other aspects of its mandate.

To facilitate the implementation of this agreement, a Joint Working Group [GCT] will be created immediately after the agreement is signed. The GCT will be composed of the chief of the Onusal military observers, who will chair it, and a representative of each of the parts. The GCT members may be accompanied by advisers. The GCT chairman will convoke GCT meetings on his own initiative or on a request from either or both of the parts.

Socioeconomic Development

PA1201231092 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1537 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] San Salvador, 12 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—The following is the complete text, not provided in detail until now, of one of the peace agreements that will be signed by the guerrillas and the Salvadoran Government in Mexico on 16 January and that will spell out the new model of social and economic development of the Central American country.

Economic and Social Issue

Working Document *(tentative version)*

I. Preamble

One of the requirements for reunification of Salvadoran society amid democracy is the sustained social and economic development of the country. Likewise, reunification of Salvadoran society and an increasing degree of social cohesion are indispensable elements in achieving development. That is why, among the series of agreements that are required to definitely end the armed conflict in El Salvador, a minimum set of agreements must be included to facilitate development for the benefit of all segments of the population.

According to the New York agreement, the topics that are covered in this document are: the agrarian problem, credit for the agriculture and livestock sector, measures that are necessary to alleviate the social cost of implementing financial adjustment programs, advisable mechanisms for direct foreign cooperation intended to promote assistance and development projects in each community, the creation of a forum for economic dialogue, and the national reconstruction plan. In addition, even though the philosophy or overall guidelines of the government's economic policy, which the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] does not necessarily share, are not part of this agreement, both parties agree on the need to provide some basic guidelines that can lead to the necessary social stability during the transition period so as to consolidate peace and make progress toward the reunification of Salvadoran society.

II. Agrarian Problem

1. As to parcels of land that exceed the constitutional limit of 245 hectares:

The Salvadoran Government will ensure the transfer of rural land that is suitable for farming that has not yet been transferred according to Article 105 and Article 267 of the Constitution.

The government also agrees to be watchful so that implementation of the constitutional mandate is not violated by the owners of in excess of 245 hectares of rural land .

2. As to parcels of land that are government property and that are not currently forest reserves:

The Salvadoran Government will ensure the transfer to the Agrarian Reform beneficiaries, according to what has been established in Article 104 of the Constitution, of rural land that is suitable for farming that is government property and does not constitute forest reserves.

Among the different programs for the transfer of land being implemented by the Salvadoran Government with government farm land, preference will be given to former fighters from both sides who voluntarily request it. They must be of peasant origin with a vocation for farming and they must not hold land title deeds. The size of the plots of land shall be determined according to the aforementioned availability and the number of beneficiaries who qualify according to what has been stipulated in this paragraph.

3. As to parcels of land that have been offered to the government for sale.

Making use of the legal, technical, and financial resources at its disposal, the Salvadoran Government will attempt to purchase and transfer the land that has voluntarily been offered to the government for sale by owners, by means of the Land Bank [Banco de Tierras]. Once such land is purchased, it must be transferred to the Agrarian Reform beneficiaries.

4. As to the beneficiaries of transferred parcels of land as stipulated in the aforementioned paragraphs.

Land that is transferred according to sections 1, 2, and 3 of the present agreement will be intended to satisfy the need for land of peasants and small farmers who lack it. The land will specifically be legally transferred to the peasants and small farmers who are beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform law.

5. Payment for land

The transfer of land, as pointed out in the previous paragraphs, will be conducted according to market price and under the same credit conditions granted to the Agrarian Reform beneficiaries. In addition, a payment system may be established based on fixed prices and low, fixed interest rates. Internal credit shall be complemented with financing provided through international cooperation, for which a special fund will be created so that land can be bought with foreign financing.

6. New Legislation

Bearing in mind the dispersed nature of the agrarian legislation, its gaps and contradictions, the parties agree that it should be coordinated and unified in the Agrarian Code. To accomplish that, the government will submit to the Legislative Assembly the relevant bill within a 12-month period following the signing of this agreement. If that commitment is not fulfilled within the period of

time established above, Copaz [National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace] will assume the task of drafting the relevant bill.

III. Parcels of Lands Within Areas of Conflict

1. Land Tenure System Within Areas of Conflict

According to the New York Agreement, the current state of land tenure within ares of conflict will be maintained, until a satisfactory legal solution to the final land tenure system is reached. Consequently, those holding land will not be evicted until the aforementioned solution is reached and, moreover, will receive financial support to improve farm production.

Taking into account the irregular land tenure system within areas of conflict, the parties agree to:

2. Determination of the "present holders." The term holders is understood to be those currently settled and/or working in those areas.

3. An inventory of the cases that fall under this chapter:

Within 30 days after its signing the agreement, the FMLN will present an inventory of the land and structures affected by this agreement. Prior confirmation that such land and structures comply with the conditions of the agreement, and according to the procedure defined below, the Government of El Salvador will seek a legal and satisfactory solution to definite land tenure, by way of a voluntary purchase agreement between the legitimate landowner and the current holder.

In those cases in which the legal owner does not wish to sell the property, the Salvadoran Government will resettle the small-scale peasants, within the legal mechanisms at its disposal, on available land within the same areas, whenever possible.

4. Creation of a Special Commission

Copaz [National Commission for Consolidation of Peace] will form a special commission, consisting of representatives of renowned integrity and capability. That special commission, which will be formed within 20 days after the signing of this agreement, will have the following responsibilities and duties:

a. To verify the inventory of the land and structures affected hereby located within the conflict areas. Once verified, the commission will deliver a copy to the Salvadoran Government and Copaz;

b. To facilitate the resolution of disputes between land holders and the legal landowners;

c. To take whatever steps and actions it deems necessary and convenient to allow for the timely and effective fulfillment of all that has been agreed to under this chapter.

5. Legalization of Land Tenure

Excluding exceptionally complex cases, the Salvadoran Government will legalize the land tenure system within ares of conflict conclusively, within six months after the signing of a cease-fire, and will grant individual or collective property deeds, as called for.

6. Payment for Land

The purchase of land from the previous owners will be based on the current market value. The sale to the current holders will be made under the same conditions granted to the beneficiaries of the land reform programs. However, special conditions may be agreed upon to contribute to the pacification process.

7. Verification by Copaz.

Copaz will ensure fulfillment of the agreements under Chapters II and III.

IV. Agreement on Lands Takeovers of 3 July 1991

The agreement on land takeovers, reached between the Salvadoran Government and the peasant associations, will be respected.

With regard to those lands illegally taken over after the agreement, the Salvadoran Government hereby states that it has reserved the right to apply the law to guarantee the existence of the state of law. The FMLN hereby states that it is better to meet land problems, including land takeovers, by way of mutual agreement following the paths and mechanisms set forth by the peace agreements.

V. Credit for the Agricultural Sector

1. Credit for the Sector in General

The government of El Salvador will ensure that the national financial system will have the necessary resources for handling the credit demand of the agricultural sector in general, and particularly for micro-enterprises and small enterprises, small-scale farm production, and cooperatives of reformed and traditional sectors.

Likewise, it will establish the norms for credit of agricultural and industrial production so that they will be granted in due time and so that the amount will be enough to support productive capacity and the marketing of production. Toward that end, it will facilitate increasing the participation of micro-entrepreneurs and small entrepreneurs in the credit departments of commercial banks.

2. Active participation of Recipients

The government also accepts the commitment of making feasible and promoting active participation by the recipients, both in designing and in managing special credit programs for those sectors. Toward that end, it commits itself to strengthening the participation of the organizations' representatives of the aforementioned groups in preparing policies of the Agricultural Guarantees Fund,

FIGAPE [expansion unknown], FEDCREDITO [expansion unknown], and the Agricultural Development Bank, and to make sure that those institutions remain financially solid and become the recipients of foreign resources for the effective channeling of loans for microenterprises and small enterprises, small-scale farm production, and cooperatives of reformed and traditional sectors.

3. Technical Assistance

The government of El Salvador will design and promote new technical assistance programs to encourage greater production from peasants and small farmers, particularly in areas of conflict.

4. International Cooperation for the Agricultural Sector

In view of the increased demand for agricultural credit that has resulted from the peace accord, the Government of El Salvador commits itself to seeking additional foreign resources for the purpose of including the new needs of that group. Toward that end, the government will seek additional foreign resources for increasing the operations of the Agricultural Guarantees Fund as a mechanism for expediting the channeling of credits to the small-scale and mid-scale farmers and their cooperatives without affecting the financial soundness of the credit institutions.

VI. Measures To Alleviate the Social Cost of Structural Adjustment Programs

1. Consumer Protection

The Government of El Salvador commits itself to adopting policies and creating effective mechanisms intended to defend consumers according to the provisions of the last part of Paragraph 1 of Article 101 of the Constitution. To comply with that constitutional provision, the government commits itself to presenting before the Legislative Assembly within 60 days after this accord is signed a draft law to protect consumers intended to strengthen the Ministry of Economy, which could mark the first step in the direction of the possible creation of a General Office for the Defense of Consumers.

2. Privatization

The policy of privatization will promote social participation in property, promoting the access of workers to the property in privatized enterprises. Likewise, it will prevent monopolies, while at the same time it will guarantee the freedom of enterprises and the protection of consumers, in line with the provisions of Article 110 of the Constitution.

3. Social Compensation Programs

The government of El Salvador will seek to strengthen programs of social compensation being implemented that are intended to alleviate extreme property. Additional foreign resources will be sought for that purpose.

VII. Modalities for Direct External Cooperation Intended To Promote Projects for the Assistance and Development of Communities

The Government of El Salvador will facilitate direct private foreign cooperation intended to promote programs to assist and develop communities, provided it is legally channeled and in line with regulations concerning foreign currency and credits. It will also be able to approve direct external cooperation of an official nature, provided information on the recipient of that cooperation has been previously provided.

The government will grant legal and institutional facilities for private channels of direct foreign cooperation for communities, social organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, and it will not discriminate between one or the other as long as it is proven that they will develop or seek to develop projects of overall development. Former fighters from both parties will have access to foreign cooperation funds.

VIII. Forum for Socioeconomic Coordination

1. Objective of the Forum

A forum will be created with the equal participation of government, labor, and business sectors, to secure broad agreements on the country's socioeconomic development for the benefit of all its inhabitants. Coordination will be a sustained effort, in phases, considering that the purpose is to secure agreements to be implemented immediately to achieve stabilization, to attack the socioeconomic problems that will stem from the end of the conflict, and those entailed in reconstruction.

The government will propose to the forum on socioeconomic coordination the revision of labor aspects of the legal system to promote and maintain a harmonious climate in labor relations, without detriment to the unemployed sectors and the public in general. It will also propose an analysis of the situation of marginal urban and suburban communities with a view to solve problems that stem from the armed conflict of the past few years. In general, the forum will be a mechanism to secure measures that will alleviate the social cost of the structural adjustment program.

2. The Installation of the Forum

Copaz will convene to install the socioeconomic coordination forum members, within one month at the latest after the present agreement is signed.

3. Composition and Representation of the Forum

The composition and representation of the sectors and the government in the forum will be as follows:

a. The Government of El Salvador will have high-level representation, with decisionmaking capability in the social and economic areas;

b. The organizations that have the largest representation will be called upon to represent the labor and business sectors.

Furthermore, representation as observers will be open to the participation of other social and political sectors under conditions determined by the forum.

4. Attributions of the Forum

The forum will define its operational structure and the topics for discussion and coordination. The sectors represented in the forum will have equal rights and will enjoy the same conditions to present their proposals.

To guarantee the effectiveness of the agreements reached by consensus in the forum, the Government of El Salvador commits itself to enacting, modifying, or repealing the decrees or regulations it is authorized to and to present initiatives pertinent to other state organizations.

5. Secretariat of the Forum

The forum will designate a secretariat that will lend it technical support and ensure the continuation of its work.

IX. National Reconstruction Plan

The Government of El Salvador will present to the FMLN, within 30 days following the signing of document ending the armed confrontation, the National Reconstruction Plan it has drafted so that the recommendations and suggestions of the FMLN and those of other sectors of the nation will be considered to reflect the collective will of the country.

The plan's principal objectives are the overall development of areas affected by the war, paying attention to the most pressing needs of the people most affected by the war, and the former combatants on both sides, and to the reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure. In particular, in keeping with the respective national programs, measures will be adopted intended to facilitate the reintegration of the FMLN into the country's civil, institutional, and political life, including programs such as scholarships, jobs, and pensions; housing programs; and the establishment of enterprises.

The plan will offer special attention to the need of creating opportunities for mass employment and increasing the production of basic foodstuffs, which will take precedence for the state. For that purpose, the government will promote the overall development of agriculture, livestock, fishery, forestry, and agro-industrial activities and guarantee basic social services. It will initiate the construction and rehabilitation of the socioeconomic infrastructure. Also, the National Reconstruction Plan will include programs that will benefit both the war wounded and relatives of victims among the civilian population.

Given the large amount of additional resources that will be required to implement the aforementioned plan, both parties will call upon the international community to lend the greatest support possible to this drive. A national reconstruction fund will be created for that purpose by the UN Development Program [UNDP].

The role of the UNDP will include counseling by the government in everything that pertains to mobilizing foreign support, contributing to the preparation of projects and programs that receive such support, expediting arrangements with official organizations of a bilateral and multilateral nature, mobilizing technical assistance, and cooperating with the government in coordinating the plan with nongovernmental organizations dedicated to development activities at the local and regional level.

Public Security Academy

PA1001203492 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1650 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] San Salvador, 10 January (ACAN-EFE)—The following is the full text of the hitherto undisclosed agreement between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front guerrillas to create "A Public Security National Academy" [Academia Nacional de Seguridad Publica"] as part of the general peace agreements.

Some of the details of the agreements, to be signed on 16 January in Mexico City, Mexico, depend on the definition of details and dates, which the two sides are currently negotiating at UN Headquarters in New York.

Draft Law on the Public Security National Academy

Article 1.

1) The Public Security National Academy of El Salvador is created as an autonomus organism assigned to the Interior and Public Security Ministry.

2) To fulfill its goals, the Academy enjoys its own legal status, administrative autonomy, and the full power to function based on existing legislation.

3) The Academy functions with financial autonomy, and will have sufficient resources. For that purpose, it has its own budget.

Article 2.

The activity of the Academy can be conducted throughout the country. The Academy headquarters will be located in... (pending).

Article 3.

1) Included in the Academy's functions are:

a) training members of the National Civilian Police [PNC].

b) drafting selection plans and conducting the respective tests to enter and graduate from the PNC.

c) investigating, studying, and disseminating information about matters related to the PNC and public security.

2) The Academy will provide studies corresponding to the training cycles that may be created for the PNC, based on the study plans that are established.

3) To achieve and develop those goals, the Academy will promote institutional cooperation among universities, the Judicial Branch, the attorney general's office, and other national or foreign institutions useful to the above educational goals.

Article 4.

The directive and administrative sections of the Academy are the director and the Academic Council.

Article 5.

The director, who has the same rank as the PNC director, is appointed in a manner similar to the PNC director, as proposed by the interior and public security minister.

The director's term in office will be 3 years.

Article 6.

The Academic Council has eight members, all civilians. They are named by the minister, as proposed by the director, from persons in civic, cultural, legal, technical, police, and academic endeavors who have different views. Its mandate is the same as that of the Academy director.

Article 7.

The Academy director will:

a) Direct the Academy services and personnel;

b) Authorize expenses and payments;

c) Issue diplomas and certificates;

d) Hand out appointments and contracts to teachers designated by the Academic Council;

e) Hire administrative personnel for the Academy;

f) Prepare the draft budget; and

h) [as received] Direct implementation of plans for training and selection.

Article 8.

The Academic Council will:

a) Appoint teachers, avoiding predominance of a specific political party;

b) Determine the admission system and make sure that it is not discriminatory.

c) Issue reports and recommendations on teachers' activities.

d) Inform the director on matters requested by him;

e) Prepare annual reports on the activities of the Academy.

Article 9.

The Academy's patrimony is comprised of the following resources:

a) Contributions from the government;

b) Contributions from international organizations;

c) Subsidies and other public or private contributions;

d) Payments derived from agreements;

e) Other contributions.

Article 10.

1) The Academy's organizational structure will be determined by decree;

2) The Academy's permanent personnel will have the status of public administration official.

Article 11.

The following temporary rules will be applied in the appointment of the Academy's first director and the first Academic Council:

1) The director will be appointed by the president of the republic from a list of candidates proposed by the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Copaz).

2) Copaz will also propose a list of candidates for the Academic Council based on criteria of political pluralism, for their appointment by the president of the republic.

3) During the transition, the Public Security National Academy will not be under the jurisdiction of any ministry. Its director will be under the direct authority of the president of the republic.

National Civilian Police

PA1201011792 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1717 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] San Salvador, 11 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—Following is the full text, which has not yet been revealed, of one of the most important peace agreements to be signed in Mexico on 16 January by the Salvadoran guerrillas and government. The following agreement creates the new National Civilian Police [PNC]

Consolidated Working Document

National Civilian Police

I. Creation of the PNC

The PNC will be created in accordance with the constitutional reform emanating from the agreements reached in Mexico. The PNC will be a new organization that will have a new leadership, new training methods, and a new doctrine.

1. The PNC will be the sole nationwide armed police body. Its mission will be to protect and guarantee the free exercise of a person's rights and liberties; prevent and combat all kinds of crimes; and maintain internal peace, calm, order, and public security in rural and urban areas.

2. In keeping with the New York agreement, the PNC organization and the general characteristics of its personnel profile will be defined by the terms established in that agreement under close international cooperation and supervision and UN coordination.

(The international cooperation mentioned in these agreements will be coordinated by the United Nations and subjected to the receipt of formal government requests and compliance with official formalities and the corresponding consultations.)

II. Doctrine

1. The legal regime, the personnel training, the organizational and operational guidelines, the institutional definition, and the PNC actions will be guided by democratic principles; by the notion that public security is a state service for the citizens that is granted regardless of political or ideological considerations or social position, and free any other kind of discrimination; by a respect for human rights; by efforts to prevent crime; and by the subordination of the body to constitutional authority. The exercise of the citizens' political rights cannot be undermined by police actions.

2. The PNC will be a professional body, independent of the armed forces and partisan activity. Without having their citizens' rights to follow their political preferences undermined, they cannot use their position for partisan purposes.

3. PNC members will at all times fulfill the duties imposed by the law by serving the community and protecting all people from illegal actions in keeping with the high degree of responsibility demanded by their profession.

4. In the fulfillment of their duties, PNC members will respect and protect human dignity and respect and defend the human rights of all the people.

5. PNC members may use force only when absolutely necessary and only to the extent required for the fulfillment of their tasks.

6. Confidential matters that PNC members may have access to will be kept secret unless the fulfillment of their duties or the needs of justice strictly demand otherwise.

7. No PNC member may inflict, instigate, or tolerate any act of torture or similar treatment or any cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. No PNC member may claim the order by a superior or special situation—such as war or the threat of war, threat to national security, internal political instability, or any other public emergency—as a justification to torture or inflict other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

8. All superior orders will be in keeping with the laws of the republic. Obedience to a superior order will not be justification for the commission of clearly punishable acts.

9. PNC members will guarantee the full protection of people under their custody, and in particular, adopt immediate measures to provide medical attention when warranted.

10. PNC members will commit no acts of corruption and will also vigorously oppose such actions and combat them.

11. PNC members who have reason to believe that a violation of the current norms of conduct has occurred, or is about to occur, must notify their superior officers and, if necessary, any authority or the appropriate organization that has control or corrective authority.

12. While carrying out their job, PNC members will use, whenever possible, nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only when other methods prove ineffective or do not fully guarantee the achievement of a foreseen legitimate result.

13. PNC members will not use firearms against the people except to defend themselves or others, in case of imminent death or critical injuries; to prevent the perpetration of a particularly grave crime entailing a serious threat to life; to arrest a person who represents danger and resists the PNC member's authority; and only in case less extreme measures prove insufficient to achieve those goals. In any case, lethal weapons may intentionally be used only when they are absolutely necessary to defend a life.

14. In accordance with the fulfillment of their duty to protect people's rights, PNC members will protect the exercise of the right to meet and participate in demonstrations when, for legal reasons, they are compelled to dissolve a demonstration or meeting; they will use the least dangerous means and only the minimum measure of force required. PNC members will abstain from using firearms in those cases, except when it involves violent meetings in which other measures have been exhausted and when the circumstances in the preceding paragraph prevail.

III. Operational and Territorial Structure

The operational and territorial structure to be adopted by the PNC is defined in the following general outline. The structure must be reflected in the PNC's organization chart and organization law.

1. General Legal Framework

A. PNC Authorities

a) The PNC will be under the rule of civilian authorities (Article 168, Number 17 of the Constitution). The authorities will be: The president of the republic, the minister [not further identified], the deputy minister [not further identified], the police director general, the assistant directors general, the inspector general, and the chiefs of departmental divisions [delegaciones].

b) The PNC inspector general will be appointed by the president of the republic. He may be removed by a Legislative Assembly resolution in the case of grave human rights violations. PNC commanders will be civilians.

c) Without detriment to the provisions in this agreement for a transitory regime, the PNC will be assigned to a new Interior and Public Security Ministry. The current Interior Ministry will be reorganized to that effect. A public security deputy ministry will be created, and it will be in charge of relations with the PNC. The public security structure will be entirely new.

B. Nature of the Organization

The PNC will have a centralized organization because it will be structured at the national level so that it may cover all the tasks assigned to the police. However, its operation will be decentralized because it will be comprised of Departmental Police Divisions [delegaciones] according to the country's administrative division.

Given the type of functions assigned to certain agencies within the PNC's organization, they may be placed under the functional rule of certain authorities in the terms outlined by this agreement.

2. Organizations Under the Director General

A. Assistant Directorates General

B. The Inspector General's Office

The Police Inspector General's Office will operate under the Director General's authority, and it will supervise and control the activities of the corps' operational services. The inspector general will be appointed by the director general, following consultations with the attorney general of the republic and the national human rights attorney.

The Inspector General's Office will be comprised of the Control Division, whose function will be to control any police service; and the Disciplinary Investigation Division, whose function will be to investigate disciplinary violations perpetrated by a police member.

C. Legal Counseling Services

These services will be offered by legal experts in the area. The legal counseling will be organized in keeping with the needs of the different operational and territorial structures of the police.

D. International Counseling Services

International counseling will be offered by qualified personnel and high-level technicians. It will be coordinated by the United Nations and will have a temporary nature.

3. The General Operations Deputy Director's Office

A. The Divisions.

a. The Public Security Division

The Public Security Division will be responsible for maintaining tranquility, order, and public security. It will consist of the following departments: Prevention; traffic; public order; private security; juvenile (this department will support the Juvenile Directorate of the Justice Ministry); and general coordination with the departmental offices.

b. The Criminal Investigative Division

Placed under the operational command of the attorney general of the republic, the Criminal Investigation Division will be responsible for investigating crimes and gathering evidence that will serve to identify those responsible. It will also conduct investigations or other duties, as requested by the attorney general of the republic, the judges, and the courts.

The chief of the division will be appointed by the director general of the PNC, after consulting with the attorney general and the president of the Supreme Court of Justice.

The area of operation of that division will be organized in keeping with the crimes that are most frequently perpetrated. It will also have some technical support departments. The juridical administration applicable to the division will be in line with the Constitution with regard to the auxiliary organs of justice.

c. The Border Division

This division will be responsible for overseeing and controlling the entry, departure, activities, and deportation of foreign citizens, as well as the migration of national citizens. It will also provide security and protection to public and private civilian airports, without interfering with the constitutional mission of the Armed Forces to defend the integrity of the territory of the state.

d. The Finance Division

Placed under the operational command of the Finance Ministry and without affecting the fiscal control or other tasks of the said ministry, this division will be responsible for preventing and fighting the violations of the fiscal legislation. It will be the organ that will provide police support to the Finance Ministry. It will be divided into two departments: Customs and Tax.

The Finance Division will be the only police organ that will exercise authority over the areas of customs and taxes. Consequently, when it begins operating, all the provisions and structures that are not consistent with that principle will be left out.

The chief of the Finance Division will be appointed by the director general of the PNC with the approval of the finance minister.

e. The Arms and Explosives Division

This division will be responsible for preventing and taking action against violations of the constitutional and legal regime in manufacturing, importing, exporting, in commerce, ownership, and in bearing arms, ammunition, explosives, and similar articles.

f. The Division of Protection of Personalities

This division will be responsible for guarding and escorting high-ranking government officials, foreign dignitaries who may be visiting the country, and other persons, as a result of decisions made by the government or courts. In addition, it will be tasked with guarding public buildings and the offices of diplomatic missions or international organizations.

g. The Environmental Division

Under the operational command of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, this division will be tasked with preventing and fighting crimes and offenses against the environment.

The chief of the Environmental Division will be appointed by the director general of the PNC, with the approval of the minister of agriculture and livestock.

B. Territorial Distribution

A police office will be created in each department, plus a metropolitan police office for San Salvador. The headquarters of the regional police offices will be located in the capitals of the departments. Each police office will be able to have subdivisions, which will be located in the most important cities and also police offices in rural areas.

a. The Departmental Police Office

The chief of the departmental police office will exercise his authority over all units of that department. He will be appointed by the director general of the PNC at the request of the deputy director of operations, who will be his immediate supervisor. Its organic structure will be made in accordance with the needs of each department.

b. The Subdivisions and the Police Stations

Police offices will be established in the cities and will be organized in keeping with the local needs. Police stations will operate in rural areas.

4. The Administrative General Deputy Director's Office

The Administrative Deputy Director's Office will be responsible for carrying out and coordinating administrative activities, and providing logistical support to the police. In its initial stage, it will include the following divisions:

Infrastructure

Information Science

Administration

Logistics

Planning and Budget

IV. PNC Personnel

The PNC personnel will be organized under a hierarchical roster that will have three levels: basic, executive, and superior. Each level will have the positions stipulated by law. The personnel guidelines and general rules will be adapted to the terms stated in the current agreement.

1. Guidelines

A. The PNC personnel must have the calling to serve the community, must be proficient in human relations, and must be emotionally mature. The personnel must observe the necessary conduct and have the mandatory physical requirements to be policemen. Personnel must be able to work in a police corps that is conceived, structured, and disciplined as a civilian institution that must protect and ensure the free exercise of all the people's rights and liberties; that must prevent and fight all types of crimes; and that must maintain internal peace, tranquility, order, and public security in the country. The conduct of the police personnel conduct must conform satisfactorily to the National Civilian Police's doctrine and the legal system.

A candidate's resume will have to be verified prior to his admittance to the National Security Academy and to his permanent admittance to the corps. Specific guidelines and evaluation procedures will be established for each position and level of responsibility.

B. Education Requirements

a. Basic Level

(1) A policeman must have completed the ninth grade in high school education.

(2) The police sergeants must have a high school diploma.

b. Executive level

The applicant must have passed three years of university studies or the equivalent.

c. Superior level

The applicant requires a university bachelor's degree or the equivalent.

C. General requirements to enter the National Public Security Academy.

The requirements for a candidate to be admitted to the National Public Security Academy are:

a. must be a Salvadoran by birth;

b. must be 18 years old prior to the date he presents his application;

c. must have the required studies for the position or level he is requesting;

d. must be physically fit;

e. must be in full exercise of all his civil rights;

f. cannot have a criminal record, that is, he cannot have a record of having been convicted of a crime;

g. must pass the entry tests that will confirm whether the candidate meets the requirements to become a PNC member, according to each of the levels of responsibility defined by this agreement. The entry tests will include education, physical, health, and technical placement exams. The exams will be complemented by personal interviews with the candidates.

D. The exams mentioned in the preceding paragraph, as well as the manner in which the panel responsible for the exams and their evaluation is chosen, will be determined under entirely technical guidelines.

E. Special emphasis will be placed on training personnel. The objective is to give them the best professional skill and prepare them to carry out their work with strict adherence to the corp's doctrine. Special importance will placed upon respect for human rights.

2. General Regulations

A. The PNC members will be career professionals and representatives of authority.

B. The regulations that cover the duties, rights, responsibilities, and discipline of the PNC be determined by law.

C. The PNC members will be obliged to render their services anywhere in the national territory.

D. The PNC members will wear the required uniform whenever they are on active duty. In exceptional cases, the minister or deputy minister or the general director will be able to authorize that a policeman not wear the uniform to carry out a special task.

E. The PNC members will carry weapons when the service they are rendering requires it. They will only use handguns that are considered proper for police work and are not war materiel. The PNC's arsenal will have special weapons to be used by trained personnel when the minister or the deputy minister or the general director consider that there are special circumstances that require it.

F. The PNC members will respect the Constitution and the laws and will adjust their conduct at all times to the corp's doctrine, as has been defined in the present agreement.

G. The PNC members will not normally be confined to barracks. That regulation will only be implemented under special conditions and only for the period of time required by the special conditions.

H. A law to cover the special situation of the PNC members' labor rights will be formulated in accordance with the nature of the tasks they must carry out.

I. The PNC members will enjoy job stability. They cannot be fired except for specific legal reasons.

J. The PNC member will have a right to a salary to ensure proper living conditions for the policeman and his family, in accordance, also, with the policeman's rank and years in service.

K. The vehicles, communication equipment, uniforms, installations, and, in general, the equipment to be used by the PNC members will conform to the requirements of a police corps of the nature established in the current agreement.

V. National Public Security Academy

1. The National Public Security Academy's responsibilities are:

A. The training of the PNC personnel at the basic, intermediate, superior, and specialized levels.

B. The selection of the PNC personnel.

C. The investigation, evaluation, and announcement of all matters related to the PNC and public security.

D. The yearly evaluation of all PNC personnel.

2. The National Public Security Academy will be an autonomous organization placed directly under the public security minister's authority.

3. The National Public Security Academy will have a directorate board comprised of a director general and an Academic Council. The Academic Council will have normative and comptrollership functions within its field. The director general will be chairman of the Academic Council and he will have executive and administrative authority in the academy.

4. The director general will be appointed by the president of the republic.

5. The Academic Council will be comprised of civilians with an outstanding role in the country's civilian, cultural, legal, technical, police, or academic life; they will be appointed by the president of the republic upon proposals from the public security ministry and based on popular political views.

6. The admissions system will be determined by the Academic Council, which must guarantee that it is not discriminatory.

7. The academy's teaching staff will be appointed by the Academic Council. No political tendency should predominate within the staff. The law will establish the appropriate mechanisms to guarantee that last goal.

VI. Legal System

The PNC and the National Public Security Academy will be regulated by two special laws. Consequently, the parties state their general agreement with the proposals for legislative bills that are included as annexes to this agreement. Therefore, consistent with the New York Agreement, the proposals will be sent to Copaz along with this agreement so that it may prepare the corresponding bills.

VII. Transition Regime

1. Organization

A) The PNC will not be placed under the authority of a ministry during the transition. The director general will be under the direct authority of the President of the Republic.

B) The PNC's organization will be led by the director general, under the terms set forth in this agreement and the New York Agreement. The organization will be carried out by a coordinator, selected by consensus, until the PNC's creation is legally established.

C) During the transition, the PNC director general will be appointed by the president of the republic from a list of candidates proposed by the Copaz.

D) The coordinator, and then the national director, will establish the appropriate information and communication mechanisms with Copaz or, prior to its formal installation, with its Transitory Phase, so that it can fulfill its supervisory role in the PNC's organization. Within the normal exercise of its authority, Copaz will appoint a subcommission to carry out that mission; and the subcommission will act as a consultative commission for the coordinator or director general to adopt decisions or relevant measures concerning the PNC's organization, its functions, and general issues related to the transition regime that have not been specifically settled in this agreement.

E) According to what is established in the New York Agreement, the PNC's organization will be defined in the terms outlined in this agreement, with close international cooperation and supervision, coordinated by the United Nations.

2. Carrying Out Duties

A. The PNC will progressively carry out its duties to allow the contingents graduating from the National Public Security Academy to allow each of the functional and territorial contingents outlined in this agreement to fully assume their duties. The director general will determine priorities and the order in which the duties will be carried out.

B. The process of replacing former security forces will be carried out by department, making sure that there are no gaps in authority. All the departments must be covered by PNC contingents within 21 months of starting the process.

C. The goal of 5,700 members and 240 executive and higher level officers must be reached within the first two years of creating the new corps. The definite PNC figures—10,000 basic level members and 500 executive and higher level members according to preliminary estimates—must be reached within the next five years.

D. The director general will be able to order the creation of provisional commands exclusively for the PNC, while the first directorate and executive echelons are organized. Those commands will operate for a predetermined period and they will be supported by experts and advisers within a program of close international cooperation and supervision that will be coordinated by the United Nations under the terms outlined in this agreement.

E. While the new corps progressively carries out its duties based on the terms outlined in this agreement, the current National Police will continue to fulfill its usual obligations concerning public security, based on decisions made by the PNC director general and according to the following paragraph.

The National Police will be the only current public security corps body that will keep its functions during the transition period. The participation of a group of specialists from countries with experience in the organization and operation of civilian police corps will be included in the international verification of the agreements, carried out by the United Nations through Onusal. The specialists' role will include—in addition to cooperating for the appropriate implementation of the transition and providing assistance to the police authorities—accompanying the PNC officers and agents when they carry out their duties.

F. While the new corps is progressively being deployed to zones that have traditionally been affected by the armed conflict, public security in those zones will be subject to a special regime that will be defined by the PNC Director

General. In any case, the regime will call for the participation of the group of specialists mentioned in the previous paragraph.

G. PNC personnel graduating from the National Public Security Academy will be subject to the general no-billet rule included in this agreement. However, exceptions may be made in the beginning, whenever it is deemed necessary by the lack of personnel during the preliminary phases of the new corps' deployment. In any case, the special regime may not be extended beyond 31 December 1993.

H. In any case, the international advisory and verification role will be strengthened during the preparatory phase and during the transitory period in general, until the National Police is fully replaced by the PNC.

3. National Public Security Academy

A. During the transition period, the National Public Security Academy will not be under any ministry. Its director will be under the direct authority of the president of the republic.

B. The director general of the National Public Security Academy will be chosen during the transition period by the president of the republic from a slate proposed by Copaz.

C. Copaz will determine the number of members of the Academic Council of the National Public Security Academy during the transition period. During that period, council members will be chosen by the president of the republic from slates proposed by Copaz. At any rate, it will be made up of civilians with outstanding civilian, cultural, judicial, technical, police, or academic records, in keeping with this agreement. The slates proposed by Copaz and the president of republic's final appointments must ensure that the makeup of the Academic Council is pluralistic.

D. The admissions system will be established by the Academic Council, which will ensure that it will not be discriminatory.

E. Admissions will be contingent on passing of admissions tests specified in Chapter IV of this agreement and adapted to the criteria and procedures mentioned in the New York agreements. The drafting of such tests will be based exclusively on technical criteria. The composition of the juries tasked with administering and grading the tests must ensure their absolute impartiality. For that purpose, should it be necessary to obtain suitable technical resources that are in short supply in the country, the help of experts will be secured, in keeping with Paragraph F of this section, via the United Nations under the terms specified in this agreement. Copaz will closely supervise that.

F. In selecting the initial academic personnel, all efforts will be made to secure the services of the best human resources available in Salvadoran society to put together a team of professors who are sufficiently broad-minded, pluralistic, and qualified to offer the new police the bases of a cultural identity that is in keeping with their nature and doctrine. To that effect, the collaboration of university professors, expert jurists, doctors, and other professionals linked to police life will be recruited. Copaz will establish the appropriate mechanisms to ensure that this academic body will not be dominated by any political persuasion. The mechanisms must be included in a draft bill on the National Public Security Academy.

G. The support of experts, as specified by the following article, will be secured via the United Nations, in keeping with the terms established in this agreement, should certain areas of study lack sufficient local teaching personnel to meet the initial needs of the academy.

H. In the recruitment, selection, and training of the new personnel, the support of experts from other countries, who can offer the required assistance to meet the process' needs, will be secured via the United Nations, under the terms established in this agreement.

4. Personnel

A. The criteria and mechanisms used to select and train personnel will be based on the principle of the PNC as a new body, with a new organization, new leadership, new training mechanisms, and new doctrine. With that in mind, people who had have no relation to the armed conflict will be incorporated into the organization. That will be done without violating the right of those being tested; the National Police and former FMLN combatants will not be discriminated against in the selection of personnel to join the PNC under the terms specified by the New York agreements and the present agreement.

B. Shortly an information and propaganda campaign aimed at encouraging the recruitment of new personnel for the PNC will be devised and implemented. Special emphasis will be placed on recruiting women.

C. According to the present agreement, after an evaluation of their conduct has been done, the former members of the National Police will be able to join the PNC as long as they comply with the admissions requirements and pass through the new National Public Security Academy. The aforementioned evaluation will be conducted by the director general of the PNC, under the supervision of Copaz, and it will be subject to verification by the United Nations.

D. The former combatants of the FMLN will be able to join the PNC as long as they comply with the admissions criteria and procedures established by Copaz and go though the National Public Security Academy. As part of the verification of the cease-fire, Onusal will see to it that the former FMLN members who are prospective candidates have effectively and definitely abandoned the armed struggle. That will be supervised and guaranteed by Copaz.

E. Regarding the recruitment of personnel alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, at the basic level of the PNC, the cultural level of prospective candidates and/or the areas from where they will be recruited to perform their duties will be taken into account. Those who do not have the level of studies required to join the PNC will have to pass an aptitude and ability test, which will permit the authorities to evaluate their ability to satisfactorily pass the study programs at the National Public Security Academy. To prepare prospective candidates for that test, specific courses will be organized by the National Public Security Academy, with the support of the Education Ministry and universities in the country.

F. For the courses at the basic level, 330 candidates will be selected each month for a six-month training class, during the first 24 months of the massive training program. The selection will be made in such a way as to ensure that most candidates have not had direct participation in the armed conflict, and to ensure that the participation of former FMLN combatants is not greater than that of the former National Police members, or vice versa. Copaz will verify that the aforesaid measures are complied with.

G. The recruitment of cadres for the executive and top positions at the PNC will be made based on a rigorous selection process, in keeping with the criteria and procedures established in the present agreement. The principles of nondiscrimination and equal opportunity among the candidates will be fully adhered to in the selection process. The courses will last one year, depending on the level and echelon in question. Every year, 120 cadres will be trained.

H. The appointments of graduates to the National Public Security Academy at the executive and top levels will be made by the director general, based on the needs of the service. However, those who have ranked in the first five positions of each promotion will be able to choose among the different vacant slots corresponding to the level of responsibility of the approved courses.

I. Without affecting the preceding paragraph, the traditional areas of conflict during the war will be treated in a different way in order to promote national reconciliation and stability in the transition period. Such special administration will include the incorporation of police units of different origin who have graduated from the National Public Security Academy. The appointment of the chiefs of the corresponding police stations will be made based on recommendation by the consulting commission of Copaz.

J. All persons joining the PNC in accordance with the present agreement, regardless of their origin, will be considered civilians.

5. Any other matter pertaining to the temporary administration not covered by the present or by other agreements adopted by the parties will be decided by Copaz, according to the terms established by the New York Agreement, during the transition period.

Electoral, Judicial Systems

PA1001185392 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1601 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] San Salvador, 10 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—Following are the complete texts, texts that had not been disclosed, of the agreements on the electoral and judicial systems reached between the government and the guerrillas of El Salvador. They will be signed in Mexico on 16 January.

Working Document on the Electoral System

The parties reaffirm their commitment, contained in the Mexico Agreements, to promote a general project of reforms to the electoral system. To that end, they ask Copaz to appoint a special commission created for such a purpose in the Mexico agreements. That commission will study the draft reforms to the electoral code that the Central Electoral Council presented to the Legislative Assembly, as well as any contributions that may be presented by any of its members or the independent experts invited for this purpose. The special commission will organize its work in such a way that the work can be used within the scheduled time for the electoral reform.

Working Document on the Judicial System

1. National Council of the Judicature

The parties reaffirm what they have agreed on in the Mexico Agreements, in the sense that the National Council of the Judicature will be formed to guarantee its independence from the branches of the state and the political parties. It will be made up not only of judges, but of members of society who are not directly linked to the administration of justice. In accordance with the New York Agreement, this matter is put into the hands of Copaz in order to prepare the corresponding bill.

2. Judicial Training School

A. In compliance with the Mexico Agreements, the bill mentioned in the preceding paragraph must include the regulation for the Judicial Training School, which will operate under the authority of the National Council of the Judicature. The purpose of the school is to guarantee continuous improvement in the professional training of judges, other judicial officials, and members of the attorney general's office; to investigate the country's judicial problems and to promote solutions for them; and to further greater ties of solidarity among themselves, as well as coherence in their overall view of the judicial mission in a democratic state.

B. The management and organization of the school will be established so as to guarantee its academic independence and to guarantee access to persons of different currents of juridical thought.

3. The National Prosecuting Office for the Defense of Human Rights

A. The national prosecutor for human rights will be appointed 30 days after the constitutional reforms contained in the Mexico Agreements become effective.

B. Copaz will be in charge of drafting the bill for the National Prosecuting Office for the Defense of Human Rights.

C. The bill will establish the appropariate means to make effective the firm commitment the two parties made during the negotiations to identify and eradicate any of the groups involved in the systematic violations of human rights, especially with regard to arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, and executions, as well as other ways that go against an individual's freedom and personal safety. That includes a commitment to identify and, when applicable, eliminate and dismantle any jail or secret detention sites. In any case, the parties agree to give top priority to the investigation of such cases, under the verification of Onusal.

Armed Forces High Command Announces Changes

PA1101214292 Paris AFP in Spanish 1923 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] San Salvador, 11 Jan (AFP)—The High Command of the Salvadoran Armed Forces announced today several changes of commanders affecting seven brigades, five military garrisons, and two elite battalions.

One of the most important changes announced is that of Colonel Francisco Helena Fuentes, who was removed from the post of chief of the 1st Army Brigade in San Salvador. He was appointed as representative to the Permanent Cooperation Confederation of Central American Armies, which is based in Guatemala.

Colonel Humberto Gomez, who served for the last two years as commander of the 2d Army Brigade in Santa Ana, will reportedly replace Col. Fuentes. Colonel Rolando Herrarte, who served as chief of the 4th Army Brigade in San Vicente, will replaced Col. Gomez.

Colonel Ciro Lopez was also removed as chief of the 3rd Infantry Brigade based in San Miguel, 138 km east of the capital. Lopez, who reportedly will be replaced by Colonel Ivan Reynaldo Diaz, was appointed to the post of National Police general director.

Another important change reported by the January military order is the removal of Colonel Oscar Leon Linares from the post of commander of the Morazan Garrison. Col. Oscar Leon Linares was appointed as commander of the 4th Infantry Brigade based in Chalatenango.

Colonel Jose Angel Orellana was appointed as commander of the Morazan Garrison, while Colonel Arnoldo Majano Araujo was appointed as 4th Army Brigade commander. Colonel Julio Grijalva, who was until now chief of the 4th Army Brigade, was appointed director of the Military Academy.

There were also changes of commanders in the garrisons of Sensuntepeque, La Union, Sonsonate, Cojutepeque, as well as the counterinsurgency elite battalions "Atonal" and "Belloso."

Twelve changes were also reported in lower echelon positions, particularly in some battalions, while the High Command of the Salvadoran Armed Forces remained intact.

Nicaragua

President Chamorro Opens Assembly Session

PA1201185692 Managua Radio Nicaragua Network in Spanish 1540 GMT 10 Jan 92

["Annual report to the nation" by President Violeta Chamorro at the National Assembly session opening, at the Legislative Palace in Managua—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] We want a Republic of Nicaragua based on love for the fatherland; representing peace, reconciliation, freedom, progress, and social justice. Thanks to the efforts of all Nicaraguans, in 1991 we established the solid foundation for the economic recovery of Nicaragua. Once we attained peace, we eliminated the hyperinflation of 55,000 [number as heard] percent in the first 12 months. We forecast there will be less than 10 percent inflation in the following 12 months of my presidential term.

We have promoted an economic model that encourages private production, particularly from small and medium enterprises, as well as agricultural activities, without neglecting the vulnerable and fragile groups of society. We need to create a society where market efficiency will join social solidarity. We feel the state role should be subsidized; in other words, it should be directed to provide what the individuals and institutions of civil society cannot provide on their own. This calls for an active state without falling into the interventionism of the past decades or the system of oligarchy and exploitation of the Somoza times.

Therefore, 107 state enterprises—representing a heavy burden for the national budget—have been privatized. The process of privatization of state enterprises that we have promoted through the People's National Corporation will encourage the formation of private enterprise, but with the participation of workers. The fiscal and financial reform in 1991 managed to collect, with greater efficiency and equity, the resources needed to provide basic services for all Nicaraguans, particularly for the poorer sector.

We also promulgated the banking law, which allowed the establishment of six private banks of great benefit for a Nicaragua that needs everyone's efforts to strengthen the economy. We approved the foreign investment law to provide a continuous flow of foreign resources to finance our growth and modernize our production. The modern

law for promoting exports also stimulates the variety of our exports. Likewise, the free zone law facilitates investments and generates employment for the Nicaraguan people.

As part of our efforts to recover our economy, we canceled our back payments of $360 million with the financing organizations, which made us eligible for international credit. [break in reception] ....with the country members of the Paris Club, and now that we [words indistinct]. The doors to the World Bank [words indistinct] for the development of our country. We finally signed an agreement on commercial and financial preferential treatment with the United States. We are also negotiating other free trade agreements with Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia.

The policy of my government is to integrate Nicaragua with the world. Therefore, we firmly support Central American and hemispheric integration. We [words indistinct] should be based on a society with clear and strong principles. The family is the indispensable basis of society, where one can be [words indistinct] at the head of a struggle and the survival of the family, without giving up our roles as mothers who guard and struggle for their homes. We must do everything possible to strengthen the family with laws and measures that will promote its unity and its responsibility in the reconstruction of the future.

As a result of all these [words indistinct] in the field of economy, the outlook for recovery and growth for Nicaragua in 1992 is very encouraging. Our goal is to achieve an economic growth between 4 and 5 percent in 1992. If everything works out well, in 1993 we will have greater rates, promoted by the public and private investment of 1992. Nonetheless, we have to say no to violence, regardless of where it comes from and under any political disguise. The economic achievements now require the consolidation of peace among all Nicaraguans to take advantage of the special treatment that we are enjoying from foreign governments and international organizations, and thus achieve the goal of the economic recovery of Nicaragua in 1992. In order to do this, it is absolutely necessary to promote measures of (?investments), from the state institutions, political parties, unions and organizations, as well as the media and all citizens who have been involved in confrontation. My government has always promoted detente.

Therefore, on 22 December 1991 I promulgated an amnesty law for all political and common crimes committed between 10 May 1990 and the date of promulgation of the law. My message is that the armed rebels and those who have promoted violence in the past will return to legality, and will understand that the only way to improve Nicaragua is through social stability and respect for the law and authorities of the country.

It is advisable to caution that this amnesty does not entail tolerance for committing criminal actions in the future. Those who continue to do so as of 1992, will have to suffer the penalties stipulated by the law. They will no longer have any justification for their actions. Therefore, as the economy grows in 1992, we are going to work to strengthen public order, legality, and the reaffirmation of rule of law. Any disruption of public order is an attack against the community, particularly the citizens, and greatly harms Nicaragua. Nobody wants this.

Legality and a respect for the authorities results in harmony and tranquillity. Public order brings us peace and the confidence of the citizens, it benefits the interests of the community, and it promotes development. Those who do not abide by the law will have to accept the punishment stipulated the law, as no one is above the law. Likewise, we plan to strengthen the rule of the law among all public officials. To that effect, I will have a firm hand with government officials involved in proven acts of corruption. As president of the Republic, I feel these tasks should not just be the work of the government, but of all Nicaraguans. Let us all participate in this great task.

On the topic of ownership that took so much of our time in 1991, I want to tell you that even though I understand that reviewing the abuses committed in the transition period is very important—and the office of territorial order will see to this—I also feel that we must worry about the most urgent issues. We must prevent party, personal, or group interests causing confrontations that are harmful, particularly in these crucial moments when we must work toward economic growth and strengthening legality and public order. The topic of ownership must be considered with a high sense of responsibility and justice, within the framework of the legal state that we are building in our country. We must do it without any vindictiveness, and avoid falling into vicious practices of the past. For example, we must avoid using the arbitrary mechanisms of confiscations or massive expropriations. My responsibility as ruler is to watch over the interests of all Nicaraguans.

Esteemed representatives to the National Assembly, Nicaraguan brethren: Today, 10 January, I want to invite all of you to form a great patriotic alliance, a blue and white [national colors, as opposed to the red and black of the Sandinists] understanding that will allow us all to be part of a great task for 1992: Economic growth and strengthening legal order. [passage omitted]

Humberto Ortega Adopts Military Security Plan

PA1201132392 Managua Radio Nicaragua Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] The Sandinist People's Army [EPS] and the National Police will create special rapid deployment units to cope with the recontras and armed former military members [recompas] operating in the country's northern area. General Humberto Ortega, EPS commander in chief, announced on 10 January that a military plan will be coordinated with the special police

forces to impose order in the northern departments of Matagalpa and Jinotega, where approximately 1,000 armed men operate.

He said that the EPS will act strictly to prevent the seizure of highways, the construction of roadblocks by the recontras and recompas—although the intention is to restore order rather than cause a military confrontation. The EPS commander in chief said that former Sandinist military members, meaning recompas, are counterrevolutionaries. He added that right wing politicians who encourage armed groups are irresponsible.

This is not a war between Sandinists and contras; it is a new phenomenon, he said. Gen. Ortega added that the activities of the recontras and recompas are illegal, irresponsible, and adventuresome and have resulted in highway robberies.

New Foreign Minister Leal on Foreign Policy

PA1201171692 Managua Radio Nicaragua Network in Spanish 1248 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] New Foreign Minister Ernesto Leal Sanchez has said that as head of Nicaragua's diplomacy, he will work hard to consolidate the country's international position.

Minister Leal Sanchez stressed that President Chamorro's government has been consolidating its position in the world by working for a broad reconciliation process and economic recovery.

Leal Sanchez said that former Foreign Minister Enrique Dreyfus will return to the private sector.

[Begin recording] [Leal] I would not say that there will be substantial changes, although there will be some adjustments. As we said before, we are considering the possibility of making some changes. We have closed and will close some embassies and transfer some of our missions abroad.

[Unidentified reporter] [Words indistinct], what will be your policy?

[Leal] It will basically be the same. The important thing is that our Foreign Ministry must design policies in accordance with world changes. You are all witnesses to the changes taking place in the world daily, so we must adapt and adjust policies and design strategies to meet these changes. Our foreign policy cannot remain at a standstill at this time. It cannot be a foreign policy based on rigid guidelines on specific matters. It must provide a general framework, which was defined by President Chamorro when she assumed power on 25 April 1990. What we are doing now is adapting our strategies and designing new ones in our bilateral and multilateral relations in accordance with the changes taking place in the world. You have seen what has happened in the former USSR and we are very happy and pleased with the peace agreements in El Salvador. We hope that peace will soon reach Guatemala, so that Central America, as a region, can advance faster in the international community.

[Reporter] Why did Dreyfus resign?

[Leal] I am not aware of the reasons for his resignation. I understand that he will return to the private sector.

[Reporter] What do you think about the cabinet changes?

[Leal] I think that the president can make the changes she deems convenient every year, which is customary in all countries. For example, yesterday I read in LA PRENSA that in Mexico two secretariats were merged and that the finance secretary will now head the merged secretariat. So you see, government changes are normal in all countries, and the Nicaraguan president, who represents the Nicaraguan people, makes the necessary adjustments every year. [end recording]

Former Contra Commander Resigns Government Post

PA1201164592 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 10 Jan 92 p 9

[Article by Guillermo Cortes Dominguez]

[Text] Israel Galeano ("Franklyn"), the last commander of the military counterrevolution, resigned his post at the Government Ministry [Mingo] to engage in private business, a source from that ministry has reported.

Galeano reportedly resigned his post as director of the Inter-Institutional Coordination for the Demobilized to dedicate himself to private business, not due to differences with the Mingo.

The source, which has close links with Galeano, said that "Franklyn's" resignation is not related to the actions conducted by the recontras in the northern part of the country, particularly in Jinotega.

Israel Galeano succeeded former National Guard Colonel Enrique Bermudez as head of the counterrevolution. Galeano officially completed the demobilization of his troops on 28 July 1990 in San Pedro de Lovago, Chontales.

Afterward, he distanced himself from the Nicaraguan Resistance Civic Association headed by Oscar Sovalbarro, "Ruben," in 1991, after assuming the post he is now leaving at the Mingo.

The source said that "Franklyn" believes that the government must restore order in the northern region, but also admits that the executive branch should have implemented actions to ease the difficult situation faced by many demobilized contras.

Galeano feels that nothing can justify resuming the armed struggle. Apparently, he has withdrawn to private life tired of war and of his brief incursion into Nicaraguan political world.

Government Ministry To Investigate Attack

PA1101155292 Managua Sistema Nacional de Television Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Report by Maria Elsa Suarez]

[Text] [Announcer] Government Ministry spokesman Frank Cesar has confirmed that an attack took place on recontra commanders who have been holding talks with the government.

Maria Elsa Suarez has reported that a Government Ministry delegation has gone to the First Region to conduct an investigation.

[Suarez] According to Government Ministry reports, on the evening of 8 January there was an ambush on a vehicle transporting the staff of the so-called Democratic Forces for National Salvation. The injured include recontra commanders Tigrillo [Encarnacion Valdivia], Campeon [Jacino Tercero], and Freddy [Feonel Benavides Castillo].

[Begin Cesar recording] This is the group with which we had been holding talks for approximately four months. This group has the political will to rejoin Nicaragua's civilian life and this type of action mars the dialogue process. We will continue talking with the members of the group but, as they have said, one of their biggest problems is security, and this kind of event creates difficulties. We have already talked with them. Today a Managua delegation went to Esteli to meet with the local people and then talk with these companeros.

We do not know what group carried out the attack, but presumably it was a group of recompas operating in the region. Once the commission returns, or once we establish communication with the First Region—where I was going to go and visit the injured—we will be able to give a full report on what really happened. [end recording]

[Suarez] Cesar announced that he is scheduled to meet with El Indomable next week.

Communique on Fired Deputy Minister Investigation

PA0901214092 Managua Radio Nicaragua Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 9 Jan 92

["Communique" issued by the Public Relations Department of the Comptroller General's Office, in Managua on 8 January]

[Text] The Comptroller General's Office, in light of articles published by several media concerning this institution's participation in the investigation of the Ibarra-Vidaure conflict, wishes to state the following:

1. On 29 November 1991, the Comptroller General's Office issued official credential number DAI-127-91, and on 2 December official credential number GPA-092-91, with which our auditors personally went to the Presidency Ministry to carry out an investigation related to the accusations presented by Deputy Economy Minister Noel Vidaure Arguello against Deputy Presidency Minister Antonio Ibarra Rojas. On that occasion we were not able to initiate our work because we were told that the investigation could not start until the Presidency minister had contacted the comptroller general.

2. Subsequently we received from the Presidency minister a letter dated 12 December 1992, whereby a meeting was requested with the comptroller general. The meeting was to take place before this institution could initiate the appropriate investigations.

In our reply, dated 18 December, we expressed our willingness to hold the meeting as soon as possible, given the magnitude of the case and the amount of publicity surrounding it.

3. On 7 January the Presidential Press and Information Directorate—possibly because it did not have knowledge of the aforementioned—issued a communique stating that the Presidency had requested that the Comptroller General's Office issue a final ruling on the case. First, a ruling had not been requested, and second, it could not be issued because an official investigation has not been carried out for the already stated reasons.

[Issued] Managua on 8 January 1992

[Signed] Public Relations Department of the Comptroller General's Office

Marxist Leader Demands Participation in Dialogue

PA1001173592 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1100 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Isidro Tellez, secretary general of the Marxist-Leninist People's Action Movement, said on 6 January that the talks between the government, the National Opposition Unity [UNO], and the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN] cannot be called a national dialogue, because all the political and social groups of the country have not been invited to participate.

[Begin Tellez recording] It was clearly proved, both last year and the previous year, that the government has tried to depict UNO and the FSLN as the main parties—as if no other parties existed. Given the current situation, meaning the national dialogue, we disqualify it as a national dialogue. We think that a national dialogue implies the participation of all political parties in the country, including all social groups.

In other words, the government should sit down and discuss the problems that are overwhelming the population. We think the government should not meet solely with the political groups; the country's labor groups and social groups should also discuss the problems and be represented in the national dialogue, so that it may be rightfully called a national dialogue.

What has been called a national dialogue, and what the government is trying to install as a national dialogue, is

nothing but the formalization of a series of negotiations that have been carried out between the government, the FSLN, and government dissidents within UNO. They are trying to reach an agreement on how to provoke hunger every day by implementing the economic plan they have designed. They are trying to implement a joint policy against social groups, against the workers.

Consequently, we met with other political groups—for example, the Central American Unionist Party, the Social Christian Party, the Nicaraguan Conservative Party, and others—and agreed to demand our rights. We will demand our right, as legally created political groups, to participate in the dialogue. We believe that the government should invite all political groups. It is up to each group to decide whether or not it wants to participate in the national dialogue.

We think the national dialogue should discuss the problems overwhelming the population—meaning salary, labor, investment, finance, and peasant problems. The point is, we should really discuss those problems—meaning health, housing, and education problems—instead of discussing issues that ...[rephrases] we understand what the government is trying to do. It is trying to distract the people so they do not pay attention to the real problems prevailing in the country.

We have already stated that the so-called national dialogue must... [rephrases] if the government wants to really hear what these groups have to say, it should call them. We also think this is what should be done so that each group may be properly represented. The workers' demands must be seriously discussed in order to seek a solution. We are sure the government does not have a favorable solution for the masses; it is always endorsing its economic plan and the IMF policy. [end recording]

Brazil

U.S. Army Plane Makes Emergency Landing

PY1101154692 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 1520 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] A U.S. Army plane early this morning made an emergency landing at the Corumba Airport in Mato Grosso do Sul State. The plane has been at the service of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.

The plane—which was flying from Bogota, Colombia, to La Paz, Bolivia—was carrying eight passengers. When it was halfway to its destination, the plane started to have problems with its radio equipment, lost its route, flew over Rondonia, and had to make an emergency landing in Corumba.

The passengers consisted of three military officers and five civilians, including Robert Gelbard, U.S. ambassador to Bolivia [title as heard]. Four passengers suffered minor injuries. The plane is now at Corumba Airport awaiting the arrival of experts from the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia.

Brasilia University Hires Foreign Scientists

PY1001205592 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 8 Jan 92 Section 4 p 1

[By Thais Oyama in Brasilia]

[Text] Four Ukrainian and one Vietnamese scientist have been hired by the Brasilia University (UnB) and will arrive at the end of this month. They will work as professors and scientists of the International Physics Center of Condensed Matter [Centro Internacional de Fisica de Materia Condensada] of the UnB. They will receive grants, which include a housing allowance, of between $1,200 and $1,400.

Last July the center offered grants to physicians from anywhere in the world. Of the 40 replies, 30 were from Eastern European scientists. Five professionals were selected for the first phase of the program.

The Ukrainian scientists are between 30 and 40 years old and work in superconductivity in Ukrainian universities and research institutes. The UnB wanted to contract them at the beginning of the year but lacked the money to pay them. The solution was to use the grants offered by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).

The arrival of the scientists in Brazil, initially scheduled for last month, was postponed due to problems encountered by the scientists in obtaining their passports. Some of them obtained their passports after waiting for four months.

The contract with the UnB Center is for four years. Institute Director Alvaro Ferraz has said that some of the scientist have already expressed interest in residing in Brazil. "So much so that some of them are coming with their families," said Ferraz. The contract only offers a monthly allowance and the scientist's fare. Housing and transport for members of their families has to be paid for by the individual scientist.

Five more scientists from Russia, the PRC, Norway, and Vietnam are scheduled to arrive in Brazil by the end of this year. In March, the center's selection committee will select five more scientists for the second phase of the program. A total of 15 foreign scientists will be contracted by the UnB.

Ijui University Hires Russian Scientists

PY1001211992 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 8 Jan 92 Section 4 p 1

[By Ricardo Bonalume Neto in Sao Paulo, Fernando Gabeira in Berlin, and Thais Oyoma in Brasilia]

[Text] It is open season on scientists from the former USSR. The Foreign Ministry has instructed its ambassadors in former communist countries to concentrate on importing brains. A small southern Brazilian university has taken the lead and hired six Russian researchers.

Foreign Ministry Counselor Fernando Pacheco has stated that Ambassador Marcos Azambuja, Foreign Ministry secretary general for political and foreign affairs, intends to discuss the issue with Uruguayan and Argentine representatives.

The arrival of these highly qualified scientists, who are starting a two-year contract at the Ijui University—located about 420 km northwest of Porto Alegre—has practically doubled the number of professors at this university who hold doctorates. Ijui University Rector Telmo Rudi Frantz, 44, states: "They will make a big difference."

The presence of the six Russians in the small southern border town seems even more odd when we tell you that they come from Kazan, about 850 km from Moscow, in the Russian region inhabited by the Tartars. They worked at the Kazan Aviation Institute, an aeronautics research center.

Physicist Joao Carlos da Silveira, 36, an Ijui University professor who studied five years in the then USSR, stated that the institute "was completely involved in war research," but now it is centering its activities on civilian aviation.

The crisis in the former USSR has prompted an exodus of experts and researchers, a phenomenon which concerns the United States. Many of these qualified professionals know how to operate nuclear reactors and weapons and manufacture conventional arms.

The former Soviet socialist republics are being visited by Third World envoys interested in contracting some of the 2,000 experts capable of designing nuclear weapons, or the 5,000 experts who worked in uranium enrichment.

But the CIA (the U.S. secret service) should not be too worried about those who are moving to the southern Brazilian border. The Ijui University has no plans to manufacture a nuclear bomb. It is just interested in training its personnel in scientific research.

Colombia

Ariel Otero Denies Cali Cartel Links

PA1001170692 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0056 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Santa Fe de Bogota, 8 Jan (EFE)—Luis Meneses, former head of one of the self-defense groups in Middle Magdalena, who is known as Ariel Otero, denied on 8 January that he ever offered his services to the "Cali Cartel" to resume the war among drug traffickers, as "The Extraditables" have charged.

On 6 January, "The Extraditables," the armed branch of the "Medellin Cartel," published a communique, the authenticity of which has been questioned by the authorities. The communique said Otero was hired by Gilberto Rodriguez, chief of the "Cali Cartel," to murder former members of the Mafia in Medellin.

"The Extraditables" said in the communique that Otero was protected by Jorge Enrique Velasquez, alias "El Navegante." They said he was responsible for reporting the whereabouts of drug trafficker Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, "El Mexicano," who was killed by the police, and that he currently works for the "Cali Cartel."

Otero said that "as former commander of an armed organization in process of demobilization, I have not sought and do not want to start confrontations or enter into sterile discussions." He said he does not need the protection of third parties or organizations, because he is not being sought by the authorities.

Otero stressed that his legal situation "was settled by a judge," adding: "I do not know and I am not interested in knowing anyone by the name of Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, who has been irresponsibly mentioned as someone who helped me." He recalled that the Colombian Army supervised his surrender.

Otero said he could have waged a war when he had military power, but "it is stupid to think that I would deliver my weapons to begin a war against criminal organizations that are armed and active."

He stressed that "with those deceitful communiques, The Extraditables or Pablo Escobar want to disinform or confuse the public in order to justify possible attacks on citizens. [no closing quotation marks as received]

He said it is possible that Escobar could have ordered the publication of the communique, "and then denied that he issued it, in order to create confusion, as usual."

In fact, Pablo Escobar, the main leader of the "Medellin Cartel" who surrendered to justice last year, denied on 9 January that he issued the communique. Security organizations have not, however, ruled out that possibility.

"The Extraditables," who announced their disappearance when Escobar surrendered, surprised the public with this statement. Their traditional enemies in Cali interpreted it as a new declaration of war.

Otero Shot to Death

PA1001182892 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 1730 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Ariel Otero, chief of the paramilitary groups in the Middle Magdalena region, was shot to death and his body left at the entrance of Puerto Boyaca. Otero's death occurred three days after the drug traffickers of The Extraditables group sentenced him to death.

Recently Otero had promoted the surrender of weapons by many members of the paramilitary groups.

New Paramilitary Group Emerges

PA1101192592 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 1816 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Santa Fe de Bogota, 11 Jan (NOTIMEX)—A new paramilitary group emerged in Colombia and announced that it will "execute" members of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board in reprisal for the killing of the paramilitary commander Ariel Otero.

The body of Otero, considered the number one enemy of the country's rebel groups, was found on 10 January 15 km from Puerto Boyaca.

In a pamphlet read on 11 January by a local radio station, the new organization, called "Ariel Otero," announced that its late leader will be "avenged" and that actions will be initiated against the members of Colombia's communist guerrillas.

The peasant self-defense groups of Magdalena Medio, which emerged at the beginning of the 1980's to defend themselves from rebel attacks, had alliances with drug-trafficking groups, according to the authorities.

Approximately one month ago, Otero had charged that members of the Medellin Cartel were planning to kill him because of his alleged links with the Cali Cartel. His charges, however, were rejected by drug-trafficker Pablo Escobar, who denied having any responsibility for the five attacks carried out in recent months against the commander of the self-defense group.

Otero's body, which was buried in this capital on 11 January amidst strict security measures, was found with a sign hanging from his neck. The sign read: "Ariel Otero, for being a traitor, a thief, and an assassin."

The new paramilitary organization, in declaring war on the guerrilla coordinating board in the country's northeast, stated: We will "execute" the people responsible for this crime.

The Colombian authorities have said, however, that it is not clear yet who killed Otero, who commanded a private army of at least 4,000 men in the Magdalena Medio region, one of the most violent in the country.

ADM-19 Leader Shot To Death in Magangue

PA1101145692 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1851 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Santa Fe de Bogota, 10 Jan (EFE)—Two gunmen killed Democratic Alliance M-19 (ADM-19) leader Jafed Ortiz Bohorquez on 10 January in Magangue (on the northern Caribbean coast), according to ADM-19 sources.

The ADM-19 office in Magangue (Bolivar Department) reported that Ortiz Bohorquez was assassinated by two men who arrived on a motorcycle, violently entered his house, shot him, and then fled.

Leaders of the political party, founded in March 1990 following the dissolution of the 19 April Movement (M-19) guerrilla group, said Ortiz received death threats and had requested special protection from the authorities.

Jafed Ortiz' assassination occurred one day after two gunmen killed Carlos Edgar Torres Aparicio in Cali. Torres was an ADM-19 candidate for the post of assembly member for Valle del Cauca Department.

Medellin Police Discover Clandestine Arsenal

PA1301023392 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 1730 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Report by Diego Alonso Sanchez]

[Text] Antioquia police authorities are currently investigating the origin of a small but modern arsenal discovered in a an apartment located in a very exclusive sector of Medellin.

During an operation carried out within the past few hours in the Monterrey housing development located in the southern Medellin neighborhood of El Poblado, Fourth Brigade units seized six modern short-range and long-range weapons and a large quantity of assorted ammunition.

The small arsenal discovered in one of the closets of the apartments of the housing development includes five modern shotguns, one handgun, a weapons cleaning kit, a telescopic sight, and more than 4,000 rounds of assorted ammunition. During the operation, one person was arrested while trying to escape.

In addition, the discovery of a fake wall in the apartment has led police to suspect that there is an opening that leads to a bigger arsenal than the one uncovered. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to tear down the fake wall since the apartment was ordered sealed by a judge until the owner can be located. Reports indicate that the owner of the apartment is currently out of the city.

The person arrested during the operation was immediately placed under the jurisdiction of a police magistrate.

Roundup of Guerrilla Activities 22 Dec-9 Jan

PA0901155092

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of guerrilla activities in Colombia monitored at Panama Bureau between 23 December 1991 and 9 January 1992. Sourceline information is given in parentheses at the end of each item.

Between 0500 and 0730 on 22 December a group of armed men raided the Argelia Municipality, Cauca Department, kidnapping two nurses and stealing an ambulance. It was also learned that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, guerrillas reportedly took Dr. Lucia Chaves to the El Plateado region to care for injured rebels. As a result of this incident, police deployed helicopter reinforcements to the area to find the guerrillas. (Santa Fe de Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 23 Dec 91 p 9A)

Two FARC guerrillas were reportedly killed on 23 December during clashes with Army troops in the rural area of Planchon on the road from Granada Municipality to El Castillo, Meta Department. A spokesman for the 21st Infantry Battalion reported that units of the 31st Front of the FARC tried to launch a surprise attack against a military patrol at the aforementioned location. (Santa Fe de Bogota EL NUEVO SIGLO in Spanish 24 Dec 91 p 7)

Colonel Carlos Castro Garcia has reported that military and police forces aborted a National Liberation Army, ELN, plan to dynamite the installations of the largest air base on the Atlantic Coast. Col. Castro Garcia confirmed that four guerrillas and one soldier were killed in the foiled attack. The officer concluded that the police also defused a bomb near the air base. (Santa Fe de Bogota EL NUEVO SIGLO in Spanish 30 Dec 91 p 1)

On 29 December troops of the Voltigeros Battalion clashed with ELN rebels in the jungle region of Uraba, Antioquia Department, killing three guerrillas. Army troops are reportedly searching for the guerrillas in a vast area of Mutata Municipality, Antioquia. During the clashes, the Army seized a Galil rifle, three AK-47 assault rifles, communication radios, ammunition, supplies, and other war materiel. (Santa Fe de Bogota EL NUEVO SIGLO in Spanish 30 Dec 91 p 6)

Hope, Peace, and Liberty, EPL, sources have reported that three members of that organization were murdered on 29 December in Chigorodo Municipality, Antioquia, by alleged members of a paramilitary group. Sources reported that unidentified gunmen stormed a shantytown in Chigorodo calling the names of EPL activists, murdering two of them on the spot. Authorities have attributed many of these crimes to dissident groups of the former Popular Liberation Army.

Authorities have reported that one police officer and one guerrilla were killed and another policeman was injured in clashes with FARC rebels on the road between El Rosario and Taminango Municipalities, Narino Department. Meanwhile, seven policemen reportedly disappeared after a FARC column clashed with Army troops on 30 and 31 December in Chita, Boyaca Department. According to eyewitnesses, three policemen were kidnapped by the rebels, while the bodies of the other four were found under the rubble at police headquarters. Also, the 4th Brigade Command reported that Army troops clashed with members of the 36th Front of the FARC in Guadalupe Municipality, Antioquia, killing one guerrilla. Authorities stated that on 31 December six soldiers of Pichincha Battalion and one civilian were injured in an ambush by units of the National Guerrilla Coordinating Board in La Hondita, Pelaya Jurisdiction, Cesar Department. Finally, the Army reported on 1 January that units of Los Panches Counterinsurgency Battalion clashed with FARC guerrillas in El Quebradon, Algeciras Jurisdiction, killing two of them. (Santa Fe de Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 9B)

Police have reported that ELN elements dynamited the "Mata de Bore" bridge in El Carmen Municipality, Santander Department, as well as a municipal storage room and a private home, injuring one peasant. In addition, ELN units reportedly dynamited the "Oponcito," "La Negra," and "La Legia" bridges on the road from Corregimiento El Centro to Yarima, also in Santander. (Santa Fe de Bogota EL NUEVO SIGLO in Spanish 3 Jan 92 p 6)

Police sources have reported that on 6 January ELN guerrillas blocked the road between Bucaramanga and Valledupar in El Barco. After clearing the road, Army troops launched intense patrol operations to try to locate the rebels. (Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 6 Jan 92)

After being held captive for 12 days by the Front Armando Cacua of the ELN, the mayor, notary public, and mayoral candidate of Gonzalez Municipality, located in the southern part of Cesar Department, have been released. The insurgents reportedly demanded that Mayor Wilson Osorio resign from the post as of 1 January; that notary public Manuel Angel Osorio refrain from participating in politics in Gonzalez Municipality; and that mayoral candidate Augusto Osorio drop his candidacy. (Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 6 Jan 92)

On 6 January, FARC guerrillas attacked a police car in the eastern part of Santa Fe de Bogota, killing one soldier, police sources have reported. Authorities concluded that the guerrillas seized the rifle and ammunition belonging to the victim. (Paris AFP in Spanish 0117 GMT 7 Jan 92)

One sergeant major and one soldier were killed, while seven other soldiers were injured during a dynamite attack on January 8 by the Simon Bolivar National Guerrilla Coordinating Board on a road where a police patrol and a military convoy were passing, near Barrancabermeja. The bloody incident took place on the road that goes from the petroleum port to the airport. [Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 8 Jan 92]

U.S. Aircraft Allowed To Overfly Country

PA1201192592 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 1800 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] U.S. military aircraft that overfly Colombian territory have permission from the authorities. Colombia is part of a military multinational antidrug-trafficking operation led by the U.S. Government. Here are the details discovered by this newscast.

U.S. military aircraft are overflying Colombian territory. They are part of an operation called Justice Support, which is coordinated by the Pentagon. Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador are participating. The objective of the Justice Support operation, also called Andean Operation, is to detect aircraft, landing strips, and air routes used by drug traffickers. U.S. P-3 type aircraft take off from two bases, Panama and Guayaquil. Their missions have been conducted in Peru, Ecuador, and southern Colombia. The mission consists of informing the Air Force of each country of the presence of suspicious drug-trafficking aircraft.

The Colombian Defense Ministry confirmed the existence of the Justice Support operation. The U.S. radar aircraft are flying with the permission of Colombian authorities. Colombian Air Force technicians on bases in Panama and Guayaquil are part of the crew of these aircraft. It was discovered that the recent confiscation of a cocaine shipment in Cordoba was the result of this Andean operation. The P-3 aircraft are not gunships or bomber airplanes but radar aircraft that serve to detect air movements in zones outside the range of ground radar and to warn military aircraft to intercept such aircraft. The operation has been handled very confidentially.

It was also discovered that the operation in Colombia is under the command of General Luis Eduardo Roca and that the existence of the Justice Support operation is only known by liaison officers in Palanquero, Cali, and Barranquilla Air Bases. Aircraft from these bases support the P-3 in intercepting the drug-trafficking aircraft. It was reported that no drug-trafficking aircraft have been downed in Colombia thus far. Three have been downed in Peru. Two ground radars recently installed by the U.S. Government in the Amazon Jungle in Peru and Ecuador are part of the Andean Operation. The Colombian Defense Ministry dismissed the presence of U.S. troops in national territory now or in the future.

Ecuador

Reportage on Peruvian President Fujimori's Visit

Fujimori Addresses Congress

PA1101015492 Quito Voz de los Andes in Spanish 2134 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Speech by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori to the National Congress in Quito—live]

[Text] Your Excellency, president of the Ecuadoran Congress; Congressmen, Authorities, Ladies and Gentlemen: When nations overcome their differences, turn their tribulations into hope, and give themselves new opportunities to believe in a better future, then they are given a place in history. In the case of our countries, this is within the framework of our glorious events and strongly exceeds the dreams and words of men like Sucre, Bolivar, and Sanmartin.

Aware that we have come closer on the eve of the new millennium, Ecuador and Peru have given each other this new opportunity. Their peoples have decided to seek among themselves the best reasons for a shared future. Aware of having been given this magnificent opportunity, I am here in this democratic building, which shelters the will of this brotherly people, so that through me— for the first time in the history of our Republics—the president of Peru can speak directly to the Ecuadoran people on their own soil.

I thank you very much for the invitation to visit Congress and for the opportunity to express here my personal affection for the Ecuadoran people, who I know appreciate much more the frankness of direct communication than the precision of form. Your actions build the strong columns of dialogue and set the foundations for true friendship. [applause]

I am here in this legislative building, where the most important pages of Ecuador's democratic history have been written, encouraged by the special welcome you have given me. I am here to confirm again the obvious similarity of our peoples, who are united by the same language, culture, and history. I can truly say I feel at home, [applause] and at every opportunity the people have confirmed this in a spontaneous and frank manner.

Distinguished deputies, allow me, with all due respect, to be very frank in the same manner that your president was very frank with me. I always say what I think—that is my style—even though sometimes I seem to be politically naive. Therefore, I request beforehand your understanding for the direct words I will use and your pardon for any mistakes I may make.

I want to tell you that, after making progress with President Borja in our mutual rapprochement during the last few weeks and after receiving the magnificent expression of friendship from the Ecuadoran people, I could not under any circumstances bring to this honorable assembly an empty, formal speech devoid of new ideas or specific proposals.

Pardon me, but I believe if I had done that, I would have thrown overboard an excellent opportunity to take a step toward the future and, sincerely, we would have wasted our time. I believe that I should adopt a different attitude because I am sure that the Ecuadoran people and Congress actually want to learn—without subterfuge and hedging—what Peru expects from our relationship as fraternal countries.

I have spoken and will speak clearly because I want us to know each other better and to once and for all set out on the path of peace and development that we long for.

I bring my most sincere and deeply thought out reflections. Mine are the deep thoughts of a president who is new to politics. I have been on the job less than 18 months. My ideas are the result of the careful observations a common citizen would make. A citizen who is more closely linked to the world of science and university teaching and more easily convinced by technical solutions and numerical calculations.

I view things with a very different outlook, and I am not saying this because I have slanted eyes. [laughter, applause] I am free of the constraints that make political activity difficult. I am pleased to have come to share these reflections with this different and bias-free outlook.

You are probably aware of the political background of my presidency. The time of the independents arrived in Peru with me. It is the time of those who have never had a commitment other than to their people and who definitely have no commitment to those tied to pacts and alliances that make it difficult for them to act and think on their own.

The government has drafted a general policy making the pragmatic solution of each problem a priority. This means nothing more at this time than to obey the natural logic of reality without framing it to the reduced boundaries of old ways of doing things that have become eloquently inoperative over time. The mandate of the people has been respected. A 180-degree turn has brought Peru in line with history.

In the first months of my administration I have had the opportunity to learn about the crude reality of very harsh problems, and I believe I have tackled them with firmness and determination. Terrorism, drug trafficking, hyperinflation, severe economic crisis, negative international reserves, and an hypertrophic state, among other problems, were simultaneously at their worst at the onset of my administration.

We have used a rational criterion to tackle these scourges one by one. When in August I faced the need to make decisions on an issue that permanently focuses the attention of our countries, diverting a large amount of resources that should be targeted to development and

integration, I could only wonder what were those very powerful difficulties that for decades the imagination of our people and intelligence of our governments had not been able to defeat.

In doing so I concluded that there is no powerful reason or strong enough argument to maintain an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion as the 21st century draws near and important changes for the future of humanity are taking place. This conviction is surely shared by the fraternal people of Ecuador and their dignified representatives.

I then asked myself how to approach the problem and what specific answers I would give to the large number of questions that may arise on what was probably a thorny issue that had been worsened by years of isolation. I told myself that the first thing I had to do was talk to President Borja and that it was necessary to seek personal contact and—if possible—send a specific proposal for peace and shared development. The reason was simple: Neither Peru nor Ecuador, I am sure, wanted to reach in a deteriorated situation the 50th anniversary of a date that is equally important to both nations. Quite the contrary, I believe that the people's inclination is to start, as soon as possible, the process to achieve an everlasting, strong, and monolithic peace. Please do not misinterpret me. What I am saying is that the new opportunity we have given ourselves for friendship should not be tarnished by any regression. I want you to clearly understand me because my appeal is issued in good faith.

Hence, this anniversary should become an opportunity to resume our position in history as brother countries. This is the goal I had in mind when I prepared the proposal I presented this morning to President Borja and which I have explained throughout my visit. Given the multiple statements in favor of peace recently issued by various leading groups in our nations, I dare think we have chosen the right path. The church, universities, media, and other organizations have raised their voices and endorsed the cause. Therefore, we are all pledged. I cannot fail to mention the warmth with which the brother Ecuadoran people, in the streets and squares of Quito, have stated their desire for peace. I am touched by the people's wisdom and generosity.

History has shown us that there are no reasons to indefinitely postpone the legitimate hope for peace and progress that is shared by the two nations. Quite the contrary, now is the best time to present specific initiatives that will enable us to begin a fruitful dialogue. Therefore, under this new concept, the long wait has ended. I want to tell the brother people of Ecuador, from the room where all their representatives have gathered, that I will continue to exert myself on the auspicious road we have started. I will personally seek, with imagination and audacity, the rapprochement that our people expect. We will explain our position on every available occasion, and we will follow up our latest actions with renewed efforts. I cared enough to send a personal envoy with a letter to the president of the Republic of Ecuador outlining my reasons and hopes. I proposed the summit meeting in Cartagena de Indias and sought to achieve a rapprochement with this visit to Ecuador. I trust this example will be followed in the future and that the two presidents will meet frequently.

All this is only the beginning of the many efforts that as presidents we must offer in this process of renewing an old and deep friendship. What is the goal of my presidential visit to your country? Definitely, I will not solve things overnight. Excuse me for being so frank. I am a realist, and I admit that discrepancies will not be solved with one visit, nor will one magic event radically shorten the distance between the two countries that had been separating us for decades. This is very clear, and its evolution will certainly require not two or three presidential meetings, but many more, and—in general—a determined effort for rapprochement.

I do have one immediate goal: We must establish a direct, high-level line to ensure fluid and permanent communications. I do not mean that we need a red telephone, because we are not—nor will we ever be—in any cold war. On the contrary, we must create a different atmosphere for our two peoples who are heirs of the same social and cultural identity. This line will function so the progress of each country and the institutions of our nations will actively participate in this process.

Only permanent communications will ensure the creation of an atmosphere of detente that will set aside all resentments and strengthen mutual friendship. I also want to emphasize before you my hopes of achieving growing complemetary economic and commercial relations between our two countries. Soon we will begin studies that will make this common desire feasible. However, neither integration nor border development will be possible amid distrust.

We will not attain peace, friendship, and joint progress if there are cannons along our borders pointing at each other and tanks ready to begin combat. If this were the case—and here I agree with you, Mr. President of the Congress—and following all logical reasoning, we would have to eliminate the word integration from our vocabulary. If, on the contrary, we carry out these efforts, the ideals of Bolivar and Sucre would turn our vast geography into the site where the only limits would be the borders of integration.

Distinguished and honorable deputies, this is the Peruvian stand and it is within the framework of pacifist actions that seek the establishment of an overall solution to ensure lasting peace and create the atmosphere of confidence that will make possible the development of the people in the area.

Our proposal definitely rules out war as an option. This is the case because the levels of cooperation should and must surpass conflict. Cooperation should be sought, more so because history explains that cooperation must be maximally exploited. When we evaluate the high cost of the arms race over the past 10 years, we must compare

the amount of resources and time devoted to this with the scope of the problems that those same resources and time could have solved.

Over the past 10 years, my country has spent approximately $2 billion in placing troops and equipment along the border, at the rate of $200 million per year. If we add the funds Ecuador probably invested in this, we would see that since 1981, our treasuries have spent at least $4 billion. This would have solved many of the social needs of our people. [applause]

My government is firmly convinced that tanks, missiles, and sophisticated combat airplanes could definitely become—based on our states' sovereign decision—tractors, bulldozers, trucks, and machinery [applause] that open roads, build bridges, build colleges, and firmly support the complemetary economies that have been spontaneously launched by many towns in Ecuador and Peru. Let us use the opportunity we have created for ourselves and embark on a fruitful and permanent dialogue in which security organizations—including, naturally, the Armed Forces—decidedly and sincerely approach each other with the means to achieve cooperation and peace. We will clear our doubts and mistrust only by learning more about each other and honestly talking to each other—as you have done, Mr. President—because we are brothers. This is essential to reach our longed for goal. I insist on this, and since this is the only style I know, I apologize in advance if I sound too forward.

Peru is aware that we must look toward the future. Therefore, we are working to quickly reach, to quickly reach [repeats] a specific agreement so we may settle all the pending issues included in the complementary treaty our two countries signed in 1929. We believe future generations have the right to recall their predecessors' historical feats with pride and dignity. We also believe the best way to do this is by guaranteeing them—today—the groundwork for authentic development and by being certain that we bequeath them a better country. This groundwork must be laid out progressively, but also tenaciously. That is why Peru is expectantly waiting for Ecuador's decision to grant it the right to freely navigate throughout the Amazon and its northern tributaries. My government is prepared to cooperate with your country so this may become a reality.

I wish to voice my profound satisfaction for the salute and invocation that His Holiness, the pope, made personally to providence for the sake of an understanding between us. I wish to say to the Vicar of Christ that our greatest aim at this time is to try to achieve that goal as soon as possible. The pope's message is an appeal to friendship and mutual understanding, and our proposals should be adjusted to that framework if we truly consider important the message of His Holiness to our people. Precisely because we believe that a stubborn attitude would never justify that invocation, I am prepared to admit, on behalf of the Peruvian Government, its mediation within guidelines that render compatible President Rodrigo Borja's proposal and our own views on the issue.

My government proposes to Ecuador and to the Governments of the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile—the guarantor countries called by our two governments—to support the appointment of a Vatican expert, whom His Holiness John Paul II, in response to a joint request we will make to him, will task with the very special mission of finalizing pending issues pertaining to border demarcation. [applause]

My government thereby wants to recognize the importance of the peace message sent to the two presidents by His Holiness John Paul II. My government also thereby responds to the concerns expressed by President Rodrigo Borja at the United Nations.

I ask the Ecuadoran people and their honorable Congress to accept the full dimensions of our effort and the goodwill of my government. The guarantor countries, as can be seen in the essence of their recent statements, have said they are willing to cooperate in the implementation of the agreements reached by our two countries.

The Peruvian Government consequently believes that efforts should be aimed at achieving the fundamental objective, which is lasting peace, so that within the framework of international law which Peru strictly respects, the aforementioned participation of the Vatican will help guarantee the process is clear.

Definite peace may be around the corner if we make a firm and sensible commitment. The internal differences that exist in both countries are always to be respected. But in the search for peace, just as is being done by our two governments and our basic national institutions, we must not be afraid to take firm steps toward the future.

With the firm promise to conduct in Peru, at my presidency's initiative, a national campaign to lead the people to new forms of mutual understanding and knowledge, and with the hope of finding in the minds and hearts of the Ecuadoran Government, Congress, and people respect for our most favorable attitude, I reiterate my appreciation to this grand assembly for having invited the president of Peru to explain his efforts to the noble Ecuadoran people.

Congressmen, I am immensely thankful and touched by the demonstrations of goodwill I have found in Ecuador. I believe they will bear the fruits of peace and tranquility in our two countries. I am leaving with the best impressions of Ecuador and the Ecuadoran people, and I feel a stronger need to build more bridges to unite us. Thank you on behalf of Peru. [applause]

Borja Dinner Speech

PA1001162292 Quito Voz de los Andes in Spanish 0320 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Speech by President Rodrigo Borja at dinner for Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori at Carondelet Palace in Quito—live]

[Text] Representative of Peruvian and Ecuadoran business sectors, Messrs. university rectors of polytechnic schools, Messrs. presidents and secretaries general of Ecuadoran trade unions, Messrs. presidents of the country's universities, Mr. President of our country's university student federation, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I want to reiterate in the name of the Ecuadoran people and their government the most cordial and warm welcome to the president of Peru, to Mrs. Fujimori, to Messrs. ministers of state, and the distinguished retinue visiting Ecuador. We fully appreciate the Peruvian president's presence in our country to deal with matters that affect our bilateral relations. We believe this to be of particular historic importance for Ecuador, because this is the first time a Peruvian head of state has visited our country.

Throughout Ecuador's history—allow me to say this with full sincerity—a relationship of mutual distrust prevailed between Ecuador and Peru. Serious military confrontations took place, and we lived for a long time under potentially explosive situations. Children from both countries were taught, the moment they entered first grade, that they must be hostile to the other country. More than one politician, both here and there, misused the territorial issue to gain electoral dividends. Both countries have wasted financial resources and energy.

President Fujimori and I know this belongs to the past. As men of a new generation, we hope for an agreement of peace and brotherhood between our two countries. As true brothers, we sincerely hope to leave behind both cold and hot wars, the exacerbation of our [words indistinct], and the irrational use of force to try to settle differences between the governments. All this must be buried in the past.

Today the world lives under the sign of peace. The superpowers have managed to overcome their differences and have ended the cold war; Europeans have abandoned their secular struggles and wars and have founded the EC; the Germans now understand each other; the Koreans are taking steps to reunify the country; Arabs and Israelis discuss prospects for Middle East peace. Therefore, we Ecuadorans and Peruvians must be capable of overcoming our disputes. We must direct all our efforts and resources to achieve development.

Mr. President, you and I were elected by our people, and we have the solemn responsibility of leading our countries. One of our solemn responsibilities is to search for and find a solution to our long-lived territorial differences in terms of peace and dignity.

We know this is a complex problem and intense fervor is involved. Therefore, we should not expect easy, instantaneous, or miraculous solutions. There is the fact, however, that you have courageously accepted my invitation as president of Ecuador, that you are visiting our country to discuss this issue, and that you have made it possible for the two presidents to meet. This is in itself an event of great historic significance.

We are opening a road, the road to dialogue and peace, a road that will lead to solutions, concord, and equity between our two countries. [name indistinct] once said: We want to declare peace on Peru.

I offer a toast to the personal well-being of you and your distinguished family, to the well-being of the people of Ecuador and Peru, and to the success of our meeting and our work.

Fujimori Dinner Speech

PA1101035092 Quito Voz de los Andes in Spanish 0330 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's dinner speech at Carondelet Palace in Quito—live]

[Text] [Words indistinct] Ecuadoran people's welcome. This open, simple, and spontaneous (?welcome) has aptly confirmed our peoples' feelings—none other that their hope for peace, harmony, cooperation, and mutual support between our countries so we may achieve development and progress. Honestly, I did not expect the great, generous, and warm show of sympathy that I saw in Quito's streets this afternoon. Along the way I was able to see children and young people waving their country's flag in a courteous but also warm welcome to the president of a brother country who came with the best of intentions to turn this first approach into a great and strong friendship. I thought, joking with myself, that when my term ends and when an Andean Parliament president is appointed by direct vote in the [word indistinct] countries, it would not be a bad idea to begin my campaign in Quito, [laughter, applause] because the people of Quito... [pauses] the Ecuadoran people barely know me and they have welcomed me as if they have always known me.

Mr. President, both the Ecuadorans and Peruvians will certainly remember this day and this evening as a memorable date—the day on which we embarked, together, on a different road devoid of mistrust and harassment. I am a practical man like you, Mr. President Borja, and I know that we are on the threshold of a new road. We have a long way to travel. We will forge ahead when necessary. I am sure that neither you nor I will lack the strength because our convictions are strong. I am an agronomist and I cannot but feel that this visit—the first ever by a Peruvian president to Ecuador—is like a seed, a good seed that will undoubtedly bear fruit.

I want what is best for my people, just like you want what is best for your people. That is why I had the courage and

determination—if I may be so bold—to take the first step and make this move. As far as I am concerned, I have intentionally sought to start at the highest level because it is our duty to discuss important goals like the strengthening of Ecuadoran-Peruvian friendship, the creation of a direct line of communication, and the presentation of cooperation plans. All this is part of the Peruvian proposal I will deliver to you. The first meeting we attended this afternoon was marked by the best of intentions and the willingness to achieve specific goals for our mutual benefit.

This visit by a Peruvian president to Ecuador, this meeting of two presidents, represents a victory. I believe we have destroyed a myth: the myth of our permanent lack of communication. This is proven by the fact we are discussing topics never before discussed, including Ecuador's free navigation throughout the Amazon River. This first and modest victory represents an open door that will lead us, regardless of our differences, to a greater rapprochement, a greater cooperation for plans that can and must result—provided we follow the winds of change in the world—in developing our two nations. I am quite convinced that our differences will take on a new meaning. They will obviously be surmountable as we implement this cooperation plan.

I know that Ecuadorans are positively inclined to establish better relations between Ecuador and Peru. Mr. President, rest assured that Peruvians want the same thing. Our powerful ties—language, culture, and traditions—are stronger than any difference. Our destiny is to remain united, due to our geography and history. We will not always be able to contradict this mandate. Differences will be overcome sooner or later. This evening we begin to work so this is done sooner rather than later. This is demanded by historical needs for our countries' development, welfare, and national goals.

I am fully confident that the progress achieved—which seems small but, I repeat, can be considered a victory—cannot be lost because our people are now aware of the urgent need to not postpone their development. We know perfectly well, because we have linked our proposals for national disarmament, that a rash arms buildup devours the resources that could otherwise be destined for development. We have common problems, we should strive to achieve common solutions. We have a lot of work to carry out in the next two days, and I hope that when I leave this brother nation after fulfilling this mission, our relations will be different.

Mr. President, I expect to repay the favor with the same affection when you go to Peru, so we may take another step in the task we have pledged for Ecuadorans and Peruvians. President Borja, I drink a toast to the Ecuadoran people and the great friendship we are now building. Thank you. [applause]

Presidents Comment on Talks

PA1101223992 Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in Spanish 1537 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Statements by President Rodrigo Borja and Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori to domestic and foreign reporters at the National Palace in Quito—live]

[Text] [Borja] I would like to begin by expressing my warmest greetings to Ecuadoran, Peruvian, and international reporters present. I would also like to take this opportunity to convey my fraternal and fond greetings to the Peruvian people, through the Peruvian radio, television, and newspapers represented here by distinguished journalists. I would like to say that for the Ecuadoran people, our government, and for me in particular, it has been very gratifying to receive President Alberto Fujimori, his wife, his children, members of his cabinet, and his distinguished retinue, who have accompanied him during his stay in our country, which has pleased us a great deal.

I have held long, important, fraternal, and friendly talks with President Fujimori. These talks were conducted with total honesty and openness, as is customary for the two of us. We have stated our views and expressed the respective stances of our countries with total sincerity and honesty. In response to the proposal I made at the UN General Assembly to submit our Ecuadoran-Peruvian territorial dispute to the mediation of Pope John Paul II, the Peruvian president presented a package of specific proposals dealing with the problem in an all-encompassing manner. These proposals are not merely related to the territorial issue, but also to complementary economic aspects and other commercial and tourist activities that will certainly benefit our two countries.

We will study those proposals with utmost care and interest. They obviously reflect a spirit of integration and fraternal friendship that President Fujimori and I want to further between our two countries. Our people, in turn, are demanding from their leaders a totally honest and sincere stance, something that reflects the style President Fujimori and I support. We speak with total frankness about our problems.

A clearly considerable distance still exists between the Ecuadoran proposal to submit the whole Ecuadoran-Peruvian problem to the mediation of Pope John Paul II, and the Peruvian proposal to submit the pending demarcation matters to an expert—this way a Vatican expert would participate at the request of the guarantor countries of the Rio Protocol. The important thing is to continue working and holding talks to shorten the distance gradually to seek what we—the Ecuadoran and Peruvian Governments and people—long for, a peaceful solution to the longstanding dispute; a solution that is equitable and dignified.

The important thing is that it is already possible to do that. We can and will continue talking. President Fujimori and I have already established a permanent and ongoing dialogue in all bilateral matters. Ecuador's doors are open at any time to a visit by the Peruvian president; and Peru's doors always remain open to a visit by the Ecuadoran president. At any moment, each one of us can pick up the telephone and call the other president to discuss a problem. In sum, the important thing is that the quality of relations our countries have maintained traditionally have changed. A path of dialogue, mutual understanding, and trust exists, shortening the distance that still exists between our positions until a consensus is reached. This will lead to the peace longed for by Peru and Ecuador in a world that, because of past experiences, is ceaselessly and arduously seeking peace.

This is what I can preliminarily state regarding my talks with President Fujimori—which have been, as far as I am concerned, very pleasant and very interesting—during meetings we held these past few days during his stay in Ecuador.

I want to emphasize the fact that this is the first time a Peruvian President has been in Ecuador in the history of our two nations. This represents great progress and a fundamental change in relations between the two countries.

The Ecuadoran people have received the president of Peru, his family, and his retinue with tremendous regard. This regard has been eloquently displayed by the popular demonstrations that have taken place along Quito's streets wherever President Fujimori traveled.

I am very satisfied and very proud of our people's behavior. Ours is a noble, intelligent, and sensible people who understand the problem, who want peace, and who have shouted in Quito's streets: Viva Peace! We Want Peace! This is a nation destined for a grand historic future. With pride for my people, I join the warm expressions of welcome and joy they have shown Peruvian President Fujimori, who has had the courage to accept my invitation to visit us to discuss all our problems.

I want to give the floor now to my friend President Alberto Fujimori so he may also state his opinion.

[Fujimori] Thank you very much, Mr. President. I must express my acknowledgement and gratitude for the warm welcome I have received from the government, the president, as well the Ecuadoran people. Regarding the Ecuadoran people, I want to point out that I was quite impressed. The reception has really been quite impressive, emotional, warm, friendly, spontaneous, and unpretentious. I even had the opportunity to hear phrases such as: Hurrah for Peace! Hurrah for Ecuador! Hurrah for Peru!

I previously stated in one of my speeches that the so-called myth related to ongoing differences or antagonisms between Peru and Ecuador had finally crumbled. It has been the Ecuadoran people, on their own, who have destroyed this myth; not only by opening themselves to us, but also by pouring out the warm feelings pent up for decades. This 50 year coolness between our two countries has been absurd. Civilized countries cannot accept such a situation.

The warm reception I received was repeated once again today on my way from the hotel to the palace. Fortunately, this could not be misunderstood as my taking votes from any Ecuadoran presidential candidate. What I previously mentioned regarding the existence of an Andean Parliament with direct elections within the countries of the group, then my reception in Ecuador would confirm that I have numerous Ecuadoran voters I could count on. [laughs]. This is strong evidence of the deep ties between Peru and Ecuador.

There have been attempts to tarnish the effects of this visit with a regrettable attack against the Ecuadoran consulate in Lima. Nevertheless, it was an attempt that in no way affects direct relations between both countries. There will always be irrational groups who continue to promote barriers and block steps leading to improved relations. I deeply regret the incident, but once again I repeat, this will only strengthen our commitment toward the path of integration.

In addition to the joint project proposals between Ecuador and Peru which I presented to President Borja in a document currently being analyzed by the Ecuadoran Government, I also want to refer to the proposal made public before Congress on 10 January. Naturally, it was not possible to go into too much detail in a speech that was already very long. The main guidelines of my proposals are also included in the speech. The specific details of the proposals are explained in one of the annexes of the document. Of course, from the Peruvian point of view, it would be ideal to progress as fast as possible, especially relating to certain specific cases.

Last year, we had that minor incident in the area between (Yaopi) and Santiago and between (Cusumata) and (Bunbuisa). Allow me to refresh your memory by using a chart of that zone. There are two lines mentioned in one of the documents of the Protocol. According to Ecuador, this line should be the borderline, and this other one is Peru's. I mention this case to explain how the procedure would work. Here we have an undefined zone.

Through the procedures outlined in the Protocol, and with the participation of the four guarantors, Peru and Ecuador are requesting the appointment of an expert [perito]. This expert could come from Brazil, the United States, or Japan; but Peru and Ecuador are specifically proposing and requesting that the expert come from the Vatican. Within the period mentioned in the proposal, or 12 months, the final demarcation line could be established. This has a very practical purpose because we must seek possibilities or feasible paths. I have pondered on the Peruvian stance and on President Borja's proposal at the United Nations and tried to make them

compatible so we can truly take a step forward. The first point, which I just mentioned, could be a sign of the feasibility of our proposal.

It is important that we make progress as soon as possible on this matter because those interpretations constitute a limiting factor, marring our relations. I say it is important because the establishment of a true climate of detente would have repercussions on the Peruvian and Ecuadoran people. Yesterday I mentioned a figure. That figure is really based on conservative estimates. Peru and Ecuador spent $4 billion in the past 10 years. We certainly could have built 20 (Puyambo)-Tumbes projects, 20 binational projects. We must definitely eliminate this sort of squandering of resources from our budgets and earmark those funds for development projects that directly benefit the people.

The president of the Congress was right in saying, and I fully agree, that poverty, underdevelopment, and illiteracy are the enemies of Peru and Ecuador. We must fight those enemies. My visit is important because of this and is based on this framework. In addition to the formal and intense work conducted these past days, it has another important aspect as well; namely, the warmth of the people. That is why I want to reiterate to the Ecuadoran people that they have a loyal friend in the president of Peru. I am a sincere friend who feels committed to strengthening Ecuadoran-Peruvian friendship and who has the clear objective of reaching peace through pragmatic and specific measures. I hope this marks the start of a very close relationship and that President Borja soon will have the opportunity to visit Peru on an official visit, accompanied by his distinguished wife and family. I also extend this invitation to the person who may be elected for the next mandate. I think this contact and the framework in which it has taken place should be continued for the sake of our relations.

[Borja] Fortunately, this dialogue with the national and international press helps us maintain the frankness, openness, and sincerity that have prevailed throughout the talks we have held with President Fujimori in the past few days.

There is much agreement on the goals to be secured by the two presidents and the two countries in the near future. These goals are peace, a friendly bilateral relationship, economic cooperation, and the development of important, mutually beneficial projects. We have much to trade. Both countries can greatly benefit from bilateral economic relations. Both presidents have the same goals.

The point on which we differ—and our differences must be solved through the dialogue that we have just initiated and that must continue—is on how to resolve the ongoing, complex, and emotional Ecuadoran-Peruvian territorial dispute. We must resolve our differences on this issue. I admit we have moved closer to solving them. The very fact that we are discussing the issue represents great progress. However, some differences remain between the proposal made by Ecuador at the UN General Assembly regarding a general papal arbitrage and the counterproposal that President Fujimori has presented to me regarding a papal message on the pending border-marking issue. His proposal is based on the Rio Protocol. There are still differences between the Ecuadoran and Peruvian positions. We must continue trying to resolve these differences until we reach a point where the will and the interests of the two countries coincide. We want to secure an agreement of peace, equality, and dignity within the framework of international law that will satisfy the rights and aspirations of the two nations.

As we said in the beginning, considering the complexity of this problem, we should not expect magic and immediate solutions. We must realize that we are beginning to march, for the first time, on a road of understanding. There are common positions and opinions between the two countries. We hope this will be a short road. We have chosen dialogue as our tool. Intelligent people understand each other by talking, stating their opinions, and solving their differences. This is what we are doing. We have open minds, we are free of prejudices, we have abandoned worn-out hostile attitudes and rhetoric, and we have created a suitable environment in our countries. The environment exists in Ecuador and Peru for these talks to be seen by our people as something natural and for the media in our two countries not to become too excited if the presidents of Ecuador and Peru happen to visit one another, hold talks, have discussions, or state their positions honestly and clearly.

That is the qualitative progress the Ecuadoran-Peruvian relationship has achieved. It has been very significant progress. I am absolutely sure we will be able to reach a global agreement on this issue. Because our respective economies are essentially complementary, a positive understanding between both countries will be fundamental to our mutual social and economic development. We are committed to this task and plan to forge ahead. We have faith and confidence in the future and in the final success of the dialogue.

There are numerous projects that can be established between both countries. For example, I believe that our electricity surplus could be sold to Peru's northern region, which is currently experiencing severe electrical shortages. Another example could possibly involve the Norte-Duran pipeline, which is currently being used at only 30-percent capacity. This pipeline could be used by Ecuador to transport crude oil that is produced in the central and southeastern region. As we forge ahead, we will continue to discover numerous areas of mutual cooperation that will encourage development and improvement in the living conditions of Ecuador and Peru.

That is our final objective. That is the integration objective we are committed to accomplishing. We are sure we will achieve this with the support of our respective citizens. The old period of hostility must be left

behind. All that worn out literature on mutual harassment between both countries must also be left behind. We must forget about all those useless, nonproductive, and futile discussions that never led to anything. We cannot talk for another 50 years as we did in the past. We must look for new, improved, and modern formulas to solve our problems. We must synchronize our clocks with the rest of the world. There is no more time for futile discussions. It is time to start searching for pragmatic and concrete solutions to respond to the socioeconomic challenges of the current times.

As I said in my speech, it is quite incomprehensible that the superpowers, who had enormous and apparently unsolvable differences, were finally able to come to some understanding and put an end to the cold war and the threat of nuclear war that had the entire world on the brink of war. It is also inconceivable that the Europeans, who had centuries of animosity among themselves, were finally able to overcome this and form integration systems, such as the EEC, to benefit all the Western European countries. The Germans, who were at one time separated by the supposedly indestructible Berlin Wall, were able to tear it down and unify the East and West. The Koreans, who have shed so much blood, are today carrying out unification talks. The Arabs and Israelis, who have hated each other for centuries, are today sitting together and talking about the possibility of peace.

While all this is taking place around the world, Ecuadorans and Peruvians have not been able to forget their differences and look toward the future and what it offers. We have not been able to get together, within an atmosphere of peace and stability, to work jointly for that which we both care about: the welfare of our respective countries and the improvement of living standards. This is what President Fujimori and I are intent on achieving; we are committed to this. We are not interested in how far apart our positions may be. We plan to solve these differences little by little until we reach a point where Ecuador and Peru enjoy mutual equality, justice, and prosperity. I hereby reiterate my government's satisfaction for having President Fujimori on Ecuadoran soil.

As I stated last night, everything I had to say and could have rightfully said has been eloquently said by the Ecuadoran people, who have received the president of Peru with friendship and love and with their shouts of Viva Peace during his tour through the streets of our city.

[Fujimori] I want to comment on the arms expenditure issue. This is an issue that adversely and directly affects the development of our nations. It is unfortunate that military expenditures are based on a relationship that is not in the interest of either Peru or Ecuador. The people expect pragmatic measures that will put limits on arms expenditures. I think we can adopt specific steps in that direction. We hope we will be able to reduce our defense expenditures by 25, or 30, or 50 percent. This is why we have agreed that it is necessary to adopt trust-producing measures and to institutionalize these measures at the highest military level. It is necessary that the two Armed Forces establish direct communications and that there is no distrust or doubt. We should have an environment of detente.

All this, of course, should be complemented by measures that we should adopt at the highest political level; for example, the measure that involves a proposal calling for expert testimony with papal cooperation. I think this is a most important matter that I hope can be taken care of soon.

In addition to this fluid communication between the presidents and the joint commands of our Armed Forces, it is necessary for the information to be fluid. You, media friends, have had on this occasion the opportunity to talk to each other about issues of interest, to exchange information, and to plan trips to meet with each other. I think all this is very positive. The same applies to other sectors. I am accompanied by leaders of business organizations who have established contact with their Ecuadoran counterparts. Why can we not plan for children from our countries to visit each other? I think this would be very fruitful. This also applies to labor union leaders, university students, and so forth. These contacts must increase, and we should increasingly understand each other and consolidate this friendship.

One issue that Peru had not discussed with Ecuador before is that of navigation in the Amazon River. This is why one of the annexes of Peru's proposal includes the possibility of free navigation through the Amazon, the granting of a free zone for Ecuador in Iquitos, and access to port facilities not only in the Amazon but also in other rivers such as the Napos. This, of course, is an issue that requires expert analysis, but a proposal on this does exist.

I also want to comment on the very favorable and positive reaction I noticed in the Ecuadoran press this morning. I believe there are currently no emotional tensions or subjective positions that could have [words indistinct], but there has been a rational and objective handling of the news. I think this will greatly help the rapprochement that has already begun. As presidents, we have this personal obsession. Reaching peace, in specific terms, is a personal objective of mine. I would like these measures to benefit our peoples. There may be changes in the leadership of governments, as is logical and democratic. I am convinced, however, that the fate of the people is no longer decided at the top only. The people are the masters of their fate. The people of Peru and Ecuador are determined to reach peace and unity, which we need so much.

Throughout the remainder of my mandate, I will strive to contribute to this task as much as I can. Thank you. [applause]

[Borja] I invite my media friends to accompany us on a walk through the streets of Quito and on a visit to the Churches of the Order of San Francisco. This will be very interesting. Thank you.

Foreign Minister on Visit

PA1201150892 Quito Voz de los Andes in Spanish 2300 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's visit to Ecuador and the resulting talks do not constitute a victory for the current government, but are a reflection national unity, Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Diego Cordovez has stated.

[Begin recording] [Cordovez] It is obvious that based on the spirit of this visit and the expressions from both sides, we will study the proposal with utmost attention and tremendous goodwill.

[Unidentified reporter] How does the government regard the dinner held with all the political sectors?

[Cordovez] It is historic.

[Reporter] You seem to be moved. The people were certainly moved, as seen in the news media.

[Cordovez] I think so. We, in the government, were highly pleased to see that we reacted to the sentiments of our people. What more can a government aspire to? To realize that what it is doing, such as inviting President Alberto Fujimori to go one step further to open this dialogue, has the full support of the people of Ecuador.

[Reporter] Will this begin an era of peace?

[Cordovez] I think a process of frank and direct dialogue has begun, which is what President Rodrigo Borja proposed on 10 August 1988. Many people feel the process started with President Borja's proposal at the United Nations. The truth is that the proposal matched the foreign policy he tried to establish for his government, which we have tried to implement in a manner that is timely, coherent, persistent, and open.

[Reporter] Mr. Cordovez, can you tell us what was discussed [words indistinct]?

[Cordovez] Yesterday the two presidents met to discuss the territorial dispute.

[Reporter] [Question indistinct]

[Cordovez] We are expecting President Fujimori's response to the proposal on a security and trust agreement, which we submitted to Peru at least seven weeks ago, although it seems as if this was not weeks but years ago, considering what has happened in the meantime. [end recording]

To conclude, the foreign minister stated that the results of Fujimori's visit will be seen shortly and that there must be continuity in the policy to handle the Ecuadoran-Peruvian border dispute.

Peru

Terrorists Down Helicopter; 3 U.S. Agents Killed

PY1301005092 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0020 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Lima, 12 Jan (EFE)—According to official sources in Lima, three U.S. agents and one Peruvian policeman died today, 12 January, in the Alto Huallaga Valley when their helicopter was downed by alleged terrorists.

The Interior Ministry sources said the helicopter, a UH-1H given to Peru by the United States to fight drug trafficking, was downed early today by a projectile near Madre Mia, in the central Peruvian jungle area.

The downed helicopter was assisting a similar aircraft that had suffered an accident in which eight Peruvian policemen were wounded.

The U.S. Embassy in Lima confirmed the deaths of the pilot, copilot, and mechanic, all of them U.S. citizens, as well as that of a Peruvian policeman. Their identities, however, were not disclosed. Neither was it stated whether they had been the victims of alleged terrorist groups.

According to the U.S. Embassy, the three U.S. citizens were civilian agents working for a private enterprise called "DynCorp," which provides air transportation services and maintenance by contract with the State Department in Washington.

The three U.S. victims belonged to a group of civilian agents the United States has stationed at the Santa Lucia Base, the main antidrug base in Latin America, within the framework of the cooperation agreement with Peru.

Peruvian Government sources stated that the helicopter had been downed by alleged "narcoterrorists" but did not specify whether they were members of drug trafficking rings or terrorist groups that operate in the jungle area.

This is the first time in 11 years of political violence in Peru and in the almost four years that the antidrug base has been operating in Santa Lucia that U.S. agents have been murdered by terrorists.

Ecuadoran Embassy in Lima Attacked

PA1101021292 Lima Global de Television Network in Spanish 0158 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] This is a last minute report. A few moments ago, terrorists attacked the Ecuadoran Embassy in San Isidro. Two policemen guarding the embassy were injured in the attack.

[Paris AFP in Spanish at 0212 GMT on 11 January reports:

["On the night of 10 January, a terrorist commando group threw two homemade bombs of medium intensity at the Ecuadoran Consulate General in Lima, wounding five persons and causing considerable damage, police have reported.

["This attack coincides with Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's visit to Ecuador."]

Further on Attack

PA1101165992 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 1523 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Lima, 11 Jan (NOTIMEX)—On 11 January, official sources reported that on the evening of 10 January, a Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement commando attacked the Ecuadoran Consulate in Lima, injuring three policemen in the attack.

The guerrillas threw an explosive devise from a moving vehicle at the consulate, which is located in the exclusive district of San Isidro, causing property damage.

The explosion tore the garage door from the cement structure, leaving a big hole in the wall. The explosion also slightly injured three agents protecting the building.

The attack occurred at the same time Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori is paying an official visit to Ecuador to resolve the ongoing territorial controversy between the two countries.

Embassy Security Increased

PY1301112492 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1837 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Lima, 12 Jan (EFE)—National Police Chief General Adolfo Cubas has reported that the police have strengthened all embassies guards in Lima against possible terrorist attacks.

"We have adopted this measure because four diplomatic missions run the same risk," said Cubas, without identifying the countries involved. He referred to the attack last Thursday night on the Ecuadoran Embassy.

Four policemen were injured during the attack. It occurred while Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori was visiting Quito, the first visit of a Peruvian president in 50 years and an opportunity to end 50 years of border tension.

The newspaper EXPRESO today reported that seven of the agents guarding the Ecuadoran Embassy at the time of the attack have been submitted to a disciplinary trial "because they did not adopt the appropriate security measures to prevent the attack."

This newspaper blamed the Maoist Shining Path group, although other sectors of the media have indicated that neither the Shining Path nor the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) were involved.

Senator Enrique Bernales, chairman of the Senate commission investigating the phenomenon of violence in Peru, stated recently that "a considerable number of attacks recorded over the past few years were carried out by unidentified groups."

State Budget Law Officially in Effect 10 Jan

PA1001202492 Paris AFP in Spanish 1732 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Lima, 10 Jan (AFP)—The Peruvian Congress on 9 January closed its extraordinary session after rejecting the executive branch's recommendations on the state budget law, which officially went into effect today, 10 January, thus putting an end to 10 days of legal vacuum regarding the budget.

This year's budget, which has been promulgated with the signatures of the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, amounts to 6.107 billion soles (the Peruvian currency is on par with the dollar in the free market).

Senator Manuel Moreyra, former president of the Central Bank of Reserves, has said that the parliament, since it did not accept the recommendations of the chief of state, could be blamed if the economic program fails.

At the closing of the legislative session, a strong majority of conservative, centrist, social democratic, orthodox communist, and independent forces opposed a proposal aimed at modifying the budget law.

As first vice president in charge of the presidency during Alberto Fujimori's visit in Ecuador, Maximo San Roman—who leads the (governing) Change 90 movement bench in the Senate—worked on a bill that included the 41 recommendations of the president.

When the end of the sessions was announced, Deputy Oscar Contreras raised posters from his seat and shouted insults at the president of the bicameral budget commission, Eduardo Calmell, for having left regional governments without financial support.

Fujimori Returns From Trip to Ecuador

PA1101232092 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2231 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Lima, 11 Jan (EFE)—President Alberto Fujimori returned to Lima from Ecuador on 11 January after a 48-hour visit during which he made a number of proposals to lead relations between the two countries toward a future of peace, detente, and cooperation.

The presidential plane arrived at the military airport at Callao, Lima's port, at 1710 (2210 GMT). The president returned with his family, who accompanied him during his visit, along with the foreign, industry, and defense ministers, who were members of his delegation.

Guerrilla Ambush in Huaura Province Kills 14

PA1101035692 Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] A subversive ambush against the Army and National Police at dawn on 10 January claimed 14 dead in Huaura Province, north of Lima. The 12 soldiers and two policemen were killed in (Pachotingo) on the Huaura mountain range.

Venezuela

President Perez Replaces Cabinet Ministers

PA1001192092 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1710 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Caracas, 10 Jan (EFE)—Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez today, 10 January, replaced six members of his cabinet to reinforce the ruling Democratic Action (AD) in view of municipal elections to be held this year and the 1993 presidential campaign.

The elections to be held in the country during the second half of 1992 to choose governors, mayors, and councilmen will serve as a frame of reference for the 1993 presidential elections, which may be one of the toughest electoral campaigns in 33 years of democratic rule.

Perez replaced six members of his cabinet, including the head of the Family Ministry, which is tasked with implementing the government's social programs. The new minister is Mabely Soto-Rosa, the current secretary for AD professionals and experts. He appointed Fernando Martinez Mottola as new communications and transportation minister and will be in charge of the basic infrastructure projects in the country.

AD Secretary General Luis Alfaro Ucero proposed these two new ministers. Alfaro Ucero is regarded as the current "strongman" of the powerful AD electoral machine and is tasked with imposing discipline among the sectional secretary generals in the upcoming electoral campaigns.

The AD and Perez have had serious differences during the current administration regarding the composition of the Executive, the implementation of social programs, and the "tough" economic adjustment. They seem to be going through a "honeymoon" period aimed at retaining power in the upcoming elections, according to politicial sources.

The other four ministers are also AD militants. They have the support of the party apparatus and enjoy the confidence of Perez.

Current Caracas Governor Virgilio Avila will hold the post of interior minister and "politically" will direct police actions in student protests that are expected to flare up again when classes resume. Classes were interrupted last December because of student protests against price increases.

The president's economic team maintains its unity with the appointment of Pedro Rosas Bravo as finance minister. Bravo previously served as deputy minister of coordination and planning, tasked with designing the country's economic policy.

Rafael Orijuela and Diogenes Mujica are the new health and social welfare minister and energy and mines minister, respectively. The governor of Caracas is now Antonio Ledezma, a young politician linked to the AD renewal who enjoys the support of the president in all of his political aspirations.

All the appointments were discussed and agreed on by Perez; AD President Gonzalo Barrios, who is 90 on 10 January and is regarded as the "patriarch" of the party; and Alfaro Ucero, during an 8 January meeting generally described as a gathering of "top cats."

The next day, Perez informed the AD Operations Committee, made up of the party's top ranking personalities. They gave their blessing to the new ministers and later analyzed the AD elections strategy for 1992 and 1993.

The AD strategy is based on an "electoral commitment" with the voters to improve the party image, marred by the tough economic adjustment. Observers feel, however, that the appointment of different candidates will entail a fierce struggle among the AD currents vying to select the candidate to replace Perez as president in 1993.

Government Issues Communique Recognizing CIS

PA1301015892 Paris AFP in Spanish 0255 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Caracas, 10 January (AFP)—On 10 January the Venezuelan Government officially recognized the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], consisting of 11 republics from the former USSR.

The Venezuelan Foreign Relations Ministry issued a communique explaining that, having recently recognized the Russian Federation, "it has decided to also recognize all the republics that comprise the CIS, knowing that its active presence in the international community will contribute above all to an understanding between nations and to world peace."

The government announced that it will subsequently decide on an individual basis whether or not to establish formal diplomatic relations with each one of the CIS republics.